Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

CARDIFF CORPORATION BILL [Lords] (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Tuesday next.

STANDING ORDERS (PRIVATE BUSINESS)

The Chairman of Ways and Means (Sir Gordon Touche): I beg to move,
That the Amendments to Standing Orders relating to Private Business hereinafter stated in Schedule (A) be made, that the Standing Order hereinafter stated in Schedule (B) be repealed, and that the new Standing Orders relating to Private Business hereinafter stated in Schedule (C) he made.

SCHEDULE (A)—AMENDMENTS TO STANDING ORDERS

Standing Order 1, line 9, leave out from "Orders" to "62" in line 10.

Line 17, at end insert "the term' county district' means a non-county borough, an urban district or a rural district".

Line 21, at end insert "the term 'functions' includes powers and duties".

Leave out lines 30 to 41 and insert—
the term 'local authority' means any of the following:—

(a) the council of a county,
(b) the council of a county borough.
(c) the council of a county district,
(d) the council of a rural parish or group of rural parishes or the parish meeting of a rural parish which has no separate parish council,
(e) the Common Council of the City of London,
(f) the council of a metropolitan borough,
(g) a county council in Scotland,
(h) a town council in Scotland;"

Line 45, leave out from "Orders" to "62" in line 46.

Standing Order 4, leave out lines 18 to 41 and insert—
(2) The notice shall also state that on and after the Fourth day of December copies of the Bill, or as the case may be copies of part of the Bill, may be inspected, and at a reasonable price obtained, at the offices required by the next following Order, which offices shall be named in the notice".

SCHEDULE (B)—REPEAL OF STANDING ORDER

Standing Order 10 (Publication of notice in newspapers).

SCHEDULE (C)—NEW STANDING ORDERS

Copies of Bill to be made available.
4A.—(1) The Promoters shall on and after the Fourth Day of December make available for inspection, and for sale at a reasonable price, copies of the Bill at an office in London and, if it affects Scotland, at an office in Edinburgh—

(a) if the Bill is promoted by, or alters functions of, a local authority, other than a London local authority or a parish council or parish meeting, at an office in the area of the authority;
(b) if the Bill alters functions of a parish council or parish meeting, at an office in the rural district in which the parish is situated;
(c) if the Bill is not promoted by a local authority, at an office in the county (unless that county is London) county borough or burgh in which the Promoters' principal office is situated
(d) if the Bill authorises the construction of works to which Standing Order 27 applies, or the compulsory acquisition of lands or of rights to use lands, or extends the time limited by a former Act for any of those purposes, at an office in each of the counties, except London, county boroughs and burghs in which the works are to be, or the lands are, situated.
(2) It shall be sufficient compliance with sub-paragraph (a) or sub-paragraph (b) of the foregoing paragraph to make available for inspection and for sale in the area of the local authority, or, as the case may be, in the rural district, copies of such part only of the Bill as alters functions of the local authority or, as the case may be, of the parish council or parish meeting.
(3) It shall be sufficient compliance with sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph (1) of this Order to make available for inspection and for sale in the county, county borough or burgh copies of such part only of the Bill as authorises the construction of works or the compulsory acquisition of lands or of rights to use lands in that county, county borough or burgh or as extends the time limited by a former Act for any of those purposes.
(4) In this Order "London local authority" means the London County Council, the Common Council of the City of London or the council of a metropolitan borough.
(5) The offices of a local authority, it situated outside the area of that authority, shall for the purposes of this Order be deemed to be in that area.


(6) A Bill that alters functions of a member or an officer of a local authority shall for the purposes of this Order be deemed to alter functions of that authority.
Publication of notices in newspapers.
10.—(1) The notice shall be published, in the newspapers prescribed by the next following paragraph, once in each of two consecutive weeks with an interval of at least six clear days between publications, the second publication being not later than the Eleventh day of December.
(2) The newspapers referred to in the foregoing paragraph are the following:—

(a) if the Bill is promoted by, or alters functions of, a local authority, a newspaper or newspapers circulating in the area of the authority;
(b) if the Bill is not promoted by a local authority, a newspaper or newspapers circulating in the county, county borough or burgh in which the Promoters' principal office is situated;
(c) if the Bill authorises the construction of works to which Standing Order 27 applies, or the compulsory acquisition of lands or of rights to use lands, or extends the time limited by a former Act for any of those purposes, a newspaper or newspapers circulating in each of the counties, county boroughs and burghs in which the works are to be, or the lands are, situated.
(3) Where part only of a Bill alters functions of a local authority, it shall be sufficient compliance with paragraph (1) of this Order to publish, in a newspaper or newspapers circulating in the area of the authority, so much only of the notice as relates to that part.
(4) Where part only of a Bill authorises the construction of works or the compulsory acquisition of lands or of rights to use lands in a county, county borough or burgh or extends the time limited by a former Act for any of those purposes, it shall be sufficient compliance with paragraph (1) of this Order to publish, in a newspaper or newspapers circulating in the county, county borough or burgh, so much only of the notice as relates to that part.
(5) A Bill that alters functions of a member or an officer of a local authority shall for the

purposes of this Order be deemed to alter functions of that authority.
County Council Bills conferring powers on county district councils, Proof of need.
124A.—(1) A Committee on a Private Bill promoted by the council of a county shall not hear evidence that a provision in the Bill that alters functions of the council of a county district in the county is acceptable to that county district council unless the evidence comprises proof, as required by paragraph (3) of this Order, that the inclusion in the Bill of that provision has been approved by that county district council in the manner required by paragraph (2) of this Order.
(2) Approval for the purposes of paragraph (1) of this Order shall be by resolution passed by a majority of the whole number of the members of the council of the county district at a meeting thereof held after ten clear days' notice of the meeting and of the purposes thereof, has been given by advertisement in one or more local newspapers circulating in the county district, such notice being given in addition to the ordinary notice required to be given for the convening of a meeting of the council.
(3) The proof referred to in paragraph (1) of this Order shall be a document purporting to be a copy of the resolution referred to in paragraph (2) of this Order together with a certificate purporting to be signed by the clerk of the council to the effect that the copy is a true copy and that the resolution was passed by the majority, and after the notice, mentioned in that paragraph.
(4) A provision that alters functions of a member or an officer of the council of a county district shall for the purposes of this Order be deemed to alter functions of that council.
(5) This Order shall not apply to a Bill promoted by a county council in Scotland.

These Amendments give effect so far as has been found practicable to the recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Promotion of Private Bills of last Session. Similar Amendments were agreed to in another place yesterday.

Question put and agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions — BRITISH ARMY

Sapper J. W. Harrold (Death)

Mr. Coulson: asked the Secretary of State for War whether a court of inquiry was held into the circumstances surrounding the death of Sapper John William Harrold on 26th April, 1960, whilst serving with 12 Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, stationed at Wyke Regis, Dorset; and what was the report of the court of inquiry.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Hugh Fraser): A public inquest was held at which all the military witnesses gave evidence. There was no separate board of inquiry.

Mr. Coulson: In view of the lack of direct evidence as to the cause of the injury which resulted in the death of Sapper Harrold and the uncertainty and anxiety felt by the widow and relatives of the deceased man, does my hon. Friend think that a further investigation by the investigation branch of the Army could elucidate some facts to give some help and assistance to the next of kin?

Mr. Fraser: I have full sympathy with the next of kin, but when there is a sudden death in the Army in this country it is investigated precisely as it is in civil life. The civil police deal with the matter and there is an inquest, as there was in this case. I understand that the whole matter was sifted by the police and the coroner.

Mr. Ede: Can the hon. Gentleman say what was the verdict of the jury at the inquest?

Mr. Fraser: It returned an open verdict.

Establishments and Personnel, Malta

Mr. Wall: asked the Secretary of State for War what has been the cost to his Department of maintaining Army establishments and personnel in Malta during each of the past five years.

Mr. H. Fraser: The approximate figures of full cost, in millions of £s, were 4·5, 4·5, 5, 5·5 and 5 respectively.

Mr. Wall: Can my hon. Friend say whether this respectable support for Malta's economy is likely to continue at approximately the same level? Has he any estimate about how much soldiers spend in Malta, which is also a contribution to the Maltese economy?

Mr. Fraser: The actual amount of this money spent in Malta is about £3 million.

Military Transport (Weekend Use)

Mr. Eden: asked the Secretary of State for War (1) what instructions he has given to ensure that military transport is used at weekends on British roads only for the most urgent and essential purposes;

(2) why military learner-drivers are required to practise in convoy on coast roads at weekends in the summer months.

Mr. H. Fraser: Instructions are already in force restricting movement by road by the Regular Army during summer weekends. But units of the Territorial Army have to travel to their annual camps and carry out training, including driver training, at weekends. I am afraid that this cannot be avoided.

Mr. Eden: Will my hon. Friend give instructions that when such training takes place at weekends on heavily congested coast roads, particularly the roads in Hampshire, drivers will be provided with some kind of escort, perhaps a motor-cycle patrol, and will be instructed to pull to the side of the road when great congestions of traffic occur in order to allow the traffic to pass them; because the continuous traffic blockages which occur are very bad and sometimes it is impossible for other traffic to overtake?

Mr. Fraser: We attempt in every way to help the traffic, and instructions are given to the drivers to be as helpful as possible. But it is necessary for the Territorials to train at weekends because that is the only time when they can train. I think that hon. Members who have experience of the Army, both Regular and Territorial, will know that the Army extends as much courtesy as is possible to the general run of traffic.

Bank of England Picket

Mr. Langford-Holt: asked the Secretary of State for War why, during the daily march to the Bank of England, the picket does not honour the Highway Code.

Mr. H. Fraser: The picket complies with the Highway Code except where compliance would cause delay to the picket and nuisance to other traffic.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Is my hon. Friend aware that the Highway Code requires marching bodies of troops to have lookouts at suitable distances at front and rear, but that this picket does not have this arrangement and is constantly in the habit of changing direction without giving any indication to oncoming traffic or to traffic overtaking? What is the use of the Minister of Transport spending thousands of £s of State money in inviting people to honour the Highway Code if it is dishonoured by the Secretary of State for War?

Mr. Fraser: On the contrary, experience and expediency show that the best way to get through the rush hour is to move at the greatest possible speed.

Mr. Strachey: May the rest of us obey or disobey the Highway Code when we like in the same way?

Mr. Fraser: This is a question of a reasonable interpretation of instructions to give the minimum trouble to the public.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Would my hon. Friend consider asking my hon. Friend the Member for Shrewsbury (Mr. Langford-Holt) how often the Fleet Air Arm, when he was in it, obeyed the Highway Code?

25-pounder Gun (Replacement)

Mr. Holland: asked the Secretary of State for War whether it is the intention to replace the 25-pounder gun with the 105 millimetre pack-howitzer; and by what year it is estimated the changeover will he completed.

Mr. H. Fraser: The pack howitzer will replace the 25-pounder gun in the parachute light regiment next year, and in three other regiments a year later. Beyond that, the replacement programme is under consideration. A self-

propelled 105 mm. gun is also being developed to take over some of the rôles of the 25-pounder.

Mr. Holland: Would my hon. Friend agree that three essential things for a modern Army are mobility, flexibility and fire-power? Would he also agree that the 105 millimetre pack-howitzer has advantages in all these three spheres over the 25-pounder? In these circumstances, does he not think that the adoption of the howitzer in place of the 25-pounder should be expedited?

Mr. Fraser: I could not go all the way with my hon. Friend on that. Of course for airborne and light rôles I agree that there is great advantage in the new air-portable howitzer. We are pleased that we are getting that. Beyond that there are certain rôles for the 105 mm. self-propelled gun, and developments on that are going very well.

Mr. Shinwell: Does the hon. Gentleman know of any modern Army using the 25-pounder? Is it not completely obsolete, and does not this demonstrate that our Army, on which we are supposed to depend, is badly equipped?

Mr. Fraser: No, Sir. I think that it is still an extremely effective weapon.

Camp, Sedgefield (Disposal)

Mr. Slater: asked the Secretary of State for War what his intentions are regarding the military camp at Sedge-field; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. H. Fraser: The camp is no longer required and my right hon. Friend is arranging for its disposal.

Mr. Slater: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that these camps remain vacant for too long before anything is done? The decision to wind up such a camp should be followed by immediate action. Would he not also agree that in the course of winding up such camps it would be as well to make contact with representatives of Government Departments such as the Board of Trade? Perhaps this camp could be transferred to one of these Departments.

Mr. Fraser: We are in touch with other Government Departments, but at the moment families are still living in this camp. It will not be cleared until the end of this month.

Mr. Slater: How long has the camp not been in use?

Mr. Fraser: The camp will be empty next month. It was abandoned by troops in March of this year.

British Sunday Newspapers, Malta (Distribution)

Mr. Braine: asked the Secretary of State for War why British Sunday newspapers, supplied exclusively for members of the Forces in Malta, which arrive regularly in the island at 0420 hours every Sunday morning, are not collected for distribution until the following day.

Mr. H. Fraser: To distribute the newspapers as soon as they arrive would entail the compulsory use of troops or the payment of overtime to civilians. The overtime would cost about as much as it does to fly the newspapers from England to Malta- This situation may be capable of improvement and I shall look further into it, but the present position is that by holding the papers back for a day we need not charge the troops more than the United Kingdom prices, nor need we increase the cost to public funds.

Mr. Braine: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for agreeing to look into this matter. But is it not ludicrous that when the Newspaper Proprietors' Association makes special arrangements to get Sunday newspapers to the island in the early hours of Sunday, and when the cost of transport is borne by the military authorities, the troops do not actually get the papers until Monday? Could my hon. Friend give an assurance that more cooperation will be shown with the N.P.A. by the War Office on behalf of the troops than has been the case up till now?

Mr. Fraser: As I have said, I will look at this again, but all the newspapers are sold, which shows that the soldiers prefer to pay the home price for a newspaper on Monday rather than 7d. for a 4d. newspaper on Sunday if they got it through an ordinary newsagent.

Mr. Bellenger: Could the hon. Gentleman assure the House that none of these Sunday newspapers are in officers' messes on Sundays?

Mr. Fraser: They can be in anyone's mess, or in anyone's hands, if the people concerned are prepared to pay 7d. for a 4d. newspaper.

Intelligence Corps Exercise, Lewes

Mr. Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for War what inquiry has been made into the arrest of three civilians in Lewes during the Big Brother exercise of the Intelligence Corps on 13th July; and what action is being taken to avoid similar errors in future.

Mr. H. Fraser: A board of inquiry has been held. The mistake occurred because orders given when the exercise was planned were not fully obeyed. Disciplinary action is being taken and the general precautions required in an exercise of this kind are being re-examined.

Mr. Lipton: While thanking the hon. Member for that reply, may I ask him to ask his right hon. Friend to remind those guilty of this unfortunate error of what the Secretary of State himself told the Army League Council on the very day that this blunder was committed—namely, that internal security jobs for which the Army must be prepared demand delicacy of touch and responsibility?

Colonel Beamish: While not wishing to spoil the fun of the hon. Member for Brixton (Mr. Linton), who did not tell me that he was putting down this Question about my constituency, may I ask my hon. Friend whether he is aware that this unfortunate incident—which should not be exaggerated—has caused a great deal of upset? Would it not be easier in cases of this kind to make the real prey carry some simple means of identification?

Mr. Fraser: There would not be much point in the exercise if the prey was obvious. I am sorry that this has happened. We will try to see that there is no recurrence.

Personal Case

Mr. Stratton Mills: asked the Secretary of State for War whether, at any time, he arranged a personal inspection and examination, by one of the honorary consultants in urology to the Army, of a constituent of the hon. Member for Belfast, North, particulars of which have been sent to him, who has been declared medically unfit for entry to Sandhurst.

Mr. H. Fraser: No, Sir. The candidate was examined by a senior medical


specialist. The case notes and X-ray films were then seen by a consultant. I am advised that no symptoms of kidney disease in this candidate were detectable on physical examination and that a decision depended on a study of the X-ray films.

Mr. Stratton Mills: Does my hon. Friend recall that in a letter to me on 29th January he said that investigations had been carried out and
…included examination by the Honorary Consultant in Urology to the Army.
As it appears that this has not been done and, also, that this was the basis on which my hon. Friend's decision was taken in this extremely difficult case, will he not look at this matter again and invite the Honorary Consultant in Urology to the Army personally to examine this boy, in view of the conflict between senior medical people involved?

Mr. Fraser: I am sorry that my letter was badly worded, and I apologise. It has always been clear to me that the examination by the consultant was confined to a study of the films of the X-rays, which is the only way in which this complaint can be discovered. I have looked at the matter of giving this boy a further examination but there would be no medical purpose in it. There is nothing further that I can do.

Mr. Stratton Mills: Is my hon. Friend aware that I have been advised by medical opinion that this extremely complex disease can best be discovered by personal examination and not only by examination of X-rays? Will he look at this again?

Mr. Fraser: I am advised in a contrary sense, but I will discuss this again with my hon. Friend.

Mr. Stratton Mills: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I will seek to raise this matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

Land, Lincoln

Mr. de Freitas: asked the Secretary of State for War how many acres in Lincoln he expects will become surplus to his requirements within the next two years; and whether he will undertake That none of this land will be disposed

of in conditions which would allow any of the gardens, playing fields and open spaces to be built upon.

Mr. H. Fraser: So far as can be foreseen, there will be about 75 acres surplus. We shall follow the recognised procedure for the disposal of Government land and we shall consult the Lincoln City Council; but I cannot give an undertaking beyond that.

Mr. de Freitas: Why cannot the Under-Secretary give an assurance that playing fields will not be disposed of in conditions which will allow them to be built upon?

Mr. Fraser: Simply because no Government Department can make that condition, which is a question for the planning authorities. The War Office already carries a great deal of authority and for it to become a planning authority as well would be too much. What the hon. Gentleman is asking goes far beyond the recognised conditions for sale of land in those circumstances.

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Mayhew.

Mr. de Freitas: I am asking the Under-Secretary to take cognisance of the fact that in many parts of the country the War Office has done this.

Mr. Speaker: I think that the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) did not hear me call the next Question.

Hutchison Committee (Recommendations)

Mr. Mayhew: asked the Secretary of State for War how far he accepts the recommendations of the Hutchison Committee.

Mr. H. Fraser: My right hon. Friend accepts the recommendations subject to consultation with other interested parties. I would refer the hon. Member to the last paragraph of the Answer to him on 15th July.

Mr. Mayhew: Is it not a little precipitate to accept these recommendations and at the same time to admit that no consultations have taken place with interested parties? Is the hon. Gentleman aware that some of these issues are of great importance to the people of Woolwich? Can he assure me that no action will be taken until he has consulted all those involved?

Mr. Fraser: Everyone will be consulted. During the course of the inquiry, people like the L.C.C., the Woolwich Council, trade unions and others, although they did not wish to give evidence, were consulted. The whole object of the inquiry was to consult local people, as is set out in the Report.

Oral Answers to Questions — POST OFFICE

Letters, Chester and Manchester (Delivery in London)

Mr. E. Johnson: asked the Postmaster-General if he is aware that letters sent by the evening post from Chester and from Manchester frequently do not reach the House of Commons or addresses in London, W.1, by first post the following morning; and what steps he is taking to improve these services.

The Assistant Postmaster-General (Miss Mervyn Pike): I very much regret that owing to the late running of trains some letters for London posted in Chester and Manchester have been delayed in delivery. The railways are doing their best to improve the timekeeping of the mail trains, but I understand that, while modernisation work proceeds, some delays are unavoidable. I am having the mail connections from Chester and Manchester examined to see whether any improvements can be effected by re-routing or other changes.

Mr. Johnson: While appreciating the efforts which have been made to improve postal services, may I ask my hon. Friend whether she is aware that it frequently takes a letter from Chester or Manchester longer to reach its destination in London than it used to take a letter to cover a similar distance by pony express in the early days of the United States?

Miss Pike: I cannot vouch for the efficiency of the pony express. I am afraid that at present trains carrying the mail from the North-West are running very late and that delays of more than an hour are all too frequent. We are doing everything we can to overcome the difficulty.

Brentford, Middlesex (Postal Address)

Mr. Dudley Smith: asked the Postmaster-General if he will consider

giving Brentford, Middlesex, a London postal address.

Miss Pike: I have considered this and I am sorry that I cannot do as my hon. Friend wishes.

Mr. Smith: Is my hon. Friend aware that one half of my constituents, in Brentford, consider that they get a postal service inferior to that for the other half in Chiswick? Will she not agree that it would be far better for the whole of one borough to be in one postal district?

Miss Pike: Our difficulty is that we have to draw the line somewhere and in this case it goes through the middle of the borough. If we extended the line, there would be a great deal of extra expense and extra inconvenience for the people doing the job and at present we cannot move the boundary.

Telephone Equipment (Bulk Purchase Agreements)

Mr. Gresham Cooke: asked the Postmaster-General if he will publish in the OFFICIAL REPORT the terms of the bulk purchase agreement for the purchase of telephone equipment from members of the consortium of suppliers of such equipment.

The Postmaster-General (Mr. Reginald Bevins): Yes, Sir. I am publishing a memorandum in the OFFICIAL REPORT summarising, the terms of the Post Office bulk purchase agreements.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is my right hon Friend aware that many people will be very glad about that, because it is thought that there should be more competition in this industry? For instance, is he aware that Pye Radio thinks that it can produce a telephone handset for 30s. cheaper than can be done by the rest of the industry? Is it not time for the winds of change to blow through these bulk purchase agreements?

Northfield Post Office, Birmingham (Queues)

Mr. Dance: asked the Postmaster-General whether he will give instructions to the counter staff at the Northfield Post Office, Birmingham 31, to do everything possible to avoid long queues forming at one counter position while other assistants remain idle.

Miss Pike: I am having the staffing arrangements at this office reviewed with a view to reducing queues and I will write to my hon. Friend as soon as possible.

Mr. Dance: I thank my hon. Friend for that Answer. Is she aware that what is annoying people so much is the sort of thing of which there was an example the other day when a constituent of mine went into the Post Office to buy a postal order on which a 3d. stamp had to be placed to bring it up to the correct amount, but that when he asked to buy a stamp for a letter he was told that he had to get into a queue, which was 25 people long, and buy a stamp from the appropriate counter? Is that not ridiculous and will my hon. Friend do something to alter the situation?

Miss Pike: I appreciate the exasperation of the person referred to in this instance. My hon. Friend probably knows that we set up a committee to look into services at counters and it recommended that we should try composite working. It is possible that that will be the answer to problems of this kind.

Sub-Offices, Kirkcaldy (Pensions Payments)

Mr. Gourlay: asked the Postmaster-General how many retirement pensions are paid weekly at the sub-post offices in Octavia Street and Pentland Place, Kirkcaldy, respectively.

Miss Pike: About 450 and 20.

Mr. Gourlay: Is the hon. Lady aware that those figures represent only a small proportion of the pensioners in the areas covered by these offices and that there are other people who are also forced to travel an inconvenient distance to Dunearn Drive and Kirkcaldy General Post Offices to transact business? Will she ask her right hon. Friend to reconsider the decision of his predecessor in June, 1959, and to grant counter facilities at Hendry Road and Valley Gardens Corner?

Miss Pike: I have looked into the position very carefully and I find that the district is very well provided with sub-offices. There is the Octavia Street office and the Pentland Place office—it is very confusing because one of them

is called Sauchenbush office and there are two other places, Smeaton and Templehall. My information is that none of the people has to walk very far to the sub-office and that the majority of people live near to the Pentland Place office in the older part of the town.

Mr. Gourlay: Does not the hon. Lady realise that distances can be confusing and that one has to take account of the terrain? Have not many hon. Members opposite raised similar questions of areas where services should be provided, irrespective of the distance between the various sub-offices? Will the hon. Lady reconsider the decision?

Miss Pike: I will keep the position in mind, but I assure the hon. Gentleman that the matter has been thoroughly studied.

Sub-Offices (Future Use)

Mr. Harold Davies: asked the Postmaster-General what plans he has for the future of sub-post offices; if he is aware of the difficult period through which sub-post offices are passing owing to the loss of work; and what discussions he has had with the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters concerning the possibility of using sub-post offices for the payment of industrial pensions and hire-purchase remittances.

Miss Pike: I expect sub-post offices to continue to play the same useful part in serving the public as they have done in the past. While there have been reductions in some types of work, there have been compensating increases in others. There has been correspondence with the Federation about industrial pensions and hire-purchase payments. It is too early to say what the outcome will be on industrial pensions, but the Federation was told that there is no Post Office objection, subject to certain conditions, to sub-postmasters handling hire-purchase payments.

Mr. Harold Davies: I thank the hon. Lady for that courteous and partially helpful reply. Is the hon. Lady aware that the efficiency of the Post Office in Britain—and it is one of the most, if not the most efficient, in the world—has undoubtedly been made more efficient by these sub-offices throughout the country?


Can the hon. Lady say whether the Committee which her right hon. Friend has appointed will investigate fully the future position of these sub-offices?

Miss Pike: I endorse what the hon. Gentleman said about the important part that sub-offices play in the efficient service we give to the public. Most certainly all aspects of their requirements will be looked into when we are investigating this matter.

Mr. W. R. Williams: May I get the position clear from the hon. Lady's reply? Does it mean that this question of hire-purchase remittances will be one of the general facilities offered by sub-offices? If so, will the same apply to Crown offices? As she was referring to sub-postmasters, how will this work out?

Miss Pike: No. The difference is that this work is done in their purely private capacity as shopkeepers, and it does not apply to Crown offices.

Telephone Purchasing Policy

Mr. Braine: asked the Postmaster-General what requests he has received from overseas Governments for advice on the subject of telephone-purchasing policy; and what has been the nature of the advice given.

Mr. Bevins: Twenty countries have consulted the Post Office on telephone purchasing policy. They have been informed of the arrangements operating in this country. Seven countries have adopted arrangements on similar lines. Five other countries are also being helped with technical and costing advice.

Mr. Braine: Does not that reply mean that officers of my right hon. Friend's Department are in fact advising other Governments—Colonial and Commonwealth Governments—to buy their supplies from the existing ring suppliers? Is that a practice which ought to be encouraged? If it is a practice that exists at all, would not my right hon. Friend think it wiser, and more prudent, in view of the present public concern about the matter, not to give such advice in future?

Mr. Bevins: No. The countries which have consulted us have come to us of their own volition for advice. We do not go out of our way to give gratuitous advice to overseas administrations. So far

as purchases are concerned, clearly overseas Governments or agencies are completely free to purchase wherever, and from whomever, they like.

Transit of Mails (Study Group)

Mr. Holland: asked the Postmaster-General whether he is satisfied with the present arrangements for the exchange of mails between post offices; and if he will make a statement.

Miss Pike: I think the time has come to take a general look at these arrangements to see whether, in particular, we can reduce the amount of handling and the number of transfers that some mails now get in transit.
This requires a detailed and practical examination and my right hon. Friend has, therefore, decided to set up a study group to go into these questions. The group will include representatives from outside industry with experience in this kind of problem as well as from the Post Office. We hope that it will be able to report in about six months' time.

Mr. Holland: I thank my hon. Friend for that most encouraging reply. May I ask whether the Post Office Staff Association will be represented on the group?

Miss Pike: I hope that it will be. We intend to invite one of its representatives.

Mr. W. R. Williams: May I ask the hon. Lady whether the question of security is also involved in the study group which the Minister is proposing now? I should like some information about these very important people from outside who are being called into these joint consultations. What qualifications will they have?

Miss Pike: On the point of the security angle, this will be taken into consideration—this is a handling exercise as it were. On the second point, the names have not yet been finalised. We are anxious to get people with real experience of this.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Will consideration be given to the advisability of introducing more modern methods, such as electronic conveyors and that kind of thing?

Miss Pike: Yes. Our purpose is to try to get the most modern methods available.

Equipment (Supply)

Mr. Ness Edwards: asked the Postmaster-General if, in view of the recent large developments in the electronic industry, he will consider revising the arrangements for the supply of Post Office equipment.

Mr. Bevins: I do not accept that the benefits of the electronic development are not available under the present arrangements for the supply of Post Office equipment. I would instance the joint research effort between the Post Office and the telephone equipment manufacturers in the design of an electronic telephone exchange. The Post Office is fully cognizant of the important developments in electronics to which the right hon. Gentleman refers, and particularly their application to the field of telecommunications.

Mr. Ness Edwards: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that in this matter he is limited by the agreement with the consortia, and that the consortia have a monopoly in the supply of equipment to the Post Office, especially of this type? Is he not further aware that this is a very juicy business? Is it not time that this agreement was referred to the Public Accounts Committee, for full examination and exposure?

Mr. Bevins: This business—as the right hon. Gentleman describes it—was referred to the Public Accounts Committee in 1947 and 1954. On both occasions the Committee decided to make no report to Parliament. It was again examined in 1950 by the Select Committee on Estimates, which was not critical of the system. Moreover, in 1950 it was further examined by a Government committee, at the time when the right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards) was a member of the Administration. That committee expressed the view that it was satisfied with the great advantages and economy of the system.

Mr. Ness Edwards: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that a new agreement has been made since then, and also that there have been extensive developments in this matter? Materials are also much more readily available than they were in 1950. Surely the time has come for the wind of change to blow through this monopoly, so that we can have the benefits of some competition inside it?

Mr. Bevins: On the general question, I would have said that the more rapid the progress is in electronics the more desirable it is that we should have close co-ordination between the British Post Office and the biggest suppliers of telephonic equipment. I can instance the new electronic telephone exchange which, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, has been produced by the Post Office in conjunction with the manufacturers, and the now 700 type telephone, and also the developments which have been made in subscriber trunk dialling.

Sites and Buildings (Survey)

Mr. Mason: asked the Postmaster-General if he will now make a statement on the survey of Post Office sites and buildings; and what plans he has in mind for their future.

Mr. Bevins: I am sorry I cannot yet add to my reply of 29th June to the hon. Member.

Mr. Mason: How long is this going to take? The survey has now been going on for many months. When can the Minister give us an idea of exactly what he has in mind, and especially how far this will help the Post Office when the survey is complete?

Mr. Bevins: What I have in mind in this connection is to make the Post Office more commercial, and to treat Post Office freeholds as a commercial concern would treat them. The conclusions of the pilot survey, which I started three or four months ago, suggest that there is scope for a greater exploitation of our freeholds, and I am sure that we shall be able to make something of them. I can assure the hon. Member that this is very high on my list of priorities.

Oral Answers to Questions — TELEPHONE SERVICE

Dialling System (Calls to Operator)

Mr. Dance: asked the Postmaster-General why, since the introduction of the system whereby 100 is dialled in place of TOL and TRU, there has been an increased delay in obtaining an answer from the operator.

Mr. Bevins: The delay in obtaining an answer from the operator is not


caused by the introduction of the 100 code, but is due to a shortage of operating staff. I am sorry that the service is not as good as I would wish, but I should like to assure my hon. Friend that every effort is being made to improve it.

Doctors

Mr. Dempsey: asked the Postmaster-General if he will post the names and telephone numbers of local doctors in a conspicuous part of telephone kiosks for the convenience of the general public.

Mr. Bevins: I have recently arranged for lists of National Health Service doctors to be available in telephone exchanges so that inquiries from both kiosks and private telephones can be dealt with. These lists are also held at the larger Post Offices. I believe that these arrangements, and the 999 service, provide the best way of meeting this public need.

Mr. Dempsey: Does the right hon. Gentleman mean that these lists will be made available in existing kiosks? If so, they will be welcome in view of the occasional need to make calls in cases of accidents or sudden bouts of illness.

Mr. Bevins: No, Sir. The lists will not be available in telephone kiosks, but most Post Offices and all telephone exchanges will have them, and that should meet the need.

Mr. W. R. Williams: In order to meet the valid point which my hon. Friend has in mind, can the right hon. Gentleman arrange to have a notice in the kiosk to say that the names of doctors in the vicinity can be obtained on application to the telephone exchange?

Mr. Bevins: As the hon. Member knows, there is not much roam in kiosks for this sort of thing, but I will consider his suggestion.

Credit Card System

Sir A. V. Harvey: asked the Postmaster-General how many subscribers have taken up the credit card system for calls and what efforts are being made to advertise the service.

Mr. Bevins: So far 6,640 subscribers have taken up this service. About 19,000

cards have been issued for the use of these subscribers and their employees. The service has been advertised in the Press, and by leaflets, but I agree that it requires further publicity and this is under way.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Can my right hon. Friend say what arrangements have been made with other countries to make these cards valid for use abroad?

Mr. Bevins: So far as I know, no arrangements have been made so far, but I will look into the possibility.

Oral Answers to Questions — WIRELESS AND TELEVISION

Sound and Television Broadcasts (Committee of Inquiry)

Mr. Woodburn: asked the Postmaster-General whether, before appointing the members of the Committee to inquire into broadcasting and television, he will satisfy himself that they themselves possess television sets, and ascertain how long, respectively, they have held television licences.

Mr. Bevins: No, Sir.

Mr. Woodburn: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that people greatly resent superior people coming on television and flaunting their superiority by saying that they have no television set? Will he not agree that such people are not fit either to supervise or even take part in television programmes?

Mr. Bevins: I have much sympathy with what the right hon. Gentleman says. I have been reading the report of a recent debate in another place when a noble Lord used the words:
I need not say that I do not have a television set of my own and I do not think I shall ever have one.
As the House knows, that gentleman was appointed the chairman of a previous inquiry into broadcasting—by the Administration of which the right hon. Gentleman was a member. I agree that a knowledge of television is very important for the members of this Committee, but, as about three out of four households in the country possess both sets, and, I hope, licences, I do not think that we are in very much danger.

Mr. Ellis Smith: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Will it be in order in future to quote from speeches made in another place?

Mr. Speaker: It is not really in order to criticise individuals in another place, but it sounded fairly genial, so I thought that I would not notice it.

Mr. Ellis Smith: This is a serious matter. I remember the Rulings given in the past, and I want to ask whether in future it will be in order to follow the precedent of quoting what is said in another place.

Mr. Speaker: I would rather rule on the particular case, because while large quotations from a debate in this Session in another place would clearly be out of order, I am not sure that one would want to pounce on a single sentence. I would rather rule on the particular case.

Mr. Ness Edwards: So that we may realise how the right hon. Gentleman has exercised his discrimination in this matter, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman when he will be able to tell us the names of the people who have been appointed to this Committee?

Mr. Bevins: I hope to be able to announce the names of the rest of the Committee some time in August.

Mr. Ness Edwards: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Do I understand the Postmaster-General to say that he proposes—[Hon. Members: "That is not a point of order."] The Postmaster-General has made a declaration that when the House is up he will announce something which affects the House. I want to know whether it is in accordance with the traditions of the House for appointments of this nature to be made when the House has risen.

Mr. Speaker: I do not think that that would be a point of order for me.

Sir R. Grimston: asked the Postmaster-General if he has requested Sir Harry Pilkington to make a report from the Committee of Inquiry into the future of sound and television broadcasting by any particular date.

Mr. Bevins: Sir Harry Pilkington knows that the Government would like

the report as quickly as possible and the has told me that he will do his utmost. It would be unreasonable to stipulate a precise date.

Sir R. Grimston: Can my right hon. Friend tell me why, in this matter, the Government have not assumed what is properly their own responsibility, and, after debate in this House, laid down the broad lines of policy and then framed the terms of reference of the Committee to provide for its considering how that policy could best be carried out, instead of farming out the whole question to yet another Committee? Is it not likely that, after the experience with the Beveridge Committee and in view of the fact that this Committee is being asked to formulate Government policy, these gentlemen will be wasting a great deal of time, and there will be great delay in letting the industry know what its future is to be?

Mr. Bevins: No. I do not agree with my hon. Friend. This Committee is not being asked to formulate Government policy at all. It is being invited to carry out an objective and impartial survey of the whole field of broadcasting and television, and at the end of the day it will be for Parliament to make the decision.

Mr. Ness Edwards: As the question of lineage, colour, and the allocation of wavelengths are matters of very great importance on which we ought to have much more information, will the right hon. Gentleman advise Sir Harry Pilkington that he ought to take sufficient time to provide the House with a full survey of the whole field?

Mr. Slater: Can the right hon. Gentleman say who will be the No. 2 to Sir Harry Pilkington to carry out these investigations? In view of the large amount of publicity the right hon. Gentleman gave in the House regarding Sir Harry Pilkington being attached to industry, would it not be as well if the No. 2 came from the other side of industry?

Mr. Bevins: It is not the practice or convention to have what the hon. Gentleman referred to as a No. 2 on a Committee of this kind—

Mr. Slater: A vice-chairman.

Mr. Bevins: —but I assure the hon. Gentleman that organised labour will be effectively represented on the Committee.

Sir R. Grimston: Is it not a fact that the Government have already got from the Television Advisory Committee all the technical information which will be available to this new Committee?

Mr. Bevins: The Government are in possession of some very valuable technical information from the Television Advisory Committee, but I would certainly not go so far as to say that all the information of that sort is at present available.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: asked the Postmaster-General whether he will amplify the terms of reference of the Committee of Inquiry into the future of sound and television broadcasting so as to include consideration of, and recommendations upon, the proportion of United States or semi-United States programmes shown and the cultural influence of these programmes, particularly on younger viewers.

Mr. Bevins: This is not necessary. The terms of reference are already comprehensive enough to allow for the considerations my hon. Friend has in mind.

Commercial Television (Advertisements)

Mr. Ness Edwards: asked the Postmaster-General what was the average amount of advertising between the hours of 7.30 p.m. and 10.30 p.m. for the month of June on commercial television.

Mr. Bevins: The Authority tells me that its control statistics are summarised on the basis of the clock hours, but that the average amount of advertising for the period 7.30 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. would be similar to the figure I quoted to the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) last week.

Mr. Ness Edwards: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that he is being "had" by the I.T.A.? The evening peak hours are from 7.30 to 10.30. It is in that period that there is a higher average of advertising time. By using the period from 7 o'clock to 10 o'clock in the evening the I.T.A. misled the

right hon. Gentleman and he, in turn, misled the House.

Mr. Bevins: I am not being "had" by anybody. The position is quite clear. For the month of June, between
7 o'clock and 10 o'clock the average period devoted to advertising was 6·8 minutes. Alternatively, between 8 o'clock and 11 o'clock in the evening in the same month the average was also 6·8 minutes, so the right hon. Gentleman can take his pick.

Television (Incorporated Society of British Advertisers)

Mr. Mayhew: asked the Postmaster-General what communications he has received recently from the Incorporated Society of British Advertisers relating to the future of television; and what replies he has sent.

Mr. Bevins: The Director of the Society wrote to me in May saying that the Society had set up a committee to examine the future of television and to advise the Society, and that it would wish to put its views to any broadcasting committee that was set up. Its request was noted.

Mr. Mayhew: Is the Minister aware that this very powerful committee, including some of the biggest advertisers in the country, has stated that it proposes to lobby him about the future of television from now until 1964? Might it not be better, in their own interests, if advertisers held back a little from these controversial questions and allowed them to be decided on their merits by Parliament and public opinion?

Mr. Bevins: I have looked at the papers, and in fairness to this Society I would point out that the committee which has been set up is to consider the interests of the viewer and consumer as well as of the advertiser. It is a very respectable committee, including the chairman of the Co-operative Society. As for lobbying, I hasten to tell the hon. Member that I am certainly not susceptible to it, from any quarter. I am equally sure that Sir Harry Pilkington is not susceptible to it.

Local Broadcasting

Mr. Mason: asked the Postmaster-General if he will give an assurance that


local broadcasting will not be permitted to develop until the Pilkington Committee has considered its future and made known its recommendations.

Mr. Bevins: I am at present discussing the B.B.C. 's proposals in regard to local broadcasting with the Corporation. No firm decision has yet been reached. But, in the nature of the case, the Government view must be influenced by the setting up of the Committee.

Mr. Mason: Will not the right hon. Gentleman answer the Question on the Order Paper and give an assurance that no local broadcasting, either commercial or by the B.B.C., will start before the Pilkington Committee has made its review? Secondly, is the right hon. Gentleman quite satisfied that there is sufficient local demand from the people for local broadcasting in cities and towns? What steps is he taking to assess feeling in this matter?

Mr. Bevins: I am in no position to say what the demand for local broadcasting is, but it would be very unfair to give an assurance of the sort asked for by the hon. Gentleman—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"]—because I have received the B.B.C.'s proposals, and I have told its chairman that I am prepared to examine them. In those circumstances it would be quite wrong, at this stage, for me to make any announcement until a decision has been made one way or the other.

Mr. Mason: Will the Minister also tell the House whether he is considering further proposals made to him, especially from a certain quarter of the House?

Mr. Bevins: I should have thought, in the circumstances of today, that it would be natural and right for the Government to require the advice of the Pilkington Committee on questions concerning major changes before making decisions.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL AIR FORCE

Establishments and Personnel

Mr. Wall: asked the Secretary of State for Air what has been the cost to his Department of maintaining Royal Air Force establishments and personnel in Malta during each of the past five years.

The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. George Ward): We estimate the direct cost to Air Votes in the last five financial years at £4·4 million, £5 million, £5·1 million, £4·9 million, and £5·2 million.

Mr. Wall: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the figure he has just quoted, together with the figures given by his right hon. Friends in charge of the other Service Departments, show that about £20 million a year is going to Malta from the defence forces? Will he see that this figure is given wide publicity in the island?

Mr. Ward: Yes, but I should make it clear to my hon. Friend that the figures of cost for which the Question asked, and which I have given, are not quite the same as local expenditure, but we have spent about £18 million in Malta in this period.

Jet Aircraft, Strubby (Complaints)

Mr. C. Osborne: asked the Secretary of State for Air what steps he will take to reduce the excessive noise, and nervous strain to the local inhabitants, created by continuous low flying jet aeroplanes from the Strubby, North Lincolnshire, aerodrome; if he will have a special investigation made into these complaints; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Ward: I regret that jet flying from Strubby is bound to cause some disturbance; but we shall go on doing our best to keep this to a minimum.

Mr. Osborne: My constituents are aware that jet pilots must get a fair amount of practice. What they hope is that this practice will be divided over the country and not concentrated too much in Lincolnshire.

Mr. Ward: I appreciate the point of view of my hon. Friend's constituents, and am most grateful to them for their forbearance. I asked one of my staff to go to Strubby last week specially to make an investigation, and in addition to making inquiries at the station, he also talked to the local police and local authority representatives. He found no evidence of a general feeling that the Royal Air Force was causing either unreasonable or avoidable disturbance.

Mr. Osborne: If I send my right hon. Friend the letters that I have received on the subject, will he read them?

Mr. Ward: indicated assent.

Mr. de Freitas: In trying to help the constituents of his hon. Friend, will the right hon. Gentleman be very careful not to divert these aircraft over Lincoln?

Aircraft (Flight Plans)

Mr. de Freitas: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he will arrange that he shall be informed before any aircraft, whether British or United States, takes off from a Royal Air Force airfield on a flight the plan of which indicates that it will pass near Soviet territory.

Mr. Ward: As I explained on Monday in reply to the hon. Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton), the flight plan procedure is concerned with safety and identification. I am not myself dependent on these routine procedures for information about the flying activities of the Royal Air Force. So far as the United States Air Force is concerned, I do not think I should add anything to what the Prime Minister told the House yesterday and on 12th July.

Mr. de Freitas: In present circumstances, and particularly in view of General White's fantastic statement yesterday, is the right hon. Gentleman telling us that American aircraft can take off from Royal Air Force bases on flights for destinations which the Secretary of State does not even know about? If so, is not that extraordinary and should not it stop?

Mr. Ward: I did not say that. All that I have been saying is that I do not think that it would be right for me to comment on existing procedures concerning American aircraft at a time when discussions on this very point are proceeding in Washington.

Mr. de Freitas: In these discussions, will not the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that he is responsible to this House for what happens at R.A.F. stations? Surely it is wrong that aircraft should take off from these stations and go to destinations which the right hon. Gentleman does not even know about.

Mr. Ward: I am sure that these discussions will take into account all relevant considerations.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROADS

A.34 Road, Newbury and Sutton Scotney

Mr. Denzil Freeth: asked the Minister of Transport what plans he has for improving A.34 between Newbury and Sutton Scotney.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. John Hay): Several short widening schemes have recently been completed and work is now proceeding on another. We are planning to continue this series of improvements, including in the near future a re-alignment at Bullington cross-roads and the construction of a roundabout there.

Mr. Freeth: While thanking my hon. Friend for these improvements which have been made, may I ask him whether he will pay particular attention to the number of narrow railway bridges on this stretch of road which pass over the road and also to the unsatisfactory state of the Tothill railway bridge where the road passes over the railway and where the propping up is said to be unsatisfactory?

Mr. Hay: I will take note of my hon. Friend's observations.

A.30 Road, Staines

Mr. Denzil Freeth: asked the Minister of Transport what plans he has for improving A.30 between Staines and the junction with A.4 either by making the road dual carriageway or designating it a clearway.

The Minister of Transport (Mr. Ernest Marples): My future plans are that dual carriageways should be provided on this section of A.30, but I cannot yet say when it will be possible to do this work. Meanwhile the possibility of designating the road a clearway has been investigated but it does not appear to be suitable.

Mr. Freeth: While thanking my right hon. Friend for the fact that we shall get a dual carriageway, may I ask him whether he will pay particular attention to the stretch of road which passes along the side of London Airport, where there is room for lay-bys, where buses may stop and where it is very dangerous for


traffic at weekends to stop so that motorists may look at the aeroplanes which are passing over? Far too many motorists stop to do this.

Mr. Marples: I suggest that my hon. Friend writes to me specifying particular parts of the road, and I will look into the matter.

London-Yorkshire Motorway

Mr. A. Roberts: asked the Minister of Transport what steps he proposes to take, regarding the construction of bridges when the development of the London-Yorkshire motorway takes place, to avoid the confusion and danger to motorists caused by the shadows cast by those bridges that have been constructed on the London-Birmingham section of the motorway.

Mr. Marples: I propose first to await the results of the investigation into this matter which I mentioned in my reply of 6th July to my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, South (Mr. Hocking).

Mr. Roberts: Is the Ministry of Transport making its own private investigation? If so, will it have any bearing on the future construction of the London-Yorkshire motorway?

Mr. Marples: Investigations are taking place and the police have been asked to report. The Road Research Laboratory is considering the matter and my own Department is considering the evidence which is available. If the hon. Gentleman has any evidence which he would like to submit to these bodies, I should be grateful if he would send it to them.

Mr. Janner: What is the use of making an investigation if the right hon. Gentleman has no intention of completing the road in the near future? When does he intend to get on with the job?

Mr. Marples: There is a Question on the Order Paper on that point. The hon. Gentleman, extraordinarily enough, is misinformed.

Blackwall Tunnel

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Transport if it is proposed to charge tolls on motor vehicles using the second tube to be constructed for the Blackwall Tunnel; and when it is expected to be ready.

Mr. Marples: The second tunnel is expected to be open for traffic in 1965. Tolls will not be charged.

Mr. Dodds: Will the right hon. Gentleman explain for the benefit of people in Essex and Kent why they will have to pay tolls to go through the Dartford-Purfleet Tunnel, yet they can go free through this one which is to be built a few years later? Why should not the people of Kent and Essex go through the tunnel without having to pay tolls?

Mr. Marples: There are special reasons. The existing tunnel will be used for one-way traffic and is free of tolls already. The new tunnel will be used for traffic travelling the other way. Therefore, it would be ridiculous to charge tolls on one tunnel and not on the other.

Mr. Dodds: Will the right hon. Gentleman come to Kent and explain that to the people of Kent?

Mr. Marples: The hon. Gentleman is eloquent enough to explain it himself.

Mr. Benn: Is the right hon. Gentleman telling the House that tunnels from north to south carry tolls but those from south to north do not, or is it a question of inwards or outwards, or is this his definition of the tidal flow?

Mr. Marples: What I said was that south-bound traffic will use the new tunnel. North-bound traffic will use the old tunnel which is free of tolls. Either both or neither should carry tolls.

Mr. Braine: Does my right hon. Friend appreciate that this is a matter of some importance to my constituents in southeast Essex? In view of the Answer he has just given, haw can he justify the imposition of tolls in the Dartford-Purfleet Tunnel? Why have we in south-east Essex been singled out for discrimination?

Mr. Marples: This is governed by an Act of Parliament that has been passed by this House.

Mr. Popplewell: In view of the fact that the Minister is allowing this tunnel to be free of tolls, why should he have insisted that the Tyne Tunnel must have tolls? Is it a question that any traffic leading to the North has to have tolls?

Mr. Marples: There is a Bill coming before the House on this very issue

Oral Answers to Questions — TRANSPORT

Driving Offences (Points System)

Mr. Gresham Cooke: asked the Minister of Transport if he has studied the demerit point system, as operated by the Transport Minister in Ontario, particulars of which have been sent to him by the hon. Member for Twickenham, by which the accumulation of twelve points in a two-year period for driving offences brings suspension of the driving licence for three months; and whether, in view of its beneficial effect on driving responsibility, he will consider its adoption here.

Mr. Marples: I am not at present satisfied that the points system as operated in Ontorio is suitable for adoption in this country.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in Ontario if a motorist commits two or three offences points are given against him and that, if he collects twelve adverse points, his license is temporarily taken away? Is he further aware that the Transport Minister in Ontario has said that this had had a very beneficial effect, particularly on young drivers, and has improved driving habits? We ought not to close our minds to this practice in this country.

Mr. Marples: I want to make it clear that my mind is not closed or made up. I said that I was not at present satisfied. The reason for that is that it is a very important principle of English law that subjects should not suffer penalties without a hearing. The Ontario scheme seems to me to short-circuit that established legal practice.

Mr. Benn: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether a section of his Department is studying and assessing the experience of foreign States in this sphere of road safety? If so, will he make available to the House in a suitable form in the Library reports on these foreign experiments so that we may judge whether some of them might be suitable for introduction here?

Mr. Marples: I should like to consider that. There is a very good film on that subject which we shall be showing shortly.

Traffic, London

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Transport what was the reason for his decision to set up a study group of scientists to prepare a survey of the pattern of traffic in and out of London, in view of all the evidence now available; and how long he anticipates it will be before the scientists report.

Mr. Marples: I fear the hon. Gentleman is mistaken. I have in mind an overall origin and destination survey of London traffic which is usually carried out by traffic engineers. The matter is now under discussion between my Department and the London County Council and I hope that its results might be available in about 18 months' time.

Mr. Dodds: How does the right hon. Gentleman justify the setting up of another committee when his predecessor, the present Minister of Defence, in appointing the London Traffic Committee in 1958, said the same thing, almost word for word, as what he said in opening the second tube for the Blackwall Tunnel recently? Before then there was set up the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee. Is it not a fact that the same sort of words were used before? Is not this an indictment of the two Committees which have been set up for a similar purpose and of the Ministry which should have the information, or is this the usual device of a Minister to set up a committee to buy time until he is transferred to another Department?

Mr. Marples: The whole of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question is based on a false assumption. I am not setting up a committee. All that I am setting up—[Laughter.] The committee which considered London's roads recommended this.

Mr. Manuel: Is not that a committee?

Mr. Marples: For the benefit of hon. Members who are rather agreeably laughing, may I say that that was set up many years ago and has completed its report. It stated:
Consideration should be given to the means and methods for carrying out comprehensive and continuing traffic engineering studies for London roads which might well have an influence on the programmes in their later stages.


Origin and destination surveys provide the material which will give us the information so that we can put the roads in the right places.

CONGO (UNITED NATIONS ACTION)

Mr. Healey: (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on Britain's position in the Security Council discussions concerning the situation in the Congo.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): From what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has already said when he spoke on 14th July, the House will know that we are giving our full support to the United Nations action and tonight the Security Council will meet to hear a progress report from the Secretary-General.
I hope that there will be general agreement that we have good cause to be grateful for the speedy and efficient manner in which Mr. Hammarskjoeld and his staff hive begun discharging the difficult duties laid upon them by the Security Council.
United Nations forces and assistance teams have been got out to the Congo very quickly. This has already improved the situation. We have played our part in this. We have provided aircraft to help carry the Ghanaian contingent. In response to an appeal from Mr. Hammarskjoeld, we are providing food.
In our view it is very important that all the offers of help and supplies should be channelled through the Secretary-General. I hope that when the Security Council meets this evening it will give unanimous support to Mr. Hammarskjoeld and agree that he must be left a large measure of discretion in discharging his task.
We shall continue to do everything in our power to support his efforts to achieve what I am sure is the general wish of the House, the maintenance of law and order and stability in the Congo.

Mr. Healey: I think that the whole House will be extremely grateful for the Foreign Secretary's statement and that

there will be unanimous agreement that almost the only favourable outcome of this tragic story is the strengthening of the authority and power of the United Nations. Would he not agree that the Congo crisis has shown that there is a strong case for making more permanent arrangements for the provision of a United Nation force on future occasions?
May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether he would not agree that the present key to the situation is in Katanga and that, while we welcome the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Leopoldville area, it may be difficult to remove doubts about the real intentions of people in Katanga so long as Belgian parachutists are exercising so great authority as they are now? Also, is it true, as reported in the Press, that the Prime Minister of Katanga has agreed to receive Mr. Hammarskjoeld in his Province?

Mr. Lloyd: I am grateful for the hon. Member's acceptance and support of what I said in answer to his Question. With regard to the United Nations force, we have long believed that it is necessary to have either a stand-by force, or some- thing capable of being put into operation very quickly. I know that some hon. Members have thought we have not gone quite as far and as fast as we could in this respect, but we have not wanted this to become a sort of element in the cold war. We know that there are strong Russian objections to such a force and, also, there are differences of opinion, but I remain convinced that it is important to have a suitable arrangement that can be put into operation very quickly. We can draw great consolation from the speed with which action has been taken in this case.
On the question of the situation in Katanga, I think that it Should be our purpose, on both sides of the House, and in the United Nations and elsewhere, to try to enable things to calm down in the Congo so that we can permit them to work out their own constitutional solutions themselves. We warmly support the statement of the Secretary-General that it was not the function of the United Nations force to intervene in the internal affairs of the Congo. They must be allowed to work out the answer to that problem themselves.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Is not the relative peace and order in Katanga in sharp contrast to the chaotic and bloody state of affairs in M. Lumumba's Republic? Therefore, do not the efforts of M. Tshombe's Government to defend decent standards deserve the support and approval of the nations?

Mr. Lloyd: I think that our purpose must be, without too much comment at present, to see whether it is not possible to get, in a united Congo, support for law and order and stability and some tolerance for their various constitutional problems and difficulties.

Mr. Grimond: While welcoming the right hon. and learned Gentleman's statement, and appreciating that he may not want to go much further today, may I ask whether the Foreign Secretary will agree that there are considerable difficulties about the situation? When he said that it is not the function of the United Nations to interfere in the internal affairs of a country, is that not inevitably what they are doing in the Congo? What are the present directives to the United Nations force? Is it simply to get out the white people who are endangered, or to restore order on behalf of the Government, or is it to interfere in some way between Katanga and the central Government? If it is the last named, it seems a difficult matter and one on which the House should have further information at some point before we wholeheartedly approve of the United Nations force simply being put into the Congo without rather more explicit directives.

Mr. Lloyd: The hon. Member asked me whether I am aware of the difficulties of the situation. I would say to him, "You're telling me". I am very much aware of the difficulties, and have been ever since the crisis started.
As to the rôle of the United Nations, I certainly do not regard it as limited to getting white people out, and I very much hope that we can create a state of affairs in which people who can help there can stay there, and help to produce a viable, stable Congo. It is a wrong idea to regard this as just an operation to get the white people out. We hope that in this newly-independent territory we may get conditions of stability so that it can be a viable and united state. That is our purpose.
There are still these internal problems, because the present Government of the Congo draw their support, I am told, from a considerable number of political parties. Not one of the political leaders has a majority, or more than a small proportion of the votes concerned. That is one of the difficulties of the situation. One does not want to make too precise directives and that is why we seek to leave it to the discretion of the Secretary-General to handle the situation. It would be a fatal mistake to give any currency to the idea that the United Nations forces are to be used to settle internal constitutional problems.

Mr. Goodhart: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that there is considerable anxiety in this country lest the United Nations forces should be used directly or indirectly to try to suppress the legitimate opponents of Prime Minister Lumumba? Can he say whether any precise instructions on this point have been given to the United Nations forces?

Mr. Lloyd: I have already quoted what the Secretary-General said about the way he regards the rôle of the United Nations. One point was raised on the question of the invitation to Mr. Hammarskjoeld. I should have thought that the use of a United Nations intermediary in the situation is something quite different from the use of United Nations forces. Any initiative of that sort is something which we certainly would support.

Mr. Callaghan: Has the Foreign Secretary noticed that an earlier statement on this subject by his Department fell foul of the Prime Minister of the Central African Federation? Can he say whether his present phrase, that assistance should be channelled through the United Nations, has been conveyed to the Prime Minister of the Central African Federation, and whether he agrees with this view?

Mr. Lloyd: I think that regard was being had by the Prime Minister of the Federation to what was reported to have been said by a spokesman of the Foreign Office but that, in fact, was not what had been said. On these matters, judging by the recent statement by Sir Roy Welensky, I do not think that there is a great difference between us.

Mr. F. M. Bennett: Will my right hon. and learned Friend clarify one point about Belgium's obligations under the Security Council directive? Is it to remove her forces altogether when the United Nations takes over or is it to remove her forces to the bases which are guaranteed to her under her defence arrangements with the Congo Government?

Mr. Lloyd: My hon. Friend knows that we did not feel able to vote for the Resolution in the Security Council precisely for that reason—because it was not at all clear what the Security Council was asking the Belgian Government to do. Taking one thing at a time, there is no doubt at present that the United Nations forces have created a stabilising influence. I am told that there is being a gradual withdrawal at the moment by the Belgian forces from Leopoldville. I think that we had better leave it in the terms of my original statement and see how this situation develops.

Mr. Stonehouse: Can the Foreign Secretary say what reply has been sent to Mr. Tshombe's request for the recognition of Katanga as an independent State? Are we to understand from his second supplementary reply that there will be no question of a hasty recognition of Katanga before Mr. Hammarskjoeld's report is considered by the Security Council?

Mr. Lloyd: There will certainly be no question of any hasty action by the Government in this matter, except in the support which we have given for the United Nations' effort which has taken place. I have received Mr. Tshombe's message. No answer has yet been returned.

TERRITORIAL ARMY (REORGANISATION)

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Christopher Soames): Her Majesty's Government have decided upon a reorganisation of the Territorial Army.
Recruitment in the Territorial Army is going well, and volunteer strength has risen from 70,000 in 1957 to about 120,000 today. But the rôle and organisation of the Territorial Army needs to be adapted to modern defence requirements, having regard to the ending of National Service. Its rôle will lie in the

reinforcement of the Regular Army at home and overseas, in support of the civil Power, and as a framework for military expansion.
The Territorial Army will have to be ready, if necessary, to act with speed. It must, therefore, be sharpened, with stronger and better equipped units. Efficiency will be more important than mass, and we accordingly propose to keep the active volunteer strength at about its present total.
Divisional and district headquarters will be amalgamated, and traditional titles will be retained. The primary rôle of these headquarters will be administration and support of the civil Power. The brigade will be the largest fighting formation.
The number of units now in the Territorial Army is geared to a total establishment of 300,000. But, with the ending of National Service reserve liability, this will become a totally unrealistic figure. Moreover, the peace-time volunteer strength cannot maintain so many units at a viable figure for unit training. So a feature of the reorganisation must inevitably be a reduction in the number of units of all arms. Our aim will be to keep units in peace-time at approximately two-thirds of their establishment. A volunteer reserve will be formed from men who have finished their service in the Territorial Army and on mobilisation this reserve will be used to bring units up to establishment.
For the reduction in the number of units we shall proceed by amalgamation rather than disbandment and in close consultation with the Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations. We will be guided by the need to preserve a nation-wide cover. The changes which will result will be published in the autumn.
The Territorial Army has suffered from a lack of modern training equipment. We now intend to provide the reorganised force with scales of some of the more important items in current use with the Regular Army, including rifles, wireless sets, armoured cars, scout cars and transport. This process will begin this year.
As a result of this reorganisation, we shall have a more closely knit Territorial Army, with units at a higher strength, and better related to its modern rôles.


It will be better equipped than ever before in its peace-time history, and more able to train realistically for its important and diverse duties. It will be more youthful and will, I believe, have an even greater sense of military purpose.
I have presented the outline of this plan and the reasons for it to the Territorial Army Advisory Committee and to the chairmen of the Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations. I am glad to report to the House that they have agreed both to its need and its purpose, and I hope, therefore, that it will have the support of the Territorial Army as a whole.

Mr. Strachey: I should like to ask the Secretary of State for War three questions on this statement. The first is about equipment. He tells us that the new Territorial Army will have new equipment, and he uses the rather strange phrase, "including rifles". That is reassuring, as far as it goes, but we should rather like to know which rifles. Has he in mind the new F.N. automatic rifle or the old rifle? Will he deny or confirm the rather alarming report which has been in the Press that some of the new Territorials are to have the F.N. automatic rifle but not all of them? If this is so, does he think that it is a tolerable or a tenable position that this force should be armed some with one type of rifle and some with another? Generally, will he expand a little about the equipment, because it is of the utmost importance. The equipment must surely come after the re-equipment of the Regular Army. Can he assure the House that this re-equipment, both with rifles and with any other equipment, will be pushed on?
My second question is about the rôles. I fully understand the need for emphasising the military rôles of the Territorial Army, but is the phrase
in support of the civil Power
meant to cover the civil defence rôle of the Territorial Army, because I think this is very important and that we should not lose sight of it? It should always be kept in mind that the force is of great importance for this purpose.
Thirdly, may we assume that the Territorial Army will be wholly a conventional force and that there is no ques-

tion of its receiving tactical nuclear weapons? If it is so, how can it be expected to fulfil the purpose to which the Secretary of State refers, of
the reinforcement of the Regular Army at home and overseas"?
My impression of the Regular Army in Germany was that it is coming more and more to think of itself in an exclusively nuclear rôle. If the Territorial Army is entirely conventional, how can it possibly act as a reinforcement to a nuclearised Regular Army? Is not this an additional reason for keeping alive the conventional rôle of the Regular Army—not merely paying lip-service to it but, in equipment and training, keeping alive the conventional rôle?

Mr. Soames: May I answer the last question first? The Territorial Army will be equipped entirely with conventional weapons. Although the Army in B.A.O.R. has a nuclear capability, it is primarily a conventional force. There are a few units with a nuclear capability, but of the 50,000-odd men in B.A.O.R. only a very small proportion are handling nuclear weapons.
The right hon. Gentleman asked whether the phrase
in support of the civil Power
included civil defence, and the answer is, "Yes, it does".
As the right hon. Gentleman supposes, the Territorial Army will be provided with the equipment which I have mentioned after the Regular Army has been fully equipped. We are proposing to issue the wireless sets fairly soon. The Regular Army is already equipped with Ferret scout cars and Saladins and the Regular Army will very shortly be equipped with the wireless sets. The rifle which is in use in the Territorial Army at the moment is the Lee Enfield. That will continue. They will still have the Lee Enfield rifle, but a number of the new F.N. rifles will be issued to each unit so that individuals may train and shoot with them and learn how to handle them.

Sir O. Prior-Palmer: On the assumption that the time was ripe for a general reorganisation of the Territorial Army. I suggest that this seems to be an imaginative and sensible scheme which will kill the wild rumours which have


been circulating recently in various countries. May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he will use his influence to see that amalgamations are carried out on a geographical basis, taking into account geographical proximity and historical association? They should not be made on the same basis as they have been made in the recent past, for example, in the case of the Northamptonshire Yeomanry, which was amalgamated with a regiment in London. That sort of thing does not work. I hope that my right hon. Friend will realise that and ensure that it does not happen again.
Will he agree that his statement, especially his announcement about equipment, will probably inject a new sense of purpose into the Territorial Army, which, possibly, was lacking recently?

Mr. Soames: I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for his approval of the scheme. I agree with him that the reorganisation, with the units at a higher establishment and also having better equipment, will give the Territorial Army a greater sense of purpose. Each amalgamation will be worked out with the Territorial Army associations themselves. One of the primary considerations in this is geographical and territorial associations, which are so important lo these volunteer forces.

Mr. Wigg: Although one will need a little time to study the right hon. Gentleman's statement, I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House will welcome the statement, certainly to the extent that it gives the Territorial Army a sense of purpose and will, therefore, raise its morale.
May I ask the right hon. Gentleman some very obvious questions? First, to what extent does this statement modify the statement already contained in his Estimates of the threefold purpose of the Territorial Army? The first purpose is to support in an active rôle the British Army on the Rhine. The second purpose is the initial task of home defence in all its aspects. The third purpose is the anti-aircraft rôle. Have these been modified in any way?
Secondly, at present the Territorial Army has a liability to be called out without proclamation for home defence and overseas when the General Reserve

is called out by proclamations. Is this liability modified?
Thirdly, do the right hon. Gentleman's proposals in any way involve the amendment of either the 1907 Act or the 1921 Act? If so, when will legislation be introduced?
The fourth question is very obvious. What is the extent to which the Territorial Army falls within the scope of the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces Act, 1953? To what extent shall we have legislation on that subject?

Mr. Soames: As regards the role, the main difference between what the hon. Gentleman read out and what it will be is that the anti-aircraft rôle of the Territorial Army for the air defence of the United Kingdom is disappearing, because the Bofors gun is not capable of reaching the heights at which aircraft fly today.
The position as regards proclamation remains exactly the same. We do not expect to alter it. We do not intend to alter it. I do not envisage any amendment being necessary to the Acts of 1907, 1921 and 1953 as a result of this reorganisation.

Mr. W. Yates: I am a serving officer in the T.A. As we are now to be equipped with rifles and wirelesses, for which we are very grateful, will my right hon. Friend consider the important rôle the T.A. will have to play if it is to support Regular units? Though it does some training with the Regular Army at annual camps, will my right hon. Friend consider arranging for further training, particularly with the Royal Air Force, as vehicles may have to be carried by air, and also with the Royal Navy as we may be required to move by sea? As there is to be no alteration in the proclamation position, I do not see how we are to manage the rôle of supporting the Regular Army when required.

Mr. Soames: I believe that training will be much more realistic now, with units brought up to two-thirds of their establishment. All Territorial Army units will get much more benefit from training in the future than they have in the past, when so many of them were at very low strength indeed. As to further training with the Royal Air Force


and the Royal Navy, already quite a lot of training is done with the R.A.F. by the Territorial Parachute Brigade, and that will continue. We do not intend to alter the position about the proclamation. The support of the Regular Army overseas by the Territorial Army would only be after proclamation.

Mr. Swingler: As Parliament has voted over £13,000 million for the Armed Forces in the past nine years, is it not humiliating for the Secretary of State only now to be able to come forward and say that he will supply the T.A. with radio sets and scout cars? Would the Secretary of State now support an investigation into why this could not have been done before and where all this money has gone?

Mr. Soames: No. Far from finding it humiliating, I find it very exciting to be able to report this today. I am delighted to be able to do so. The money which Parliament has voted in the last few years has not included equipment for the Territorial Army.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I have reason to think that the House may have an opportunity of debating this matter, with a Question before it, fairly soon.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered,
That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock; and that if the first five Resolutions proposed shall have been agreed to by the Committee of Supply before half-past Nine o'clock, the Chairman shall proceed to put forthwith the Questions which he is directed to put at half-past Nine o'clock by paragraph (6) of Standing Order No. 16 (Business of Supply).—[Mr. Redmayne.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[25TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Considered in Committee.

[Sir GORDON TOUCHE in the Chair]

CIVIL ESTIMATES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1960–61; ESTIMATES FOR REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, 1960–61; MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ESTIMATE, 1960–61; NAVY ESTIMATES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1960–61; ARMY ESTIMATES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1960–61; AIR ESTIMATES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1960–61; NAVY EXPENDITURE, 1958–59; ARMY EXPENDITURE, 1958–59; AIR EXPENDITURE, 1958–59

CIVIL ESTIMATES, 1960–61

CLASS V

VOTE 5. NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, ENGLAND AND WALES

Resolved,
That a sum, not exceeding £345,672,485, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for the provision of national health services for England and Wales and other services connected therewith, including payments to Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man, medical services for pensioners, etc., disabled as a result of war, or of service in the Armed Forces after the 2nd day of September, 1939, certain training arrangements including certain grants in aid, the purchase of appliances, equipment, stores, etc., necessary for the services, and certain expenses in connection with civil defence.—[£173,500,000 has been voted on account.]

CIVIL ESTIMATES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1960–61

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £42,535,460, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for expenditure in respect of the services included in the following Ministry of Defence, Navy, Army Air and Civil Estimates, viz.:

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ESTIMATE, 1960–61, NAVY ESTIMATES, 1960–61, ARMY ESTIMATES, 1960–61, AIR ESTIMATES, 1960–61, AND CIVIL ESTIMATES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1960–61.



£


Ministry of Defence
11,045,000


Navy Estimates, Vote 12, Admiralty Office
9,915,000


Army Estimates, Vote 3, War Office
6,520,000


Air Estimates, Vote 3, Air Ministry
5,750,000


Civil Estimates, Class II, Vote 1 (Foreign Service) (including a Supplementary sum of £32,150)
9,305,460


Total
£42,535,460

DEFENCE

3.58 p.m.

Mr. George Brown: We want to debate today a subject which is of tremendous importance to the nation and a situation of extreme gravity, as many of us believe. I think that the best comment on the gravity of the situation was the great excitement which the Secretary of State for War said he felt a few minutes ago—be obviously felt great pleasure in saying it—at being able to announce that, in 1960, some rifles, which all the Regular Army has not yet got, will be distributed at some stage to some of the Territorial Army units which at present, apparently, have none. Nothing could highlight better the gravity of the situation.
I heard one of my hon. Friends sitting behind me say that we are looking today at the consummation of the efforts of eight or nine Defence Ministers—for all I know, there may well be another very soon—and the expenditure of £13,000 million, and goodness knows how much effort into the bargain. The effect of it at the end of the day is that Britain lacks, in general, a defence policy. It lacks any real strategy to fit into that philosophical picture. It appears from what the Secretary of State for War said the other day at a meeting of the Army League that the Army will lack the men that it needs for the job. It is no good the Minister shaking his head. I will come back to that in a moment. It certainly lacks the equipment and the vehicles that those men, if they were there, would need if they were to be effective in the years immediately ahead of us. I propose to say a word about each of those in turn but, first, I should like briefly to refer to the general picture.
One of the difficulties seems to be that we cannot get the party opposite to face up to the existing situation. Over the last eight years we have had some of the most violent switches in defence policy that can ever have been executed. We have only to think back to 1957–58, to the doctrine of the then Minister of Defence and his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, and then think of the situation for which we are now planning—just those two things alone—to see the vast changes there have been.
There has been almost astronomical expenditure on items that have never come to fruition or into service at all. Weapons are constantly being announced as being under research and development, but they hardly ever reach service. Every time we have a defence debate, we are debating not the weapons that right hon. Gentlemen opposite announced were coming in some years ago, and which ought to be here now; all the time—and this year is no exception—we are debating a new weapon, again under research and development which, like the others, may never arrive at all. It is not unfair to say that, at the end of the picture, the Army is neither equipped for its part in a limited war nor is it equipped for the defence of the Western Alliance and of N.A.T.O.
I recall this just to say that the other day the Prime Minister, here to deal with something else, made a cheap gibe at my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and those of us on this side about the problems that the Opposition face in arriving at their own assessment of the new position and the policies that should be followed in it. I do not complain if the Prime Minister wants to make his little party point, but while it may be true that we on this side conduct too much of our argument in the open, or, perhaps, too much argument altogether—I do not know—I wish that I could think that the Conservative Party was having any argument about defence anywhere at all. Instead of that, we are met with this absolutely monolithic front from which one can only deduce that no argument is going on. Otherwise, there would be bound to be expressions of dissatisfaction, and of disagreement, on that side of the Committee as well as on this.
We have tried to face the present situation with honesty, with candour and,


we like to think, with realism, to try to produce out of the shambles that now passes for the Government's defence policy—a shambles that we did not produce, but one which was produced by those who have been in office for the past nine years—a defence policy that matches the problems, the needs and the resources. We are not, as the Government are, still face-saving desperately; we are not still refusing to face up to the facts of the situation, as the Government are; we are not still pretending that weapons exist when they do not exist, as the Government are doing, to avoid facing the facts.
I do not especially blame the present incumbent of the office of Minister of Defence for this. No doubt he thinks that he is a strong and realistic Minister—just as did the present Minister of Aviation before him. My own case is that the man who, all the way through, has dominated the scene; the man who, in fact, produced the untenable doctrines, as they have now turned out to be, of 1957 and 1958; the man who, in fact, enforced the switch to the now defunct Blue Streak missile; the man who really played politics with the Army and connived at the "cooking of the books" that produced the unreal figure that the Government said they would get in the Army, is neither of those two right hon. Gentlemen, but is, in fact, the Prime Minister himself.
The irony of it all is that be was so anxious to produce a policy switch that would save money that, in the end, he has brought us to the position where we have wasted more millions of pounds—more hundreds of millions, I suppose—than if he had never tried that money-saving operation at all. I do not think that gibes about defence policy lie at all in the mouth of the Prime Minister. Whatever anyone else can do on that subject, I should have thought that his record was really so bad that he could not do it.
Before I turn to details of defence deficiences I would ask the Committee to look at the vast changes that have gone on in the world of weapons and of politics over the years for which the Government have been responsible—and even since the ill-fated doctrine of 1957. I do not think that any one of us here today needs apologise for seeing things dif-

ferently now from how he saw them in 1957—and that would go for Ministers as well as for us on this side of the Committee. The changes have been of such a tremendous order, politically and otherwise, that the only shame would be if one had not seen the changes or, having seen them, had not taken account of them.
Defence, as has been so often said, can only be an arm of one's foreign policy, and if the international picture changes and, therefore, the foreign policies one pursues in it change, the instrument should change as well. We have surely learned that. We on this side learned it, if we did not already know it, at the time of Suez, though Ministers did not seem to learn it then. Those who did not or have not learned it, are learning it the hard way.
Recent events in the Congo surely bring out the fact that there is now a new political situation in the world. There is practically no incident, no matter how small, that is not likely to be a spark for something much bigger if one is not extremely careful. Many things flow from that, but I do not think that Ministers see it and, therefore, do not get their defence policy into line. There is no territory or Power so small or unimportant today that cannot invoke powerful friends. We may say "friends", if we like but, at the moment, those Powers see them as friends and can, by invoking those friends, invoke the risk involved in the new weapons that existed to such a limited extent only a very short time ago.
It is because of this that we have to face the fact that there is a great limitation, a great change, considerable restrictions on the sort of defence policy we can run and, therefore, there have to be great changes in what we provide for it. This is not the occasion on which to debate the foreign policy conclusions of this, but, as was said earlier today. when the Foreign Secretary made his statement, it has its encouraging side. It would seem that the nations, however reluctantly, however unwillingly and hesitatingly, are being driven by the new threat in the situation towards a limited—though it may be none the less effective for all that—form of world authority, and towards some form of international security force. But, whatever may be the encouraging side, there are big issues


that our own defence planners have to take into account, and I beg leave to doubt whether they are doing so.
One of the consequences for defence in all this is that the terrifying risks of the situation that can arise from any one incident place much greater emphasis on the need within the Western Alliance for genuine deterrents to take hold of the role. By "deterrents" I do not mean what the right hon. Gentleman once thought were deterrents—reserving the right to strike first; the massive nuclear attack—but a continuing level of policy aimed at deterring any kind of build-up of the conflict from any one level to another.
In the light of what has happened, I do not think that it is now possible to do what the right hon. Gentleman did. It is no longer possible to confuse deterrents and first strike, but in view of what the Government are still doing I am not at all sure that they have seen that, or, if they have, have turned it into practical effect in day-to-day policies.
I think that the consequence is that it must lessen the degree of importance given to nuclear weapons in any military strategy at all, which is one of the great changes that have taken place over the last few years. For one thing, nuclear weapons have not come forward as we were told at one stage they would. We have not got steadily down to the lower and the more usable thing, as people used to say. But, in any case, the risk of getting on to the nuclear escalator is so much more clearly in the minds of everybody now that we have to reduce in our defence thinking, whether nationally or in the alliance, the importance given to all this.
That has the other consequence that it raises the prominence and priority that we ought 'to give to the ability to deter, or to hold, if not to deter, at the non-nuclear level. Once one recognises that, certain things follow. This will affect our British defence thinking—I am thinking of our own home, national defence thinking—in this way: it must raise in our minds the question of what our contribution to our own defence and that of the Western world can best be. We have to work this out now, and I do not think that Ministers are doing so. But in working it out, two other con-

siderations help considerably in arriving at the result.
It will obviously be true now that the old imperial commitment of which we talk so much, and of which the Secretary of State seemed to be talking a little while ago when he referred in some detail—I saw the report of his speech; I was not present—to the kind of commitments that we had all over the world and for which we had to provide forces, will undergo a change. I believe that the effect of Suez and of the Congo, the effect of what immediately happens is to make a great change in the extent of the old imperial commitments. The chances of doing anything are so very much reduced because other forces come into play. World opinion comes into play. Other powers come into play, and one would have far less 'opportunity, even if one wanted, to carry out this old commitment in the future than one has ever had in the past. The second consideration which must be in our minds is that unless we got there extraordinarily quickly, whatever we wanted to do, other things would be there before us. Therefore, it affects the Whole business of our approach to mobility and to the way in which we are going to equip and arm our Army.
I shall return to that later, but I want to proceed from that to the question of the independent British nuclear deterent, the question of our contribution to the Western deterrent and the question of nuclear weapons that we may think we need. I will not again go over the sorry story of Blue Streak, except to record once again, so that it is not forgotten, that it was a sorry story, a case of obstinacy carried through almost to the point of lunacy, and that it ended in a fog of evasion which Ministers still have not cleared up. It is somewhat to the discredit of the party opposite that so far there has been from the opposite side of the Committee no attempt to clear away the fog of evasion in which that project collapsed. The cost of it is still more than twice what hon. Members opposite have ever been willing to admit. Therefore, it is in every way to be regarded still as a very sorry story.
What is more germane to the argument that I want to develop is what I regard as the Government's persistent refusal even now to face the inevitable—and I


mean inevitable—corollary of their own decision. However one thinks about the consequences of Blue Streak—and I am sure that we all have; the newspapers have written about it and commentators have commented upon it—one comes back to the same conclusion. Britain will not, after the decision takes effect, make an independent nuclear contribution to the Western nuclear deterrent.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Does the right hon. Gentleman mean manufacture, or make in the sense of exploit?

Mr. Brown: I mean make, manufacture, provide. It just cannot now be so.

Brigadier Sir Otho Prior-Palmer: Why not?

Mr. Brown: Because we have decided mot to make the one independent means of giving effect to it. It might be argued that buying parts of it from somebody else, some day when we are allowed to do so, would be to have a share in it, but it cannot take the place of making our own contribution.

Mr. Richard Collard: rose—

Mr. Brown: I cannot give way again. I have already given way once.
If Ministers are willing to say "Yes, we will be making something independently at some stage", we ought to be told about it. At present, we are going on information provided, and I do not think that there is any doubt that there is no plan anywhere for us to make or provide independently our own deterrent, after the V-bombers have ceased to exist and after the date when Blue Streak would have been our independent deterrent.
We in the Labour Party are trying to face this situation in our new policy. We have got to face the fact that there is this collapse, this gap, this great change from what we have been trying to do to what we think we will do in the future. But this is added to by some other problems that have to be faced and which the Government do not seem to face. The first is the new risk of the spread of the bomb. There used to be a risk that the bomb would be spread by people obtaining the "know-how",

manufacturing it themselves and manufacturing the means of delivery themselves. But the moment we start talking about buying or acquiring, by gift or purchase, from somebody else, then the risk of the spread of the bomb takes on an altogether new characteristic. It takes on a new urgency.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Christopher Soames): The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Christopher Soames) indicated dissent.

Mr. Brown: The Secretary of State shakes his head, but it is recognised everywhere else except in the Cabinet.
America recognises this very well. The very reason that the Americans do not want to do any bilateral deal about Polaris, the one missile which exists, is that they do not know how they would hold the French pressure for a bilatera deal the moment they did it with us. We all know that the German Government's position is that they can accept the situation now while no other Continental Power is involved, but the moment the Americans made this available to some other Continental Power they would demand it, too. This is the problem that is being faced by everybody except Her Majesty's Government, so far as I can see.
We have tried to face the fact that the old arrangement by which we and the Americans kept it to ourselves was based upon this special relationship which we talk about and which the Americans were willing to say they accorded to us because of our contribution in that field. But the moment we acquire it by gift or purchase, the old special relationship no longer exists. This is the problem which would be created for everybody the moment there was the sale or gift to this country of a strategic missile capable of carrying a thermo-nuclear warhead.
There is also the other consideration that we have tried to lake into account din our policy, which I mentioned earlier, about the changing place of the thermonuclear deterrent in allied strategy. We conclude that ft is better on all grounds—practical and policy grounds—to recognise the facts, to accept What they mean, and then concentrate on the consequent problems, both political and military, which are very great, to which it gives rise. But not so Her Majesty's Government.
This is the point to which I now want to address my remarks. In the first place, we have the Skybolt humbug. With great respect, it is humbug. I do not believe that any Minister is taken in by it. My own conclusion is that this is an oblique way of putting across a change of policy consequent on their own Blue Streak decision, in such a way that they do not arouse too much opposition immediately inside the Conservative Party. Any assumption other than that would be to take such a low view of Ministers' understanding, of their grasp, of their guts or veracity, that I shrink from it, even in their case.
Let us get down again to Skybolt and let me return to some of the things which were said when we discussed the matter before. First, it does not exist. In spite of all the rather sly insinuations that there is something in California which is just waiting to be bought by us, it does not exist. We do not yet know what the final configuration will be. We do not know exactly what sort of guidance it will have. We do not know much about it, even if it ever comes to exist. We have not bought it and, although the Minister occasionally implies that we have decided to buy Skybolt and, therefore, need not worry about the departure of Blue Streak, because there will be something to follow on, in fact we have not bought Skybolt.
What we have done is to buy a certain limited right for some of our technicians to share with American technicians in the development work on Skybolt. If the Minister says that we 'have done more than that, he must tell us, but up to now that is all we have got from him. It is up to him to show that my facts are not right. He said that I was wrong in what I said about the expenditure on Blue Streak, but in that, as in many other 'things, I turned out to be nearer the truth than he was. I understand that we have bought the right to participate in development work 'on a missile which is under development and which may or may not come to fruition.
I go further. The Americans have not bought it. One remembers what happened to the Canadian aircraft company, Avro, which made such a great switch in its aircraft programme on the assumption that Bomarc was to be produced, only to find that the Americans cancelled

the project when they found that it was no use to them. Therefore, we ought not to read too much into the present situation. The Americans have not bought Skybolt and might not buy it.

Mr. J. Grimond: I am following the right hon. Gentleman's argument with interest. Am I right in saying that his attack on the Government is for failing to provide an independent deterrent which he feels should be provided, either through manufacture in this country or by purchase from the Americans, and which, he says, the Government have failed to provide?

Mr. Brown: I do not understand how the hon. Member can have been listening to what I said before I reached this point. I went to same lengths to explain my view of the situation and of the policy changes and my reasons for saying why we should accept them. I am attacking the Government for evasion and for what I believe to be downright deceit. I am not now examining what they should have done. I am pointing out that they have no right for claiming what they say will be so and I am examining the position on their awn evidence.
Nobody knows when Skybolt may exist or what it will cost. [Laughter.] I do not know what the Secretary of State for War finds so funny. If we could get from Ministers a little less of this inane laughter and a little more willingness to answer questions openly and above board, questions which the people have the right to put, we might get a better policy. Nobody knows when Skybolt will exist, or what it will cost, and nobody knows what United States policy will be at the time, if Skybolt ever exists.
I believe that the talk about Skybolt is partly for the morale of the party opposite and partly for the morale of the Royal Air Force—for the Royal Air Force here and for the American Air Force; and I can appreciate the point of that at this time. What I do not see is where it gets us, because some day somebody will have to face the truth and we might as well do it now, because if we do not we shall go on getting invalid, irrelevant policies because of the existence of this miasma in place of the truth and we shall involve ourselves in much more useless expenditure and,


in consequence, fail to do the things which need to be done in the interim.
I will give an example of how that is already happening. We have had the picture of this state of affairs with the example of Blue Steel, this new self-propelled, stand-off bomb. The Minister of Aviation, who was then Minister of Defence, cancelled the Mark II edition of that bomb, which was to fly under its own power for quite a long way, a distance said to be 600 or 900 miles. It is now said that it is to be reintroduced and that we are to have the extension development of the Mark I of Blue Steel.
I think that Blue Steel has been brought back into the picture because of the business about Skybolt. The Government are trying to bring back something which will carry them over from now until the time at which they think Skybolt will be available. That is what I mean when I say that we get into more evasions and more irrellevant policies and more wasteful expenditure once we start on the business of refusing to face consequences.
I will not go into the tragic story of the Minister of Defence's involvement with my hon. Friend the Member for Bosworth (Mr. Wyatt). The right hon. Gentleman was extremely lucky to leave only a few tail feathers behind. Had there been any justice in the world, he would have had a rough time. The then Minister of Defence cancelled Blue Steel originally because it was a flat-flying missile. Does that reason still hold good? If it does, why is the Minister now going on with the extension development of the Mark I, which will, presumably, be subject to the same criticism, plus the fact that the bomber carrying it will have to get much nearer to the target that would have been the case with the cancelled version? If the original reasons do not hold good, does that not mean that the project should not have been cancelled in the first place and that the mistake with Blue Streak was even worse than we thought?
My other question on this is whether the Minister would be messing about with the business of fitting bomb to bomber or bomber to bomb to get a 100-mile stand-off capability, with the anti-aircraft rocket defence which is now available, if it were not for the fact that

he is involved in the Skybolt business. Therefore, does not the whole matter turn on the fact that we are again being committed to policies and expenditures because the Government have got into their eyes a weapon which does not exist, which may never exist and about which nobody has any view?
I appeal to the Government now to accept the facts as we have accepted them and as, I suspect, all their advisers, with the possible exception of the Royal Air Force, have accepted them and as the Government themselves will accept them in two or three years. In that way they will be able to use the released energy and resources to handle the political consequences and to fill in other alarming gaps in the situation.
I want to consider some of those gaps and deal, first, with the man-power situation, manpower for the Army, in particular—although it now begins to be certain that the Royal Air Force will not reach its target, either. I am not seeking to make political capital out of these things, but it is time that the House, Ministers and the public faced what is now coming.
We know about the original "cooking of the books". The right hon. Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head), who is now going to another place on his way to Nigeria, as High Commissioner, was good enough to tell us about the Hull Committee and how the figures were arranged to provide a figure which the then Minister of Defence could accept. We have followed the tortuous attempts of the Secretary of State over a long period to maintain that there would be no problem. He has judiciously mixed figures and dates so that we have never been very clear about to which date he was applying which figure, or whether he was taking the figure of 180,000 or 165,000. Sometimes he talks about the end of 1962 and sometimes about the beginning of 1963, while at others he speaks of 1965. He has constantly mixed them together in the hope of avoiding being brought to book.
However, in November last year, not so long ago, he committed himself quite firmly and he spoke of what the strength of the Army would be at the end of 1962. This was not half way through 1963, nothing to do with 1965, but at the end of 1962 when the last of the National


Service men has left the Army. He went on:
I can still give a confident answer to that question. I believe"—
he then got to the beginning of 1963—
that the beginning of 1963—I base my thought on the evidence that we have had now over two years of the new terms of service—will find us with an Army with a strength of at least 165,000 all ranks, which was the target set in 1957, and I also believe that we shall in the majority of arms have exceeded the target and be on the way"—
all by the beginning of 1963—
to reaching the higher ceiling of about 180,000…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1939; Vol. 613, c. 624–5.]
That was the right hon. Gentleman's view in November, 1959. Last week he went to the Army League, where I was not, and he gave them a speech at a lunch. I have had only the report of it which appeared in The Times, though I have seen a much larger and, I think, the full text of what he had to say, which has been circulated on a more limited basis. According to The Times, which headed the article, "Army will not reach target. Admission on recruiting", the Minister said:
Projecting forward the present trend of recruiting figures we will reach 165,000 in the early days of 1963.
The right hon. Gentleman thought that it would be 1965 before we reached the target of 180,000. He went on to talk about the extent to which we were tightly stretched. Is not the present position that we shall not be at the 165,000 figure—about which the Minister was confident in November of 1959—at all by the end of National Service; that we therefore now face a period when we shall not only not have the optimum figure, which was 180,000, but we shall not have the necessary minimum of 165,000; that we shall, therefore, be down below the absolute minimum that everybody has always said that we required? If one reads the letter from Lieut.-General Poett to some of his units, of which I have a copy, or the list of questions published the other day in The Times, one sees that people have been talking outside this House of a figure higher than 165,000 as the figure which is really needed.
I want to ask the Minister of Defence to face this. Does he accept that there will be significantly less than 165,000 at the turn of 1962–63, at the end of the

year when National Service finishes? If not, I think that the Secretary of State must provide an answer to what he himself said at the Army League luncheon. If that is so, does not it mean that we have not only less than the optimum but less than the necessary minimum and that this will continue for some time?
The right hon. Gentleman maintained that it would only be for a few months, but how do we know? Might it not turn out to be longer? All the time the right hon. Gentleman has been moving his targets back and his periods forward. I wish to ask this specific question. Does the pledge, or statement, or whatever it was, that the then Minister of Defence gave in paragraph 48 of the 1957 White Paper—which was confirmed by the present Minister on 22nd June of this year—still stand, namely, that if we reached this position and we could not get the minimum, selective service would have to be considered by the Government?
I wish to ask what the Government intend to do about the situation. Are they taking any action to deal with this at all? Will there be a cut in commitments? So far as I can see, the Secretary of State took pains to restate 'them all, even though he was facing the fact that he was not getting the men he hoped to have and indeed needed to have. Will he do anything now to stimulate recruiting? If not, will he make use of selective service and, if so, how? This would be a very powerful operation to get a few thousand men and it would have a tremendous impact on the nation.
Do the Government intend to sit on their hands and do nothing while the situation gets more and more tragic and difficult? If we have not the minimum, it is already tragic. If, in fact, the trend were to go the other way, and we found more and not less difficulty in getting recruits, we could find ourselves down to 150,000 or 155,000 instead of the 165,000 by the middle of 1963. Here I think that there is a criminal evasion about a matter of absolute supreme importance, and that we are entitled to ask the Government to give clear answers; or to take responsibility for the fact that they are not going to bother and that it will come right. I hope that we shall receive a lot of support from hon. Members opposite in the middle of next year, if we find that the Government have evaded


the issue in 1960 rather than facing it when they should have done.
I wish to pass to the next question, that of mobility of this small Army. Even were we to get the optimum figure of 180,000 it would still be fearfully stretched for the jobs which the Government want it to do. Mobility would be still of enormous importance. But if we are not to get the optimum, and if we are not even to get the absolute minimum, it becomes of absolutely crashing importance. What is the position? We have never been given straight answers, I hope that we shall get them today.
What is the position regarding freight carrying airplanes? I do not want to be answered by references to the Britannic. I am not talking about ability to move men but our ability—at a time when we shall be so stretched that if we are to get anywhere it will have to be almost always by air—to get heavy and awkward equipment to our Forces?
Ministers ought now to know what they would not tell us in the last defence debate. When do we expect to have our own freight-carrying planes? What orders has the Minister yet placed for the Britannic? What production order has been given? When does he expect it in service and when does he expect the Argosy? Is not it a fact that neither of these planes, neither the long distance one nor the short-haul one, can be there in time to affect the present situation? Is not it a fact that, as things stand, we shall face a situation when we have a very small Army with no tactical or strategic heavy lift capabilities at all? Is not it questionable that even when they come, as at present intended, they will not fill the need?
When I raised this matter before, the Minister of Aviation as I well remember, interrupted me with the question would I buy American planes. The right hon. Gentleman thought that he was on a powerful point and he kept on at me to get an answer, yes or no, which—

Mr. George Wigg: May I interrupt my hon. Friend, to stop up one possible loophole? I had an Adjournment debate on 4th May in which I inquired whether the Britannic had been ordered. I was told that the contract was not then signed. Is my right hon. Friend aware that the contract is still

not signed? Would he, therefore, be good enough to amend his question in relation to the Britannic, so that it is not in terms of orders but when the contract will be signed?

Mr. Brown: All right, my hon. Friend has added a question and perhaps the Minister will tell us whether he has signed the contract.
But the information I still want is his assessment of the time when he will have these in service. I wish to know whether the production order has been placed. I can then work out from that the time-scale for the engineering work to take place. What my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has said reinforces my assertion that these planes cannot be here on any time scale which will help the problem and assist the Secretary of State for War or whoever is passed the job of making this tiny Army stretch over all the jobs which the Government have in mind for it.
I was going to answer the Minister of Aviation who asked, would I, in those circumstances, buy American, in the circumstances which Ministers have produced? I will ask the Minister of Defence, straightforwardly, would not it be better to recognise that we cannot get airplanes of our own to do this job in time, and since we must support the Army properly and give it what it needs, would not it be better to go into the question of building the American Hurcules, the heavy-lift airplane under licence here? It could be built with Rolls-Royce Tyne engines in Ulster, as the Britannic will not arrive in time. It is in service and has the sort of performance which we require for the job envisaged by the Secretary of State.
Would not it be better to face the consequences of what I am told the newspapers call the "Sandys' moratorium"—I understand that is the term for the period during which the right hon. Gentleman was Minister of Defence? Would not it be better to accept the consequences of that and order this other plane to be built here?
The same deficiency of aeroplanes, which I have talked about, could be brought out in almost every sphere of the Army's equipments and weapons. We cannot put this very tiny Army in a position to do its job, no matter what 

decisions are taken now, by the end of 1962. The story is the same whether it is anti-tank weapons, guns, missiles, the full issue even of the rifle, the replacement of the machine gun, the replacement of the Centurion tank—everywhere we look we find that the Army is running down below the figures which the Ministers themselves wanted a little while ago. We find it with gaps in every respect—its equipment, its support, its mobility.
I have spent a little time on this because I do not think that either the country or hon. Members opposite are alive to the gravity of the situation which has now come about. This is far more than a party point, although I am entitled to make a party point of it, too. If Ministers fail, the Opposition is entitled to take advantage of it. But it is far more than that. This is a situation of extreme gravity. So far as we can piece together what we know, it is a very worrying, indeed a frightening situation, and all that we have from the Ministers is the utmost evasion every time.
I turn from that to N.A.T.O., because there are one or two matters there that I want to raise, which are again of tremendous importance to this country, and on which I think that Ministers are again not facing up to. When I talk about N.A.T.O. I mean the whole Western Alliance. The first is the use of the American bases in this country. I want to get one thing clear. I hope that the Minister of Defence is quite sure that he will face the logic of his own decision on Blue Streak and get rid of the Thor bases. We can make no sense of what he has decided on Blue Streak if we go on keeping the American Thors here. They are much more vulnerable, much more dangerous, much less useful in defence.
I turn to the use of the other bases here. I shall not develop this in view of the assurance that we had from the Prime Minister yesterday. I understand that officials are now discussing it and shortly he will be discussing it with the President. I hope that we shall then be given, as soon as we can be given, information about what happens. If possible, I would hope for some report before the Recess. I want to make this clear so that there is no misunderstanding.
This time the agreement must be a comprehensive one. It must provide for

a really effective British share of the control of the operations from those bases. Ministers must be in a position to know what is going on and in an effective position to intervene if what is going on is what ought not to go on, and to intervene in time for it to be effective. We should make it perfectly plain that this is what we and, I believe, the bulk of the people in the country, whether they vote Labour or Conservative, feel on this matter.
We must this time be told in full what the terms are. There has been too much to worry people in the last months for us to accept again any assurance that this matter is too secret, too highly important for us to be told. I make my position clear. So long as it is a proper and necessary requirement of membership of the alliance, I shall support these kind of bases here, but not in the terms that have been operating up to now. That is just not possible.
We must now have an effective British share in the operation and be in a position to deal with it, and Ministers must expect to have to tell us what they have done if they want our support on this issue.
The second point which worries me about N.A.T.O.—and I now come to S.H.A.P.E.—is the part that nuclear weapons, and especially long-range nuclear missiles, are to play. I am very worried about what British Ministers are doing. Again we cannot gat straight answers. It cannot make sense to distort the defensive posture, the holding posture of that military alliance by putting into it strategic, last resort deterrent missiles in an offensive role. If we put Mace missiles and, even worse, Polaris missiles into the forward strategy of S.H.A.P.E. and the forward areas of S.H.A.P.E., we shall inevitably get file strategy building around them. We shall turn from an alliance whose job it is to hold and fight for a pause and to give an opportunity for reflection and turn it into an alliance whose only immediate reaction to anything will be to poop off the one thing that we want to avoid being pooped off by anyone. In other words, we shall be talking about deterrents, but we ourselves may be likely to start an H-bomb war in the West, which can never benefit the West.
A first strike H-bomb effort by the West can never be of benefit to us. Yet


we have the Americans putting great pressure on N.A.T.O. They have already had their way about the Mace. Now they are putting great pressure on getting Polaris distributed there and to integrate it with the forces on the Continent. We do not know what steps Ministers are taking to oppose this, and we do not even know that it is the policy of the Government to oppose it.
The strategic aircraft command was never put under S.H.A.P.E. for very good reasons. I consider that the Ministers should face up to why strategic missiles—and a missile that can reach Moscow must be in the strategic area—have a different relationship to the one that we thought was the only safe and possible one in the case of strategic aircraft. I hope that Ministers will not be misled by the comparison with the tactical aircraft. This is not the real comparison at all. I am sure that the other one is.
I beg the Ministers to recognise the German issue here. Let us be fair to the Germans. I do not believe that the present Government even want the Polaris missiles. I know that the S.P.D. does not and I know that large numbers of Germans do not. Do not let us allow the Americans or anybody else in N.A.T.O. start to put such pressure on them that a situation happens that would be militarily inadvisable, militarily wrong, and also politically very difficult and very dangerous indeed. I hope that Ministers will oppose this and say that they will oppose it not merely on purely military but also on political grounds.
The third thing which I do not understand is what the Ministers are doing in the field of political institutions in N.A.T.O. At the moment they do not exist. On the other hand, they are more badly needed than ever, partly because of developments in N.A.T.O. itself and partly because of the change which will come over the alliance when we lose, as we shall soon, our own special influence and our own special control. The need for political institutions applies not only to the need for control over weapons or control over the strategy of the alliance or over the policy of the alliance, but also to some means of influencing and co-ordinating the policies of its separate allies.
I do not believe that it is as difficult as folk are apt to say—that we must

have one finger on the trigger and fifteen on the guard. I do not accept that it is as difficult as that. The standing group procedure on the military side, which has always worked well, offers quite a good parallel for what could be put upon the political side. It is not difficult to think up ways and means of doing it. What is necessary is to insist on the alliance that it must be done. If we do that, we shall not be alone. In fact, had we been prepared to give General de Gaulle a bit of support on this issue some time ago, a lot of other problems which we have had with Europe might not have arisen, quite apart from being able to settle this one.
I want to end what I have to say with an appeal through this Committee to the people outside, very largely to the great bulk of people who make up the Labour movement. This is a difficult field for us. Of that there is no doubt. All our instincts, our traditions and our faith are revolted when we seem to be considering means of destruction, however much we remind ourselves that we are planning to deter and trying to avert such things 'happening. Nevertheless, I believe more strongly than ever that freedom, the democratic way of doing things and the advance to effective social democracy and all we stand for depend upon the answers which we give in this difficult field.
We have worked on our answers in the document "Foreign Defence Policy", which is now before the country, before the House of Commons and before our people. We have worked on our answers. There is good reason to think that we have probably got them as nearly right this time as can be. We are heartened by the reception of them by informed and civilised opinion here and by the fact that there is now, for the first time, a real unit existing in this difficult field between the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party and the German S.P.D. It seems to me that we in the Labour movement, because of the collapse there and because of the consequences of Government action, have to awaken the public mind to understand the dangerous vacuum which has been created by the Government and the kind of policy which should be followed in its place.
I hope that I may appeal to the Labour movement frankly, honestly and openly


to let us rise above any reservations that we may have as individuals to unite in trust and confidence among ourselves to bring security and effectiveness into the foreign and defence policies of this country.

4.53 p.m.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Harold Watkinson): I should like to respond to the first thing that the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said. He may remember that in the defence debate I said that the Government were engaged at that time, and had been engaged before then, on a detailed examination of this country's military tasks in a rapidly changing world. Of course, we are doing that. It would be utterly wrong if we were not. Therefore, the beginning of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, when he implied that it was only the Socialist Party that was trying to rethink the problems of what we all accept in a rapidly changing world, both technologically and strategically, was incorrect. He was a rather changed right hon. Gentleman today. I welcome that. The old Adam peeped out a couple of times, but perhaps the mantle of greater authority is to descend on the right hon. Gentleman's shoulders; I do not know.
We on this side have tried to be factual and objective about defence policy. We have not tried to belabour the Opposition on a subject—on this, at least, probably the right hon. Gentleman and I agree—which, as a prominent trade union leader said, should not be too clouded with the more extreme forms of political wrangling. The difficulty is that the right hon. Gentleman and his friends, I do not know whether genuinely in mistaken beliefs or for their own party political differences, try all the time to justify their own changes of policy by stating that the Government have taken action or been inactive and that this in some mysterious way justifies entirely their own changes of policy. I believe that a calm and factual approach to defence is the right one. If we did not believe that, world events today would, and should, certainly cause us to believe it.
I do not want to get into acute party political issues, because, as The Times said, I realise the almost insurmountable difficulties of leading the Labour Party. I must, however, take issue with the right

hon. Gentleman when he rather spoilt his factual approach of today by presenting to the House of Commons and to the country, in common with his right hon. and hon. Friends, a completely distorted view of the facts of defence policy and progress.
I hope the right hon. Gentleman will accept from me that nothing could be more dangerous at the moment in this dangerous and divided world than that we should get the facts of defence wrong. There is no single thing that the Government or the Opposition could do that would be more dangerous than that. Therefore, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will accept it also from me that what I intend to try to do now is to set out the facts as clearly as I possibly can and to go as far as I possibly can, although the right hon. Gentleman, having been a Minister of the Crown himself, will know that there are certain points beyond which one cannot go at this Box—one can go somewhat further when standing at the opposite Box. As far as I can, however, I want to set out the facts, because, as I wish to repeat, the one thing that the House of Commons, the Government and the country must not do at this moment is to give a possible aggressor the wrong idea of what we and our allies are doing. Misunderstanding about defence is a very dangerous thing.
Let me deal first with the question of the nuclear deterrent. First, I must ask where the party opposite stands. The right hon. Member for Belper, who opened this debate, took a strong line about this in the defence debate, when he said:
Clearly, I and the Labour Party do not take the unilateralist position on nuclear weapons. They exist. They must be a component part of our strategy and our armoury of deterrents unless and until an equivalent or greater advantage can be gained either by multilateral and controlled disarmament or by some lesser but vital advance".
The right hon. Gentleman then added:
I have never seen how one can seek to arm for defence and ignore weapons which exist."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th February, 1960; Vol. 618, c. 878.]
I ask the right hon. Gentleman, is that his position today? If it is, I will gladly give way if he wishes to answer now; or possibly his hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) might prefer to answer at the end of the debate.

Mr. G. Brown: I will answer it myself. So far as concerns nuclear weapons existing in the Western Alliance, that remains the position. But what I have said today, and what is laid out in our policy statement, to which the Minister must now address himself, is that since we can no longer ourselves provide an independent British deterrent, I am not applying the same arguments to the provision by us of weapons manufactured in Britain. The Minister is now mixing up what we, Britain, do and what we, the West, do.

Mr. Watkinson: I merely want to get this clear. The words in the document to which the right hon. Gentleman refers state:
We believe that in future our British contribution to the Western armoury will be in conventional terms, leaving to the Americans the provision of the Western strategic deterrent.

Mr. Brown: Mr. Brown indicated assent.

Mr. Watkinson: What I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say now, however, is that provided this country clearly continues to have in its possession the means of manufacturing nuclear weapons and the means of delivery them, the Labour Party supports the policy of maintaining that nuclear capacity.

Mr. Brown: Mr. Brown indicated dissent.

Mr. Watkinson: All right. I must leave it.

Mr. Brown: Leave it as it is.

Mr. Watkinson: That I am very willing to do. In that case, I hope the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends will not continue to try to present a false picture of where they say the Government are.
Let me make the Government's position plain on this question of the nuclear deterrent. We do not believe it is immoral or improper or unwise to possess the capacity to manufacture and to deliver nuclear weapons so long as they are also possessed by Russia. On the contrary, we believe that we must continue our nuclear contribution to defence till the control of these weapons can be achieved under a proper system of international supervision and disarmament. As soon as that situation can arise, the better the Government will be pleased, but, till it does so, we believe that it is a moral as well as a practical

duty to maintain our capacity to manufacture and deliver these weapons.
If, for example, one were to take the extreme view of what is said in this document to which the right hon. Gentlemon has referred, then it would seem to me that there would be little point in going forward with the re-equipment of the V-bomber force and the Mark II V-bombers, and if we fail to do that we deprive the West of an immensely powerful contribution to its nuclear deterrent force.
Where the Opposition has gat into difficulties is by failing to examine and face the logic of the time scale in all these questions of deterrent weapons. Unless we see these things against the background of the time scale, we get the whole position wrong.
Let me give an example of what I mean. The right hon. Gentleman has just said, and it is said again in the various documents which his party has produced, that because we cancelled Blue Streak the Thor missile, which is deployed operationally today, should also be swept away, and his judgment is that that is so because a fixed site missile is too vulnerable. I agree; that is why we did cancel Blue Streak. But let us look again at the time scale. Blue Streak would not have been operational till after 1965. That is when, it was quite certain, fixed site missiles would be too vulnerable. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, no."] Perhaps I may be allowed to finish my argument. What the Opposition is claiming is that Thor is outmoded today, in 1960. That, of course, is not for a moment comparing like with like.

Mr. Denis Healey: Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East) rose—

Mr. Watkinson: I will give way when I have finished this part of my argument.
What the Opposition is saying is that five years' further development in missiles has no relevance at all. In other words, it is dismissing and distorting the time scale—a very dangerous thing to do. If the Opposition claims that Thor is unjustified today because Blue Streak is unjustified in 1965, it proves exactly the point I am making; that is, the Opposition is taking no regard at all to the essential time factor in this question.

Mr. Healey: Is it not the case that the Government justified this very late decision to give up Blue Streak because of the evidence of the accuracy of Soviet missiles now—as revealed in the tests in the Pacific and in other ways? What, in fact, is the like which we are comparing with like is the accuracy of Soviet missiles at the present time, which we presume will last into the period when Blue Streak would have been effective. The plain fact is that the vulnerability of the missiles is based on the evidence the Government now have about the accuracy of the Soviet missiles.

Mr. Watkinson: If the hon. Gentleman will be kind enough to read what was said in the debate he will see. The right hon. Gentleman quite fairly tried to present the facts of his case. I must present the facts of mine, and if the hon. Gentleman will be kind enough to look at what was said in that debate and also to look at what he says in his own party document here, he will see that it is clearly so, that no examination is made of the quite different time scales. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer the question."] It is usually courteous to give time for somebody to answer a question. As I wish to be clear in my answer, I shall answer it in my own time.
As to the question of the accuracy of Soviet missiles, what was clearly said was that there were already signs in current Soviet tests of the increasing accuracy of missiles, which must be related to the time scale, to how many missiles are likely to be available, to their future development, and that again comes exactly to what I have said, that Thor today makes an important contribution to the deterrent of the West today. Perhaps by 1965, I accept, it may be a quite different position, but the point I am making is that these relativities in time must be clearly kept in mind if we are to take a balanced view of what we are talking about.

Mr. R. T. Paget: Surely the all-important question within the time scale is when is it relevant? Are the Russians in a position here and now to wipe out our Thor bases at any moment they choose? And is not the position that they have rockets on site to our knowledge in East Germany and that they have only to touch the button to attack the whole of our Thor bases?

Mr. Watkinson: I have already answered the hon. and learned Gentleman by saying quite clearly that the Thor missile at this moment is an important contribution to the nuclear deterrent of the West. But it may well not be so by 1965.

Mr. Wigg: May I ask one question?

Mr. Watkinson: No.
Perhaps I may come on now to the question of the plans which the Government have made to continue to make our independent contribution to the nuclear deterrent of the West.
Again, I do not accept—I do not want to pursue this, but I do not accept for a moment—that statement which the right hon. Gentleman has made again today that the cancellation of Blue Streak leaves us in the position that we cannot remain in any sense of the word an independent nuclear Power. That is a very convenient doctrine if one wants to adopt the kind of double stance which I think the right hon. Gentleman was being forced into, the stance of being all things to all kinds of Socialists, the stance of saying to the unilateralists, "We will not have the nuclear bomb," but to the right-wing of his party, "We cannot have it." That, in my view, is not a policy. It is a misleading compromise, which may well mislead people outside this country as well as, perhaps, a very few inside it.
Anyway, the Government have a very clear plan, and I wish to set it out. Today, we have the Mark I V-bombers in service armed with free-falling bombs with nuclear warheads produced in this country. I take it from what he said that the right hon. Gentleman supports that, that he accepts that as a proper contribution to the West's deterrent. I am glad he agrees with that. We are progressively improving the ability of this force to take off at short notice, and the reaction times are already comparable with those formerly expected from fighters. We hope to reduce the times still further.
This, then, is the current contribution, the contribution now, and with the further developments in electronic devices and so on we are confident that that force is capable today and in the future of reaching its targets.
But, of course, nothing stands still in this question of defence. Therefore, the first step we take for the future is to replace the Mark I V-bombers with the Mark II, which are faster, have greater range and can fly higher. At the same time, it was obviously sensible to try to give the new aircraft a greater capacity by fitting them with weapons which could be fired some distance away from the target, a great deal farther than merely the capacity which the free-falling bomb provides.
It was foreseen that there would be developments in surface-to-air guided weapons available to the Russians that would make this necessary. That was why the Blue Steel project came into being—in order that we should have a powered and guided bomb which could carry on to the target and thus give the carrying aircraft a much greater immunity from counter-attack. This weapon can carry a megaton warhead and, therefore, it is a very powerful weapon. It has reached the stage at which launching trials are taking place from Mark I V-bombers, with development rounds produced on production lines. Matched against the defences which it will meet it is in the right time scale.
The right hon. Member for Belper has been trying to say that this does not exist, or it does not fit the time scale or is some kind of reinsurance against Sky-bolt. This weapon was in the picture and must remain in the picture, and this is the second step. The first step is the bombers with their free-falling bomb. The second is the Mark II V-bombers with stand-off weapons. As to the Blue Steel Mark II, it was not my right hon. Friend who cancelled it, it was myself. The reason was this. It was a completely new weapon, a new type of weapon. I agree that it would have had a quite different purpose, but its timescale—and here we come back to the same problem—was in the late 1960s, and when it was cancelled it was still only on the drawing board. I considered. therefore, that a weapon that could not be operational for perhaps seven or eight years was not one with which we should press forward at this moment.
Now, the right hon. Member for Belper says that we have reinstated it. We have not done anything of the sort. What we

are doing is the normal sensible practice that one follows, for example, with fighter aircraft or bomber aircraft. Having made the first mark, one tries to improve its performance by developing its engine or lightening the airframe, or by other devices that step up the performance of an aircraft immeasurably in its service life. That is what we are now trying to do with Blue Steel, and we should be very stupid if we were not doing it. What I want to see is a steady improvement in the range of this weapon, which may therefore increase its value and validity and keep it valid over a rather longer time scale to meet expected improvements in enemy defence.

Mr. Wigg: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in the 1957 White Paper his right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation said that the rôle of the V-bomber was very limited and he did not propose to provide a successor? Now the right hon. Gentleman is talking about Blue Steel, which is way towards the middle of the 1960s, to fit an aircraft which the Government have only now thought up, after it was perfectly clear that the policy of the Minister of Aviation was in a state of collapse.

Mr. Watkinson: This is another example of the way in which hon. and right hon. Members opposite either delude themselves generally or are doing this sort of thing for their own party political reasons. I am giving the facts about this weapon. The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), with his knowledge of military affairs, knows perfectly well that V-bombers are valid bombers until the early 1970s.

Mr. Wigg: Oh.

Mr. Watkinson: Certainly. That is what the validity of the life of the Mark II was always intended to be, and we should be very unwise as a nation if we did not arm them with the best weapons we can provide. First, then, we have the free-falling bomb, then the stand-off powered bomb, and now I come to the air-launched ballistic missile, or Skybolt.

Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: Before my right hon. Friend leaves this point, would he clear up the various rumours and the article in yesterday's


Daily Mail about the possible reduction of the V-bomber force, particularly the Mark II, which are causing a number of misunderstandings?

Mr. Watkinson: My hon. Friend is presumably asking me to comment on an article in a daily newspaper. I have seen the article. I can only tell him that no decision of that kind has yet been taken. [HON. MEMBERS: "Yet?"] I have said that no decision of that kind has yet been taken. I am not committing the future one way or another. I am saying that the article is not based on a decision that has yet been taken.
As to Skybolt, first of all, the Royal Air Force, I believe, very much contributed to the United States Air Force decision on this missile as its own operational requirement. Since that time, two years ago, a group of experts from the Royal Air Force and the Ministry of Civil Aviation have taken part in an expert team which decided on the design of the missile. The aim—and this is clear proof of the viability of the project—was to ensure that no element in the system required for its realisation techniques which had not been proved in other tested projects, for example, other missiles. After 18 months' technical study, these techniques have been examined both by the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force and by the American Defence Department. The missile is not, as the right hon. Member for Belper implies, in a completely unformed state. Its final configuration is settled, and we are now negotiating an agreement to purchase it.
If the right hon. Member was interested in the missile, I am surprised that when he was in America he did not go to the Douglas Company and find out about it for himself. I visited the Douglas Company and saw the progress on this project. I was able to take my own experts with me and they were able to carry out a close technical assessment of it. What I am now saying about the missile rests on that information—the information we are now getting regularly from our technical team which is now integrated in the project. We have every reason to believe that Skybolt will be available when wanted, and we shall be able to fit it without any difficulty to the Vulcan Mark II. We have not yet reached a decision about the Victor

Mark II, but the latest information which I can give is that Skybolt, I believe, could be fitted to this aircraft if we wished to do it. Armed with this missile, the Mark II V-bombers will be able to maintain an effective contribution to the deterrent until the early 1970s.
The argument of the hon. Member for Belper is that because we shall buy Skybolt from the United States our contribution to the deterrent ceases in some way to be independent. I cannot see the basis for the right hon. Member's view. The missiles once purchased will be our property. We shall fit them with our own nuclear warheads, carry them in our own aircraft, and have full control of them. That represents a clear continuation of the Government's policy to make an independent contribution to the deterrent. To use Skybolt as some kind of alibi for some major change in Socialist defence policy is for right hon. Gentlemen to delude their own party and to delude the country as well. It is on the basis of personal examination and a visit, which the right hon. Member for Belper could have made himself if he had wanted to, that I have made statements about a missile which is an essential component of the Western deterrent both for the Americans and ourselves.

Mr. G. Brown: When did the Americans decide to order it for their Air Force?

Mr. Watkinson: What the Americans have decided is to put a very large number of millions of dollars into the development of this weapon. We are now negotiating an agreement to purchase it from them. [HON. MEMBERS: "When?"] The American Air Force has also disclosed requirements for large numbers for itself. The right hon. Member for Belper and I may differ—

Mr. Brown: With respect, the right hon. Gentleman and I may differ, but he must say the same thing twice. The American Air Force has not decided yet, nor has it been authorised yet to buy it. If it does not buy it, the weapon will not exist. In that case, how can the right hon. Gentleman say that he is going to buy it?

Mr. Watkinson: What I said—and I have been perfectly clear about this—was that the United States Air Force


has disclosed a very large requirement for a very large number of missiles. That is what I was told by General Power who commands the force. We, also, have disclosed a requirement for, of course, a much smaller number of missiles. We are now negotiating a firm agreement with the American Government which will ensure us a supply of these missiles, provided that the missile works. [Laughter.] I have never tried to mislead the House in the slightest degree as to the position.
What I have said is that the missile is built up of tried components and that its configuration and production policy is settled, that the Douglas Company is associated with a very large number of other American firms working on the project and, also, that the first flying trials of the missile will take place early next spring. That is the point of decision, when we shall see whether the missile fulfils its performance or not. I have every confidence that it will, and as we only have to wait some six or nine months to see that, it does not seem to me a very great risk.
Are the Opposition going to change their policy again if Skybolt works or supposing that we develop it, because one of the advantages to us is that Skybolt will cost a great deal less than Blue Streak because the R. and D. cost is being covered by the Americans. Supposing that out of our spare resources we decided to diversify the deterrent and produced a missile as a partner to Skybolt which was entirely made by us, would the right hon. Gentleman then change his policy again?

Mr. G. Brown: Are you going to produce one?

Mr. Watkinson: That is for the Government to decide. I am only saying that the advantage in buying Sky-bolt is that it gives us this spare capacity. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will answer my question instead of trying to evade it by asking me questions. In that case, will the right hon. Gentleman change the policy of his party again? I do not think that he knows.

Mr. Brown: The Minister is the Minister. If he says, "I am changing the policy again; I am now about to order

some new missile which will be made here," well, we will consider what he says. Is he saying that?

Mr. Watkinson: That is a perfectly fair position. I am saying that this is a possible thing which we can do, and I am asking the right hon. Gentleman whether that would affect his policy. The facts of the case are that throughout the piece the right hon. Gentleman has been trying to justify a change in his own policy by the misrepresentation of ours.
Let me give another example on the question of Polaris. The right hon. Gentleman wrote an article in a daily newspaper which gave a completely misleading picture of the situation regarding this weapon. He said, for example, that I had asked the American Government for Polaris submarines and had been refused. That, of course, is a completely garbled and incorrect account of what took place.

Mr. Brown: Be very careful here.

Mr. Watkinson: The Government have seen the possibilities of Polaris for a long time, and, thanks to the very generous help from the American Government, we have had an excellent liaison with them and have a naval officer in the United States solely for the purpose of keeping us informed of the technical advances and developments in this weapon system. Of course, I had general discussions with the United States Secretary of Defence, the American Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief of the American Atlantic Fleet as to how they propose to deploy these submarines and to operate them.
It was agreed that the very close collaboration which exists between the British and American Governments should be continued in this sphere. After all, we shall soon be launching our own nuclear submarine, though not, of course, of the missile-firing type, and talks are proceeding between both Governments as to how best to exploit nuclear submarines bath as hunter-killer of other submarines and as a missile-firing weapon system. But we are not at a point where we need take a decision so far as the Polaris weapon system is concerned.
Let me turn to the broader field'. It is still true that direct expenditure on the British deterrent represents only 10 per cent. of our total defence expenditure. In my view—as has been so often said in the House—if we brush that on one side and consider the broad field of our defence policy, it is not an answer to say, as right hon. and hon. Members opposite so often say, that all we have got for the expenditure of some £13,000 million is very little indeed. That is now the issue with which I wish to deal.
First, it is pretty poor thanks to all the devoted men and women who serve in the Armed Forces of the Crown. It is inevitable in these days that approximately half that sum goes on feeding, clothing and looking after the men and women in the Forces. Indeed, £800 million of the present Defence Estimates goes for that purpose. I must ask the Committee, is that money down the drain, or is it, in fact, the best insurance policy which this country could have at the moment against war starting? Whatever the Opposition may say in their struggle for political survival, I hope that it will not mislead the young men and women who are debating today whether they will make a career in the Armed Forces of the Crown. I hope that nothing which right hon. and hon. Members say will, consciously, be directed to trying to affect the results and the prospects of recruiting for our all-Regular Forces. There is, in my view, no more honourable or moral task that could lay in front of a young man today.
I hope that when the right hon. Gentleman winds up he will go out of his way to make it plain that the Opposition recognise, as do the Government, the need for recruiting all-Regular Forces and getting the right people at the right time. As to whether we shall get them or not, I shall only say this, because my right hon. Friend can deal more directly with the question of the Army when he replies. The broad issue is that the Navy has more volunteers than it can use; the Royal Air Force has an adequate flaw of volunteers to maintain its future force, and the Army, on its present recruiting trends, as I have said often enough, is in sight of its minimum target of 165,000 men. It is also clear that the Army would like to get more, and I hope that anything right hon. and

hon. Members say will not make its task more difficult.
Coming to the question, very briefly, of some of the weapons which we are now getting—and which answers the right hon. Gentleman's claim that we do not get adequate equipment for these new forces—I will give the following facts: Sea Vixen—first squadron embarked in "Ark Royal" earlier this year; the N.A.39, an aircraft of outstanding promise, production order placed; the first Commando carrier "Bulwark", in commission; the first nuclear submarine will be launched in October, and the second is to be ordered this year. More than half the frigate force is less than Ave years old. Production order for Sea Slug placed. First G.M. ship was launched in June. The new F.N. rifle is in service and all infantry units have been supplied with it. With regard to the new field artillery, the 105 mm. pack howitzer, the first regiment will be equipped with this weapon in the present year. The new Sterling S.M.G. is fully issued to all units. With regard to the new armoured car Saladin and the new Ferret scout car, equipment will be completed by the end of this financial year and will be issued to all units. As to tanks, the Centurion is now being up-armoured and up-gunned and the main battle tank order will follow on that.
There are a great many other things that I could mention, for example, the first Vulcan 2 delivered this month. Then there is the Lightning, armed with Fire-streak, to be armed later with an improved weapon. First squadron forming. There is a vast list of other weapons, modern, efficient and tailored to suit the needs of our all-Regular Forces, which are now coming forward. They are not projects either in the past or the future; they are going to the Forces now. The money which is devoted to these tasks is, in my view, money well spent and the best insurance policy that this country could have in trying to keep the peace in a very dangerous and divided world.
As to the question of mobility, about the only thing with which I agreed with the right hon. Gentleman in his statement of policy was the point that our policy should have the accent on mobility. But, here again, what he claims is not the requirement at all. The whole policy in


defence is to stockpile the heavy hardware near where one is likely to use it. Therefore, there is not the large requirement for carrying extremely heavy hardware about the world by air which the right hon. Gentleman assumes.
What we need particularly is a big tactical lift. We have now ordered 40 medium-range tactical transport aircraft, the AW.660, and the first aircraft will be coming in in 1961–62. Exercise Starlight, of which I saw part when I was in North Africa, was an exercise in which some 4,000 men, 200 vehicles and 200,000 lb. of freight were moved by air. That is the sort of problem that we have to face. For that we need a stockpile of the heavy hardware and a big tactical lift to carry the men and the lighter material. That is why the turbine-engined Whirlwinds and the advanced version of the Wessex, or the Bristol 192, are now coming forward. Again, we have met exactly the demand which the Services have thrown up and have asked should be met.
I now come to the question of N.A.T.O. and the medium-range ballistic missile. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there are very great problems to be faced by the N.A.T.O. Alliance. He mentioned one of them in his statement about fifteen fingers on the trigger. He said that it was very easy of solution. I am not sure that it is quite so easy of solution. Anyway, what I would say is that the British Government are most anxious to do all in their power to strengthen N.A.T.O. at this time. That includes meeting the quite proper request by General Norstad for modern equipment which can maintain the full vigour and strength of the shield and sword concept of the Alliance.
The difficulty is that, owing to the ingenuity and inventiveness of defence scientists, each missile is soon supplanted by something of greater range and greater carrying capacity. The Polaris type of missile is only the latest newcomer to the scene. No doubt in due course it will be supplanted or at least supplemented by others.
The point that I want to make is that the value of Polaris or of any other weapon of this type is a matter which must be discussed by N.A.T.O. through its own proper channels. It has its

military committee and its complex of military advisers, and it has its political committee. N.A.T.O. itself must first decide through its own machinery what it wants, and that process has to take place before political decisions are made.
I should like to make another thing plain. As the Government understand General Norstad's position, it is that he is not seeking to acquire some new kind of strategic capability, which would be outside his present task. That is the Government's understanding of this position. His aim, I believe, is to keep a fair balance in his forces so that they may fulfil the task laid down for them in the shield and sword concept.
This does not, in my view, mean that every aircraft in N.A.T.O. will soon have to be replaced by missiles. The facts are that N.A.T.O. must make a proper detailed study of the place of each new weapon to see how it fits into N.A.T.O.'s current pattern—it is the pattern which has existed for some years—of defence against aggression. N.A.T.O., like every other form of defence, must change with the times. That is why the Government have decided to replace some of the Canberras in N.A.T.O. with Valiants. We thought it a more modern and better means of delivery of our nuclear weapons. It is an example of our recognition of the fact that N.A.T.O. must constantly change and equip itself with improved weapons. The point is that we shall do much harm to the alliance if we do not let it work out its problems in its own constitutional way.
I am not denying for a moment that the improvement of these new weapons does not present N.A.T.O. with great problems. On the other hand, if it is to fulfil its shield function as well as its sword function, it must have a balance of forces against what may be likely to come against it. I believe that these problems can be solved if N.A.T.O. is allowed to discuss them, as I understand it will, through its own proper channels. I believe that is the right way to face the difficult problem in that field. That is the Government's view. Whether it concerns the question of Germany, the question of Polaris or any other particular problem, it should be dealt with through the proper channels in that way.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: Might I ask the right hon. Gentleman what he means by "proper channels"? I am not clear about that. Is he implying that a decision, for instance, by this country and by this Government to take a certain view in the N.A.T.O. discussions would be out of order? I am not clear what he means when he talks about discussions through the proper channels. Does he mean that the British Government will be out of order to make up their own mind that there are political reasons why we should not introduce Polaris and say so before we get to the N.A.T.O. Council? Is the implication that we shall be out of order or somehow disloyal to the alliance by doing that?

Mr. Watkinson: That is not the implication at all. I am saying that before these matters go forward for political decision and before they go to the N.A.T.O. Council the proper processes have to be gone through within the machinery of N.A.T.O. I know that the hon. Gentleman, for example, knows that full well. There is a network of military advisers leading to the military committee, and there is the same organisation in connection with the political committee. These bodies have not yet had a full chance to study the requirements of these weapons. They must be given time.

Mr. Healey: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a number of other N.A.T.O. Governments have also expressed views on this matter? Has not General de Gaulle said that he would not accept Polaris under certain conditions? Did not the American Defence Secretary make a large number of statements about American policy in this respect? And also about Germany's policy, although this was contested by Bonn? Surely in a situation like this when the matter has already entered into the field of public debate the Government are failing in their duty to the British people if they do not make their view known?

Mr. Watkinson: Of course we will make our view known at the appropriate time.

Mr. Crossman: What is the appropriate time?

Mr. Watkinson: The fact that there is such widespread and ill-informed debate makes it much more difficult for N.A.T.O. to come to the right decisions. As far as the British Government are concerned, I am not going to contribute to the sort of thing that is going on.
What I have tried to show is as follows. First of all, we do not know where the Opposition stand today on this vital question of Britain's nuclear contribution to the deterrent strength of the West. I have tried to clarify the position. The only thing that I now think I am clear about is that they at least support the present nuclear capacity of this country. If that is so, I am glad. Whether they continue to support it in the future is, I understand, contingent upon what means of delivery this country may decide to follow. If that is so, that is, I suppose, as far as we can take it. It is at least something that they continue to accept the position today that Great Britain makes a nuclear contribution, and a very important one, and that they support it.
I have shown quite clearly that we have a clear plan through until 1970 to maintain our independent contribution to the nuclear strength of the West. I have also shown that when we come to more conventional weapons—if one can call any weapon conventional today—the flow of new modern weapons to the Forces is greater than it has ever been in our military history and that these weapons give us the mobility and the hitting power which we need for our all-Regular Forces.
I have also shown that there is every chance of getting the volunteers that we need, and I hope that at least on that the whole Committee is agreed and is also agreed to support the general objectives of recruiting able and vigorous young men and women to the Armed Forces of the Crown.
I have shown as far as N.A.T.O. is concerned that it is the Government's view that there has been far too much vague and ill-informed speculation about what might happen in certain circumstances. It is much wiser to let the proper process of discussion and consultation go on in N.A.T.O. in order to try to solve the problem.
Lastly, I say this: I have tried to follow the policy which all of us on this


side of the Committee try to follow—that is, to take a calm and objective view of the great problems that face us of defending our country; trying to present the facts; and trying not to twit the Opposition unduly on the position—the very difficult position—in which its leaders find themselves. That is a right course to take. But it is equally right that we should take every chance to rebut the false impression that, rightly or wrongly, or for their own reasons, they give of our state of military preparedness, because that today, as I have said, is the most dangerous thing that this country and this House of Commons can do.
I have shown that on the whole our weapons systems, our state of preparedness and the value for our money, stand up extremely well to any kind of examination. In the Sunday Times last week there was an editorial which was headed, "The Socialist Diehards ". I shall not read it all. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] I will with pleasure. [Interruption.] I will read one or two selections.
The Army had suffered three defeats in a row. The Commander gathered his officers about him. 'Perhaps', he said, 'our weapons and strategy are a bit out-of-date…We won the last battle but three, didn't we? So we can win again. Anyway, it is better to die for the old regiment than mess about with this new-fangled gear. It's dangerous out there in the twentieth century.' ".
It "is" dangerous out there. [Interruption.] I hope that the right hon. Member for Belper will not get too excited. He started very well today and I thought that a new mantle of responsibility had fallen upon him. Now he is proving true to type, as always. It "is" dangerous out there in the twentieth century. The Government and the country recognise it and that it will not be overcome either by fighting the battles of the past or by trying to twist the facts of the present, because I believe that we shall only get peace in the world, until we can secure disarmament, by being calm, firm and united in our determination to deter aggression and to be undisturbed by threats or propaganda.
I know that it is a difficult job, but we hope to go on shouldering it successfully, as we have done over the last years. The right hon. Member for Belper ended by appealing to his supporters in the coun-

try. I shall not do that. I say, however, that I believe that in the task of honestly trying to be strong and vigorous and prepared in defence, in order to try and stop a war from starting, the Government have the support of the broad mass of the population of this country.

5.44 p.m.

Mr. E. Shinwell: It is obvious what has happened in the Ministry of Defence. The right hon. Gentleman, in the absence of a convincing case, decided on the only alternative course—to twit the Labour Party on its defence statement. But we are not debating the Labour Party's defence statement.

Mr. Ellis Smith: That will be done at Scarborough.

Mr. Shinwell: We are attempting to debate the Government's defence policy, if indeed they have a settled policy. I am bound to say that I doubt if they have a policy.
It occurred to me, because of the frequent interjections, that we might have revised our procedure today. Instead of having a debate, we might have taken one of the Committee rooms upstairs and asked each other a lot of questions, because that is precisely what the right hon. Gentleman attempted to do. He was interrogating us. That is not the rôle of Ministers. They are there, presumably, for the purpose of answering questions put to them by Members of the Opposition.
The fact is—and I regret having to say this to the right hon. Gentleman—that his case was far from convincing. I doubt whether it convinced anybody on his own side. For example, when he found himself in a position of some difficulty he took refuge at once in appealing to the Committee to think of the young men who were serving in Her Majesty's Forces. Have we not done so in the past?
It was the Labour Government who introduced National Service, despite its unpopularity, and we retained it. It was the Labour Government who sought to stimulate recruitment. It is no use the right hon. Gentleman coming along with that sort of stuff. It appeals to nobody. It was obvious that he was short of valid arguments and he had to use an


emotional appeal. I can assure him that everybody on this side, whatever our views may be on defence and defence organisation, on nuclear weapons and conventional weapons and the like, takes the greatest pride in the men and women in Her Majesty's Forces. That can be proclaimed from the housetops. Of course we do. They are serving the nation and are doing their duty. We are not discussing in this debate the men and women in Her Majesty's Forces except in relation to recruitment. I will leave that for the moment.
The fact is that if one examines the successive Defence White Papers that have been issued since the Tory Government were returned in 1951, one observes a series of vacillations, of changes in policy, and of difficulties which have presented themselves to the country and to this Committee—not that difficulties really existed but because the Government found themselves unable from time to time to make up their minds what line of policy should be adopted.
I could quote from the various Defence White Papers that have come before the Committee. There was one, for which the right hon. Gentleman the present Minister of Aviation was responsible, in which he postulated as clearly as could be that if we were attacked by conventional forces by the potential aggressor—namely, the Soviet Union—we would not respond with conventional forces but would use all the nuclear weapons at our disposal. It never seemed to occur to the Government what the consequences would be. I suppose that they have departed from that fantasy—or have they? I should like to know the answer to that question.
Is it still the policy of the Government, in consort with our allies, 'that in the event of an attack—either limited OT What they describe as a major conventional attack—we shall unleash all these horrible nuclear forces? Is that their policy? I doubt whether they retain a vestige of it at the present time. The fact is that they have not got a policy in that context. All that we have heard today is that we have the Thor missile and that it makes a contribution, and that we have a number of V-bombers, and that they make a contribution.
I took a note of what the right hon. Gentleman said. It mystifies me, because he said, "They can reach the target." Which target was he taking about when he spoke about Thor missiles and V-bombers as a contribution? Does he really suggest to this intelligent assembly—I presume that it is intelligent in the context of defence—that the Thor missile and the V-bombers, such as they are, are capable of reaching the target?
Which target is he talking about? Was he thinking of Soviet Russia? Surely, he does not intend to mislead or deceive the Committee. He knows very well that neither the Thor missiles nor our V-bombers carrying megaton bombs with warheads are capable of reaching the target. Heaven help them if they ever get near the 'target. [Interruption.] If ale noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) or the Minister, who is, presumably, better informed on these matters, has the information available and can demonstrate to the Committee what is likely to happen -when we seek to reach the target, I should be very glad -to have it. I seriously doubt that the right hon. Gentleman really means that the Thor missiles and the V-bombers, such as they are, with megaton bombs, axe capable of reaching the target.
We have been told that the Blue Streak fiasco occurred because of our apprehensions regarding the rocket missiles at the disposal of Soviet Russia. It seems to me that that disposes completely of the suggestion that the Thor missile or the V-bombers are capable of reaching the target.

Mr. Collard: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. What he is saying is extremely important. He has said it often before. Will he take it that we have, in fact, an independent nuclear striking force of immense power? If not, will he visit Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force, because things have changed a great deal sine his time?

Mr. Shinwell: The hon. Gentleman asks me that question and I will give him an answer at once. I do not believe anything of the sort. If anyone imagines that, by visiting Bomber Command, I shall be convinced that it is capable, with what it has, of reaching the target


—I have some experience of being in the Defence Department, not only in recent years but from some way back—he is very much mistaken. I shall not accept that sort of thing. No doubt, there are some hon. Members who flatter their personal vanity by going to visit some of the air stations and being shown round the place, all properly whitewashed and stage-managed, and they come back and say, "We know that we are in a very strong position".
But this is a very serious debate. What may happen may have grievous consequences not only for this country but for the world. I wish to address myself to that aspect of the subject, which is far more important than the pettifogging stuff we have heard this afternoon. I have always believed, ever since I had any association with the Defence Department and, indeed, apart from that, even during the First World War and the Second World War, that a nation is entitled to construct some kind of defence organisation in order to provide a measure of security for itself. I have always believed that. I have never been a pacifist in that sense, nor am I now. I look at this subject of defence in a practical fashion, regarding it empirically, with no emotion about it, and it is from that standpoint that I shall address myself to it now.
Nothing disturbs me more—I speak with some vehemence about it—than to have to submit to the threats of Mr. Khrushchev. I say that quite deliberately. I wish we could respond. That is my temperament. I do not like these threats. I do not like being told every now and then that we are threatened with a rocket simply because we do something, whether it is right or wrong, in which we believe. I do not like it. The fact is that we are dreadfully weak vis-à-vis Soviet Russia.

Mr. Ellis Smith: And vulnerable.

Mr. Shinwell: And, of course, vulnerable. We are dreadfully weak, and I deplore it. I would like us to be strong. I do not like the way this country is now being denigrated in various parts of the world, particularly in the United States of America. I dislike intensely the idea that we have always to be subservient to the United States. I deplore the idea

that we should be regarded as weak. I wish that we could stand up to potential aggressors. The fact is that we cannot.
The Minister of Defence said that we should face the facts. That is facing the facts, not talking about Thor missiles and V-bombers. What else have we? We are told that, perhaps, in five years, we shall have Skybolt. It is not certain. There was nothing certain about what the right hon. Gentleman said this afternoon. If the Committee will forgive the phrase, it is "pie in the Skybolt". It is that sort of nonsense. We do not know, and there is nothing determinate about our whole situation.
Regarding the matter from that standpoint, I hope that the Committee will forgive me for saying that we want a new approach. What must that new approach be? Let us face the facts. It is all very well to say that we have an independent nuclear deterrent. But where is it? It is not the sort of thing the right hon. Gentleman was talking about this afternoon. Very well then. We have not got an independent nuclear deterrent, but we hope to have it by 1970. What is to happen in the meantime? What shall we say and what shall we do in the meantime? Something will happen between 1960 and 1970. It may happen in Berlin. Who can tell? I believe that that may well be the focal point of danger, and we must make up OUT minds what is to be done if something occurs.
We have not got an independent deterrent but we hope to have it some day. Perhaps it may come, or it may not come. We do not know. This is not good enough. [Interruption.] It is all very well for the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South to murmur. I do not expect everyone to agree with me. This is not the place where one expects everyone else to agree with what one says. If one expected that, it would not be worthwhile being here at all.

Mr. Ellis Smith: That is why we have two parties.

Mr. Shinwell: This is a debating assembly, for the most part, and that is what we are here for. I do not expect the noble Lord to agree with me. Indeed, if he began to do so, I should want to examine my own ideas. Of course, he


believes that we have an independent nuclear deterrent. Let him believe it. He believes that we can stand up to Soviet Russia and can threaten Soviet Russia. We have the Thor missile and a number of V-bombers and, in five or ten years, perhaps, we shall have Sky-bolt, and a lot of other things besides, so that we can stand up to Russia. No doubt the noble Lord believes, also—I really must not argue with him—just as the Minister himself believes, that what we have or we hope to have in the next few years is a deterrent against aggression. I wish I could believe it. I frankly say that I wish I could.
I do not believe that Russia is deterred from an act of aggression against this country or the United States because we are a nuclear Power or the United States is a nuclear Power. I do not think that it suits the Russians' book to engage in war of that kind. I think that they are getting very much of what they want without it. Indeed, they are getting far more than they are entitled to, particularly in trade. The economic competition which is beginning to emerge now and which will emerge in a more intense form in the future is one of the great dangers confronting this country. The Russians are not deterred from sending a rocket over this country or from destroying people in this country or from destroying our bomber bases or the American bases simply because they think we can retaliate. Not at all. I do not believe that we have a nuclear deterrent, as it is called, whether an independent one for which this country is responsible or a so-called Western deterrent. I do not believe that it is in itself a deterrent. It is something else which deters Russia, as I have explained. However, I do not say that my view must be accepted, although that is my belief and I am as entitled to express my convictions as anybody else is.
I suggest a new approach. I come now to one or two of the statements which have been made. Some of the things which are said confuse me. I confess that I am confused about defence. Hon. Members on the other side of the Committee are never confused. I have given it a good deal of thought, but I confess that I am now confused by the whole question of defence.
Here are some of the things about which I am confused. For example, it was suggested in the course of the debate that the Government had Skybolt. They have not got it, and they are not likely to get it. What occurred to me was this. Suppose that they got it some day. Suppose that we are wrong. Suppose that in five years' the Government get Sky-bolt. What will happen? Can we accept that it will be an effective deterrent? I cannot, because I do not believe that it will. It will not make an effective contribution towards preventing war. That is what confuses me about this situation. Not only that. The idea that building up forces of that character will enable us to make a contribution to peace does not commend itself to me, not with my understanding of the situation. I say, let us make a new approach.
What should the new approach be? I suggested it in the course of the defence debate at the beginning of March, and it is this. It is obvious to me that we must now devote ourselves as assiduously and as effectively as we can, with all the forces at our command, and using all the influence in our possession, to promote negotiations in the direction of disarmament, or at any rate partial disarmament.
I bear right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite no malice. The mere fact that we do not agree with each other does not mean that we have to bite each other's heads off. If the right hon. Gentleman could convince me that we have something which would enable us to stand up to people who threaten us—I just do not like being threatened—I would welcome it, but I do not believe that we have. I regret that we have not. Because of that, I believe that we have to turn in another direction, and the direction in which we must turn is the one that I have indicated.
Now let me deal with the conventional forces. I would very much like to hear my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) speak on this subject. He is very well informed on this topic. Time and again he has forecast what would happen about the conventional forces and about the difficulties of recruitment in the Army and Air Force, though not in the Navy. We know the facts now.
I am speaking now in terms of the defence statement issued by the Labour Party. May I say this in parenthesis. I do not agree with everything in that statement, but I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) that this is an attempt to consolidate opinion and to present an alternative to the absence of policy on the part of the Government. To that extent I welcome the statement, though it does not go as far as I should like. There are certain contradictions in it, but that is inevitable when one is presenting a line of policy.
How will we build up the conventional forces? We want conventional forces. That is now our policy. It is the Government's policy. I believe that the nation welcomes that policy, but how will we get these conventional forces? This afternoon the right hon. Gentleman made a statement about the Territorials. What nostalgic memories are conjured up when I think of the difficulties I had in building up the Territorial Army when I was at the War Office and at the Ministry of Defence. I did not interrogate the Minister. I left that to others, as indeed I had to because I was not called.
There are many men who have served the nation faithfully. Some were volunteers, some were pitchforked into the Territorial Army, and others had to undertake service under the National Service Act. That is now disappearing. The men who did their National Service had the liability to serve in the Territorial Army or the Reserve Forces. They served the nation well and we are now asking them to undertake another role. We are now asking them to undertake a more stern rôle and to fit themselves into the pattern of the Regular Forces where they will he equipped with better weapons.
I do not intend to make a song and dance on this question of weapons. We have had a lot of fuss about that. Nine years ago I went to Washington where negotiations were held to consider the new British rifle. Even now, in spite of the intervention of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), on the wrong lines, we have not got the F.N. rifle available to all our Forces. When I think of that, I consider that we could make a desper-

ate attack on the Government because of their misunderstanding of the whole defence position.
What do the Government propose to do about these men? Will they give them a higher bounty? What right have we to ask these men to serve at weekends and fit themselves into the pattern of the Regular Forces and make themselves available for service? In spite of what the right hon. Gentleman said in reply to a question, I know what will happen one of these days. We will have an Amendment to the Reserve Forces Act and be asked to agree that the men in the Territorial Army can be sent for service overseas without Proclamation.

Mr. Soames: Mr. Soames indicated dissent.

Mr. Shinwell: I know what happened before when there was an emergency, or a supposed emergency. I know what happened to the Reserve Forces during the Korean War. I am not suggesting that men serve in the Forces only because of the remuneration they receive. Not at all. Nevertheless, it is important that consideration should be given to the money that these men will be paid. I think that something ought to be done.
I have read the Labour Party's defence statement. On the whole it is a considered and worth-while document. It is a document which the Government, instead of sniping at it, as the Minister did, should welcome. It is an advance on the present state of affairs. It says that we cannot regard ourselves as an independent nuclear Power, that we stand by the Western deterrent, and that we stand by N.A.T.O. I do not know if the Government noted that we have not abandoned the concept of N.A.T.O. I accept the defence statement, but I urge the Government, right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, and the people in the country, to devote more thought, not in the direction of defence, but in the direction of making it unnecessary to have any defence at all, namely, in the direction of disarmament.
We have our political differences, and we will continue to do so, but I welcome more than I can say what the Prime Minister said yesterday. He stood up firmly in his approach to Mr. Khrushchev. At the same time he welcomed the opportunity for further discussions. That is the way to act. That is the sort of thing we want. The more of it the


better, because in the long run that is what will happen. I am certain that there is a growing demand in this country, if not for unilateral disarmament, for an end to this defence business.
One finds it everywhere. People who were addicted to defence matters have now turned their thoughts in the direction of disarmament. Although I believed in the need for defence, and indeed would be in favour of effective defence now if I thought that it was an adequate weapon against a possible aggressor, my mind has turned in the direction of the promotion of disarmament, which I think is now the right course to adopt.

6.10 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander S. L. C. Maydon: Unlike the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), I welcome the statement which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War made about the Territorial Army this afternoon. The rôle of the Territorial Army has been a matter which has been under consideration for a long time, and rightly so, because in this swiftly moving arena of defence it would be wrong to come to rapid decisions over a 'body of that nature. I would like to hear my right hon. Friend, at a later date, go even further than he went this afternoon, and tell the House that he is prepared to lay before it at an appropriate moment legislation which will enable the T.A. to serve overseas when necessary, and particularly to take part in overseas exercises during annual training periods.
I also welcomed what my right hon. Friend said about the re-equipment of the T.A., and I hope that that will go forward even more swiftly. I suggest that it would be wise to give the T.A. some of our more modern weapons even before the Regular Army has been fully equipped with them, so that our Territorials can at any rate become accustomed to seeing them and judging their capabilities, if not individually practising with them.
I want to follow up some of the earlier remarks of the right hon. Member for Easington. I do not think he does justice to himself, the country or our cause in the world by decrying the rôle of the Royal Air Force at present—

Mr. A. C. Manuel: He did not.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: —as a vehicle for Britain's own nuclear deterrent. If he really believes what he said I suggest that he takes a trip to America and seeks out General Power, the Commander of the Strategic Air Command, and ask him what he thinks about it. The right hon. Gentleman says that the Americans decry and denigrate Britain's attitude. If he asks General Power I do not think that he will get an exaggerated view of America's idea of Britain's contribution.
I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) is not here, because I also want to take up something that he said. I see that he is here, after all; as one of my hon. Friends has remarked, he has moved a bit to the right on the benches opposite. I am glad to see it.

Mr. Manuel: The hon. and gallant Gentleman will never move to the Left.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: That might almost go without saying.
The right hon. Gentleman commented upon the Skybolt, and asked a number of questions about it. First, he asked whether it existed. When he talks about the existence of any modern weapon, what does he mean by existence? Before a modern weapon comes into production and full squadron use—I believe that that is the right expression in this case—it has to go through many processes. It starts with very rough sketch plans, being little more than ideas in the shape of diagrams on paper. From them follow the more detailed drawings.

Mr. Manuel: We know all that.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: From there we go to the prototype mock-ups, before even the prototype is started, and from there we go into production, before squadron service is finally achieved.

Mr. Manuel: And then the weapon is out of date.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: As the hon. Member opposite has said—in one of his rare moments of vision—very often it is then out of date.
I would ask the right hon. Gentleman at what point in time he considers that one of these weapons starts to exist. I would add that he destroyed his own


argument by making all these accusations about Skybolt's existence, when he said that nobody knew its shape or form. He asked whether we had bought it, and then he said, "We have only bought the right to share in its development." If its development is being proceeded with today the right hon. Gentleman must admit that it is already in existence.

Mr. G. Brown: I do not wish to argue whether I destroyed my own case; that is a matter for other hon. Members to make up their minds about. The weapon would obviously exist if we were sufficiently through the development stage, after research, for the engineering work to start. If engineering work was in progress I would accept all the arguments of the hon. and gallant Gentleman—but it is not in progress; the thing is still under development, and it can change many times in the process. After all that, it may still be dropped.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: I take the right hon. Gentleman's point, but I think it is merely a question of shades of opinion. But it is very misleading to this House and the country, and to our allies, to put forward the case that we are buying a pig in a poke. Of course, there are doubts about all these things, as we know only too well, but the weapon exists; it is more than merely an idea.
In the Labour Party's booklet on foreign policy and defence great store was laid on the cancellation of the Blue Streak. The party opposite called it a fiasco. It is time that hon. Members opposite realised that matters of defence, and of weapons and equipment, are like the rungs in a ladder, while the stiles represent the time scale. Very often some of the rungs in the ladder are unsound, but if we discover that in good time no great harm is done, except in relation to the expenditure of money. The main thing is to see that through the scale of time we have, successively, a sufficient number of projects to bridge the technical gaps as we go along.
On many occasions I have listened to hon. Members on both sides of the House saying that we could overcome this problem by indulging in a sort of leap-frog process with our Allies. While they are taking a jump from one rung to another we could ensure the rung that they jump over. I agree with this

point of view. If only that could be done we would be all the better for it, and we would probably have to spend less money in the long run.
I can take as an analogy the process which the Royal Air Force had to go through in years gone by. I refer to years gone by because hon. Members will understand more easily what I mean. Every project put forward for a new aircraft was not necessarily as successful as the Spitfire. Many had to be cancelled in the early stages, soon after birth. In those days we were dealing with a few thousand pounds; today, we are dealing with several millions of pounds. That is the big difference.
I have read the Opposition's booklet with some care, because I was interested to see where they would turn in their dilemma. Theirs is a case of any port in a storm. They have chosen the best policy, in that attack is the best means of defence. Most of the document is devoted to decrying what they claim to be the paltry efforts, or lack of effort, of the Government. But, heaven knows, they are faced with a tremendous dilemma—

Mr. Manuel: We are not the Government. It is the dilemma of the party opposite.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: —with 2½ million union votes for unilateral disarmament and only 1·8 million union votes against unilateral disarmament. I can appreciate the dilemma in which they find themselves.

Mr. Ellis Smith: That is not helping matters.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: With these appalling problems which confront us, people are apt to place a little too much reliance on the United Nations, the saving grace we all hope is going to save. There are far too many defects inherent in that organisation. To start with, there is the veto in the Security Council, and then something which no one has any idea how to overcome yet, namely, the fact that small irresponsible nations have the same vote and the same influence as bigger nations, and even not so big nations, which are experienced and public spirited.

Mr. K. Zilliacus: Suez.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: More is the pity that the United Nations did not make up its mind a little more quickly one way or the other at Suez. The present issue in the Congo is an extraordinarily severe test for it, and, judged by present progress, I am delighted to see that it is shaping fairly well. It has acted quickly, although I gather that Mr. Lumumba has complained that it has acted far too slowly.
I entirely agree with the Labour Party's statement that regional alliances are likely to be more effective. Let us remember that N.A.T.O. is not the only one.

Mr. Manuel: I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Gentleman—

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: If the hon. Gentleman's question has any relevance to what I have said, I shall be delighted to sit down and let him ask it, but if it is of the sort of irrelevant remark which he has been passing in the last few minutes, then I am afraid that I must resist his request to intervene.

Mr. Manuel: I am sorry that the hon. and gallant Gentleman takes that attitude because he agreed with the two interjections which I made. What I want to ask him is whether it would not be far better at this period in world history that he should say something in this important debate which would increase the prestige and power of U.N.O. instead of something which would weaken the power which it is trying to get. After all, it is not regional combinations which ultimately we want to try to get but a world authority with sufficient strength which will deter aggression completely.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: I think that the hon. Gentleman must admit that what I have said commended the United Nations on its swift action in the Congo. I said that events up to date have proved that it is shaping well, but before that I pointed out two defects in the organisation which I think all honest men would agree are there and which are at the moment insuperable difficulties.

Mr. Manuel: Then let us strengthen it.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: I should like to turn for a moment to the question of disarmament. The meetings on

a nuclear tests agreement are at present the only channel along which we are likely to make progress. But if that fails, we must not commit Britain never to make tests again, because that would be dangerous. If there cannot be general agreement over no testing in the future, Britain must reserve her right to test these devices if and when she wishes to do so.
The real tragedy of this issue was the Soviet withdrawal from the Ten-Power Conference at a time when it seemed that some progress might have been made, despite the Summit failure of a day or two beforehand. But I feel that that was all part and parcel of the Soviet policy of blow hot, blow cold, what they themselves think must be an annealing process by which they will soften Western resistance and the resistance of free nations throughout the world.
I was extraordinarily interested to read the paragraph at the bottom of page 1 of the Labour Party's declaration on Berlin and Central Europe. I take the liberty of quoting the beginning of it:
The freedom of West Berlin is of vital concern and we must resist any proposal which threatens it.
I should like to learn from the party opposite what it means by that. Does "resist any proposal" mean resistance to the point of force in the defence of the Western sector of Berlin and under all circumstances—

Mr. Ellis Smith: No.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: —or resistance under certain circumstances?

Mr. Manuel: What does the hon. and gallant Gentleman think?

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: My guess is as good as anyone's and I think that if there were a ballot of opinion on the benches opposite one would get as many answers as ballot papers issued.

Mr. Wigg: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman tell us what the Conservative Party would do in the circumstances?

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: Naturally, I cannot commit my own party, but under certain circumstances it might be necessary to use force in defence of the Western sector of Berlin. I do not think that we can put that right out of our minds. I hope that such a situation will


never occur, but I can visualise that it might occur and that we might be honour-bound to use force in defence of our allies and eventually in our own defence.

Mr. Ellis Smith: Ask the people of Britain.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: These things are cumulative, as we know only too well from the days of Adolf Hitler, and I think that the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) realises that as well as I do.
I now want to say a few words about the independent nuclear deterrent. There seems to be some very mixed ideas about what is meant by the word "independent". Because part, or even all, of a weapon is manufactured in another country, it does not necessarily mean that the user of it loses its independence to use it. That is the first point which we must remember.

Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: It is not only a question of using it, but of obtaining it. If it is designed, developed and produced in another country quite outside our control legally and physically, how can it be said that we have independent control over it?

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: Of course that is true of a great many weapons, not only of these more complicated ones.

Mr. Crossman: They are not independent.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: In a sense, the hon. Member is quite right. There is really no complete independence in these days, but what is the use of an alliance if we cannot borrow from each other's armouries? What is the use of an alliance if we cannot do that?

Mr. Crossman: I put it this way. I would agree on every other thing but nuclear weapons. In the case of nuclear weapons, the whole case for having an independent deterrent was precisely to be independent of America. That being the whole case, it is a bit odd to say that it is independent when we have to borrow it from other people.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: The hon. Member, as usual, looks at one tree and

forgets that it forms only a little part of the whole wood. Shall we consider for a moment one particular weapon and take that as an example? Take Skybolt as an example, or any other.

Mr. Wigg: Would the hon. Member be good enough to take an anti-tank gun, the 106 mm. anti-tank gun which we used at Suez and about which the Americans protested? Let us take that.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: I do not mind if it is a weapon of normal conventional artillery. The fact that one has it in one's armoury, no matter where it comes from, and the fact that one has sufficient ammunition to fire it and to continue to fire it until its purpose is fulfilled, makes it an independent weapon. There is no question of where it comes from. In the armaments trade people have been buying and selling, lending and borrowing for generations back, but that does not mean that they are dependent or independent. The mere fact that we have control over the weapon and sufficient control to be able to continue to use it as long as we want to do so makes it independent.

Mr. Wigg: The hon. and gallant Member completely disregards the fact that the 106 mm. gun was supplied to us and to the Conservative Government on the specific undertaking that we would use it only for N.A.T.O. purposes, and, to their dishonour, the Government broke that undertaking. Do they imagine that the Americans do not remember that?

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: The hon. Member is trying to bring a red herring across the path. It is not a question of the terms of the control of the particular weapon. I would not say yea or nay to what he has said because I do not know whether he knows more about it than I do. That is irrelevant to my argument. The fact that we have a weapon under our control, even if we had stolen it, if we had sufficient ammunition to use and to continue to use it until such time as its purpose had been fulfilled, even if the ammunition were stolen, would make it an independent weapon. No one else could control its use, or prevent us from using it.
I want to give one more general example of that. For years Western European Union has been trying to


standardise its armaments by buying, selling, lending and borrowing between the member nations. It has not got very far in that, but it has made some progress. The fact that it is doing that does not make the contributions to W.E.U. dependent or independent because the weapons are manufactured by or subject to royalties in other countries than those in the Union.
From there I go to the question of the United States position in this problem of nuclear armaments. To me it is quite unacceptable that the United States should be the only wielder of nuclear force in the Western Alliance. She may be the principal supplier of these nuclear devices. I for one, and I think many others on both sides of the Committee, would prefer that others in the alliance should also be capable of manufacture and supply of those particular weapons. Monopolies are never healthy in armaments or other business. It is equally unacceptable to me that the United States should be the only ally capable of launching nuclear weapons. It gives her a potential veto on defensive action, using nuclear weapons in Europe or by her allies anywhere else in the world. That means that Europe could be expendable.
It also means that other quarters where we have these defensive alliances could be written off by some future United States Government as expendable. I think that would be a very dangerous situation. I grant that in certain specific cases the United States already has the key to the cupboard where certain systems are concerned, but there is nothing to say that she has the key to all the cupboards and I should be very sorry to see such a state of affairs occurring.
From there I want to move speedily to the question of Germany—

Mr. Paget: Mr. Paget rose—

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: I have given way so much and I do not want to prevent others getting in to the debate. I want to complete my speech.
I do not think for a moment that it is desirable, or would be acceptable to many people in Europe, that Germany should manufacture these nuclear weapons for herself, but I add a very big "but" to that. Germany within

N.A.T.O., as one of our partners in this alliance, must have every appropriate weapon that is available.

Mr. Ellis Smith: After she has killed millions.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: In this, or in any other effective alliance, we cannot have first-class and second-class membership. We are all the same. Provided the alliance is strong and closely knit, no danger should come from that.

Mr. Ellis Smith: After two world wars.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: In that respect, one has to consider most carefully the position of the allied commanders. They are essentially international commanders and must never feel themselves to be subject to overriding instructions from elsewhere. We are emerging into this ballistic missile phase of warfare which confronts us with quite a different set of circumstances. This makes the position of the supreme allied commander in any theatre even more difficult. In years gone by, and even in the present time, piloted aircraft, whenever they have been dispatched on their missions, could for quite a considerable time be recalled; ballistic missiles cannot. That makes all the difference.
There are two essentials of control in this respect, the occasions on which these weapons are to be used and the targets against which they should be used. I think there must be two further limits: first, the lowest limit, the one to prevent some possibly trigger-happy military commander from pressing the trigger far too soon, and, secondly, a limit to try to avoid the other extreme. I can visualise in circumstances of broken communications a commander doing nothing because he has received no orders. Under these sort of conditions, blitzkrieg tactics could make a walkover and that would be equally dangerous.
I do not think that it is any good making categorical statements of policy on being the first or the last to use the H-bomb. I do not think that any good can come of that. When the first H-bomb explodes eternity will know that the whole policy of the deterrent has failed, and we shall not ourselves be long alive after that to recognise it. We must leave


ourselves free in this respect, but we must all along understand that once we have reached the stage at which these weapons are likely to be used, our defence policy has failed.

Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend entirely in what he said, as far as he went, about inter-continental ballistic missiles, but does he not agree that we might well draw a third conclusion—namely, that there is an even stronger case for our relying as much as possible in the future on manned aircraft rather than on inter-continental ballistic missiles?

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: I agree, but progress is bound to take its course and there will be a time when manned aircraft will not be a deterrent.

6.42 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I must say that I had some difficulty in discovering what the speech by the hon. and gallant Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon) was all about, although in one particular I found myself in agreement with him. I do not think that the independence of a deterrent turns so much on whether we make the vehicle ourselves or whether we buy it from someone else; it depends on whether we have it. If somebody tries to deter me with a pistol, I do not know that either the freedom of his choice or its effectiveness on me will be influenced much by whether he made it in the back kitchen or bought it from a shop. But the hon. and gallant Member failed to observe where his argument took him, because he went on a little further to say that the Americans have the key to some of these deterrents and they have not to others. The Americans have the key, and whenever they have been in a position to have the key, they have kept it.
He went on to say that he would never agree to the Americans having complete control of this great weapon because then they might write off Europe. From the American point of view the approach is, "If we do not have complete control of this major deterrent, then the British can force our hand". They do not intend to have their hand forced. Our independence is a subtraction from theirs. It does not depend on whether we buy

Skybolt or whether we do not. It depends on whether we get Skybolt. If Skybolt is an effective weapon, then I can assure him that we shall not get it. The Americans have an effective weapon in Polaris. It exists, and they have refused to let us have it. They have refused to let us have it precisely because it exists, and when Skybolt exists there will be a reason why we should not have it, too.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: Lieut.-Commander Maydon rose—

Mr. Paget: I am sorry, but I do not wish to give way.
The Americans do not intend to depart from the monopoly which they are establishing, if they can help it. This is simply an operation of fobbing us off.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: I thank the hon. and learned Member for making again a very salient part of my speech, but I do not follow him so far as to say that when weapons become effective in their development stage, the Americans always refuse to give them to others or to sell them to others. History is full of instances in which quite the reverse is true.

Mr. John Hall: Will the hon. and learned Member tell the Committee on what ground he is able to make the statement that the Americans have refused to let us have Polaris?

Mr. Watkinson: Hear, hear.

Mr. Paget: I am shattered that the Minister says "Hear, hear" I challenge him to deny it.

Mr. Watkinson: I have already denied it in my speech.

Mr. G. Brown: Is it not true that the Minister's Department told Pressmen in this country that if they printed this story the Department would deny it, and that when Mr. Henry Brandon printed it from Washington in the Sunday Times, no denial was issued?

Mr. Watkinson: I issued a clear denial in this debate and I have made the position quite clear. I am not responsible for what Pressmen write in the newspapers. I have denied it.

Mr. Paget: On the contrary, the right hon. Gentleman did not make a denial.

Mr. Watkinson: Then I make it now.

Mr. Paget: Let us make clear what the right hon. Gentleman did deny. He denied that the Americans had refused to supply us with a Polaris submarine. That is a very different thing. I challenge him to deny this: he asked whether, if we built a submarine, the Americans would provide Polaris to arm it, and the Americans refused. Will he deny that? It is not enough for the Minister to shake his head. Let us get it on the record.

Mr. Watkinson: I will put it on the record with pleasure. I have no wish to disturb the very close relations which exist between the Government and the United States Government or between myself and the United States Secretary of Defence. I therefore want to make it quite plain, as I have made it plain several times before, that I was not authorised when I left this country to make any bids or offers for Polaris missiles, in or out of submarines. I did not make any and therefore I was not refused, and I do not believe that the possibility of refusal existed.

Mr. Paget: Let us get this perfectly clear. If Polaris were available and if, without a refusal, or whatever form the right hon. Gentleman uses to try to dodge it—

Mr. Watkinson: I am not trying to dodge it.

Mr. Paget: If Polaris were available to the right hon. Gentleman, why on earth did he not buy it? This is a weapon which is in existence. It is a weapon ideally suited to our purposes on this island. It is a weapon which we can mount on submarines, which are well-nigh invulnerable. It does not have to be placed on aeroplanes moving in and out of vulnerable airfields. Above all, here is something which exists. Did my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) wish to intervene?

Mr. John Strachey: No.

Mr. Paget: If this weapon were available, what on earth are we doing not buying it?

Mr. Wigg: If my hon. and learned Friend will be good enough to look at The Times of 17th February he will see

that it reproduces the statements made by the then Minister of Defence in the Press Conference in February last year. The then Minister of Defence seriously questioned the Polaris and said that it would be extremely costly, that it was unlikely to remain undetectable and that its movements could be closely watched by an enemy. We have never been told by the present Minister of Defence whether he stands by his predecessor's statement.

Mr. Paget: That was a statement made at a time when the Government were looking for an excuse for not getting Polaris. The true reason is that the Americans will not let us have it. If, as the right hon. Gentleman says, he was not authorised to buy it, it may be that the question of an American refusal was not reached, but the reality is that this was not available to us. It will not be available. Obviously it is not in America's interest to have us able to use atomic weapons independently of her.
In exactly the same way, it is not in our interest to see these terrible atomic and hydrogen weapons spreading into other nations. Every large member of the atomic club—we, although very junior partners, are still in the atomic club—wants to constrict the membership, constrict the independence, and limit the people who can take this tremendous decision.
The Americans feel exactly the same way and, not unnaturally, it is in their interest to keep the atomic decision within the West in their hands and nobody else's. That is the reason why we are to cease to have an independent nuclear weapon, not because we have bought it, but because we have not bought it and are not going to buy it.
I turn now to the Minister's speech. I do not know whether it was worse for its complacency, for its evasiveness or for its offensiveness. We have had eight Ministers of Defence, and after hearing the right hon. Gentleman today I hope that we have struck rock bottom. My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said that the main blame for this situation rests on the Prime Minister. There is a great deal of truth in that. Certainly a formidable measure of the blame rests on the Prime Minister, but it goes further back than that. When this Government came to power in 1951


when the Korean War was on they inherited from us a defence policy. They scrapped that defence policy, not because they had felt it too large to be necessary, not because they had ever questioned its need, but quite simply because they recognised that they could not perform that defence programme in a peace economy. Under a free enterprise economy it was not possible to perform the defence programme which they inherited.
Having to choose between the controls and State interference necessary in a war economy or the safety of the country as they had recognised it, the Conservative Government chose their ideological preferences. They preferred to free the economy, the opportunities, and economic choice, at the expense of scrapping a defence programme the necessity of which they had recognised.
Peace eventually emerged in Korea. It might have looked as if they had got away with it, but in fact they had made a choice which has proved to be irrevocable. They have sacrificed the realities of defence. From then onwards they have not been much interested in anything except a façade.
That is not new. With decadent Governments and decadent peoples we have seen the realities of defence surrendered for their appearances. The armies of Mexico which Cortes met had trumpets, fireworks and terrifying masks. There was the same sort of thing in China in its decadence. Now again we are seeing the appearance of defence time and again being preferred to its reality. There is a bluff, a pretence, and a playing about with things like Skybolt and things which are supposed to terrify. But the realities—the rifles our soldiers need, the mobility, the effectiveness, faith and will of an effective force—have all been sacrificed to these vain appearances.
I turn now to the deterrent, or whatever it may be called. There are three quite separate conceptions. There is, first, the conception of counter-force. That is the power of the West to knock out the Russians before they can hit back. That was the basis of the American defence conception for a long time. It was the basis of U2, because if there is to be a counter-force policy it is absolutely essential that there should be continual reconnaissance to identify

every objective that must be destroyed if the enemy is to be disarmed.
With the abandonment of the U2 after one came down and Eisenhower lost his nerve, "counter-force" conception has disappeared. It would probably have disappeared anyway, because the time in which either side could knock each other flat had probably gone. However, with the abandonment of the U2 "counter-force" went.
Now we come to the deterrent, which is quite different. The deterrent is that which remains after the other man has struck. Nobody is deterred by what he can destroy. He is deterred by what he cannot destroy. Thor forms no part of the deterrent. It never has. It may have had a rôle to play in the counter-force, but it can never deter, because the Russians have only to press a button and Thor disappears. It is within the range of their rockets. A near miss puts it out of operation. It is within the capacity of the Russians to put it out of operation any time they wish. That is not the deterrent. The deterrent is that which can survive everything that the Russians can do and then hit them.
Finally, there is the conception of the independent deterrent. As my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) pointed out, "independent deterrent" means nothing except independence of America. We are seriously being asked to believe that America proposes to give us that independence after we have lost it, after we have abandoned Blue Streak as something beyond our means.
Are we insane enough, are the Americans insane enough, are the Russians insane enough, to give a single extra person independence with the atomic weapon? Anyone who has the power to deny atomic capacity to another will exercise that power.
Those are the main points which I wish to make. We have requirements. We require a mobile force. The force of the United Nations has been congratulated for its speed. I am rather struck by the fact that Mr. Hammarskjoeld with his mixed bag seems to be able to move a jolly sight quicker than our integrated force did at Suez.
We require a mobile force. The Royal Air Force? This island is indefensible,


and we know it. Do we seriously think that we are again in a world in which we cart wander round bombing places? The R.A.F. matters in so far as it can deliver troops M a critical position. The Navy? Do they really think that we shall have a prolonged submarine war, and that, if we did, we could conceivably win it? The Navy's rôle today is equally the rôle of delivering troops at a critical place where quick intervention is vital.
These are the rôles, and they are a single one. It is quite ludicrous to have three Services. We have passed into the phase where the whole thing ought to be a single Service. I shall, if I may, give an example of the sort of extravagance that this empire-building within the Services has built up. Before the 1914–18 war, and between the wars, our peacetime forces have been very much the same—a little smaller before 1914, a little more between the wars. But what of the administration? We had 6,000 civil servants in 1911, 43,000 between the wars, and 124,000 now. Those 124.000 civil servants do not include any productive people, such as dockyard workers and the like. This is straight administrative service—6,000, 43,000. 124,000.
I do not believe that this sort of empire-building, Parkinsonian extravagance is in the least necessary, or that it need occur. If, instead of looking for a pretence and a terrifying mask, this Government were getting down to thinking of what we really require in defence, without regard to how many marshals or admirals they had to sack, without regard to all the little private empires built up in the Forces, but seriously applying their minds to giving us the sort of force we require, we should have had occasion to be grateful to them. As it is, we have had years and years of waste, pretence, folly, incompetence and cowardice.

7.2 p.m.

Mr. Richard Collard: The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) was good enough to allow me to interrupt him, but he afterwards said something that suggested that he rather doubted my qualifications to do so. I would therefore start by saying that I consider myself fortunate to be able to intervene in this debate, because I have tried to

study this great subject of defence for nearly thirty years, in war and peace, on active service and on the staff, and as a student at the Imperial Defence College. That does not make me an expert. The more we study these things, the more humble and diffident we become. I simply make the point that it is very difficult to understand this great problem unless there is a pretty sound background of study, which I know that I share with a great many other hon. Members.
The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) spoke very proudly of the Labour Party's declaration, "Foreign Policy and Defence". It is my intention to deal broadly with defence by making some comments on this declaration, which purports to cover, however thinly, the whole subject. It is right that this declaration should have some attention, because if one does not accent the Government's policy, the policy in this declaration is the only one with any chance, however slight, of coming in in its place. At the same time, I am perfectly aware that in the autumn it may be replaced by some even more asinine document. Nevertheless, it is all we have to go on at the moment.
It contains several examples of what might be called "draftsmanship," in that some of the more wildly contradictory statements are widely separated in the document. I want to begin with some of these. To begin with, in the section headed "Disarmament" it says:
in order to break through the deadlock a new British disarmament plan should be launched along the lines laid down last year in our joint declaration. 'The Next Step.'
Then, a good deal further on, occur these words:
We believe that in future our British contribution to the Western armoury will be in conventional terms, leaving to the Americans the provision of the Western strategic deterrent.
In other words, the first step in this initiative is the abandonment on our part of all effective armament. The attempt to exercise influence on disarmament is to be preceded by the scrapping on our part of the very force that gives us influence in the sphere of disarmament. We are to ensure the safety of Europe by the defection of the one European country that has a completely effective defence.
Having said that the Western deterrent is to be left to the Americans, the declaration goes on to say:
As for the smaller nuclear weapons which are now being developed for the support of ground forces, we believe that they too should continue to be manufactured exclusively by the Americans but deployed only under strict N.A.T.O. control.
Two paragraphs later it says:
We must also seek to obtain from the United States an undertaking that they will not use their strategic deterrent without the agreement of N.A.T.O.
So, having placed the entire burden of Western defence on the Americans, we now propose to dictate to them how they should do the job. If this ludicrous policy were adopted, the Americans might well listen to France, but they would not listen to us.
Then there is a further piece of cement for Anglo-American solidarity. The declaration says:
The arguments which the Government has used to show the vulnerability of Blue Streak apply with even greater force to the Thor missiles. We therefore continue to be opposed to the establishment of these missile bases in Britain.
A fine contribution to the Western Alliance, remembering that, as was very very rightly said in the Sunday Times last Sunday, these American bases are part of a joint defence system for the advantage of the entire Western Alliance. In parenthesis, I should like to reflect what my right hon. Friend said about Thor. Why on earth is it supposed that because Blue Streak was to be vulnerable in 1965, Thor is equally vulnerable in 1960? It is a typically sloppy piece of thinking, no doubt put in to please someone or other.
We now move further into the realms of make-believe when we read:
At present the N.A.T.O. armies in Europe are perilously dependent on nuclear weapons. We regard this as both wrong and dangerous.
A little further down, we read:
The new strategy would require that N.A.T.O. forces should be effectively equipped for conventional defence and in this task we must play our full rôle.
There is a national figure known as Colonel Blimp who, as a rule, I believe, gets less than justice, but one of his less attractive characteristics is that he wants to prepare for the next war with the weapons of the last war but one. In

that respect, the new Colonel Blimp is none other than the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), who, I am sorry to notice, is not in his place. Those of us who have tried all our lives to study defence had at one time a great respect for the right hon. Gentleman's knowledge and courage in these matters, but how he could bring himself to accept this drivelling nonsense passes belief—

Mr. G. W. Reynolds: Mr. G. W. Reynolds (Islington, North) rose—

Mr. Collard: I shall gladly give way when I have finished with this statement. Conventional weapons indeed—

Mr. Reynolds: Mr. Reynolds rose—

Mr. Collard: No. Do not let the hon. Gentleman try to make me nervous; he will not succeed.
Conventional weapons indeed! Are they going to buy horses for the cavalry?
Thirty thousand horse and foot going to Table Bay.
That is the sort of thing—a not altogther inappropriate quotation, since there are some hon. Members opposite who apparently would sooner threaten South Africa than deter aggression from somewhere else.
There has been issued as a companion piece to the Labour Party's defence declaration this document which I hold in my hand—not one of the happiest products of Transport House and not one of which hon. Members opposite should be proud. It is a dreary mixture of slander and rather unfunny burlesques. But there is in the document a series of questions and answers which deal with one point among others. The point is made—and it certainly needed to be made—that since we already have a nuclear deterrent it would not at once be scrapped, but that it would merely be run down. That is a gross deception. Who is to be deterred? Who is to be impressed by a wasting asset like that? Who is likely to find the money to keep a wasting asset like that going? This declaration is just barefaced unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Oh.

Mr. Collard: I know that the hon. Gentleman has certain views, and I will


not now take up the time of the Committee to give my opinion of them. I cannot think why Mr. Cousins cannot swallow it—but then he is a purist in these matters. If in one's determination to pull England down one is an absolute enthusiast for betrayal, I suppose one cannot even swallow this document.

Mr. John Rankin: On a point of order. Is England the only country which is concerned with this defence debate?

The Temporary Chairman (Commander Donaldson): That is not a point of order for the Chair. I think the Committee has taken the hon. Member's point, but it is not a point of order.

Mr. Collard: If I excluded Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, I certainly apologise.
The Observer described this declaration as sensible; not exactly wildly enthusiastic praise, but praise from that quarter is suspect anyway. The Observer, to its credit, eschews expediency in favour of principles, but the trouble is that its principles are nearly all wrong.

Mr. Reynolds: I thank the hon. Member for giving way at last. He has at least proved to the Committee that he can read. He made great play of the proposal, in the policy statement from which he read, to bring our conventional forces up to better strength. He seemed to think that it was absolute nonsense, and that conventional forces are unnecessary. Is he unaware that one of the main problems that face S.H.A.P.E. and SACEUR is that the Western Alliance has nothing like the thirty divisions of conventional forces which it is considered essential to have to hold the line in Europe? Does he think that the people at S.H.A.P.E. and SACEUR do not know what they are talking about?

Mr. Collard: The hon. Gentleman has missed the point of what I was saying, no doubt due to my lack of lucidity. I was discussing whether it would be right for this country to have no nuclear force at all.

Mr. Wigg: I should like to refer to six jokes back of the hon. Gentleman, when he was being funny about forces going to Table Bay. It seems that despite his long

sojourn at the Staff College, he does not know that it was a Conservative Government which committed this country to maintaining four divisions on the Continent of Europe until the end of the century.

Mr. Collard: I was not at the Staff College—I was not clever enough. I went to the Imperial Defence College. I think the hon. Gentleman still feels that I am against all conventional weapons. What I am talking about is whether this country should base its whole defence on them.
I now want briefly to discuss what is the Government's defence policy. As I understand it, it stands on three pillars. First, it grasps the nuclear nettle. It recognises that a major war, if there were one, would inevitably become a nuclear war. It recognises that we can no more ignore the hydrogen bomb than in the past we could ignore gunpowder or aircraft or electronics. It recognises also that nuclear weapons have made war less, and not more, likely. That is the first pillar—to grasp the nuclear nettle without fear.
The second pillar is to cleave to the Western Alliance and to play our full part in it. The third pillar is that we shall seek peace and disarmament—and they are not necessarily the same thing—through strength, because twice in this century we have discovered the futility of seeking them through weakness. Of course, our forces must be balanced. In so far as it is possible to distinguish conventional forces from others, we need them for special commitments in the Commonwealth and elsewhere. There are fine careers for able, vigorous and adventurous young men in all three fighting Services. But the central part of our defence, without which all the rest would be meaningless, must be a nuclear striking force which, in spite of all that has been said on the benches opposite, we now possess with enormous power. I say that with absolute belief.
The necessity for this central part of our defence, the nuclear striking force, rests on three reasons, the first two of which, I think, will be accepted as axiomatic. First, if one is to defend oneself, one must equip oneself with the latest and most powerful weapons that one can afford. Secondly, we could not afford the vast armies, navies and air


forces that would be necessary if we were crazy enough to confine ourselves to so-called conventional weapons and still attempt to make anything like the contribution that we now make to the deterrent. Thirdly, our possession of an independent deterrent gives us a great political advantage which it is essential to retain if British influence is to be maintained.
Much has been said about our not being independent if we have Skybolt. It is very easy to quibble with words in this respect, but let us get the matter in perspective. If we have Skybolt, one part of one of our weapons will be purchased from overseas. To that extent I accept that there will be a loss of independence. But may I remind the Committee that the United States of America is dependent on bases in other people's territories—bases, incidentally, which according to this declaration hon. Members opposite would like to deny them.
It is not a question of war or peace. It is a question of freedom or slavery.

Mr. Wigg: Hear, hear.

Mr. Collard: Those who oppose nuclear armaments are so blinded by emotion that they simply cannot understand the theory of the deterrent. Even those who understand the theory frequently do not always understand the importance of operational control. I said on another occasion:
We know that Russia can demolish us. She knows that we, on our own, can inflict sufficient damage on her to make aggression not worth while, even if the United States are not involved."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd March. 1960: Vol. 618, c. 1516.]
Defence is still the first duty of Government. Salus populi suprema lex. Unless we get it right, all our other efforts, individual and national, will come to naught. Unless we get it right, those who are young will not grow old in freedom. They may grow old without war, but they will not grow old in freedom.
I have ventured to quote some humble words of my own. I will finish by quoting something incomparably greater. The right hon. Gentleman whom I am now privileged to call my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), wrote these words:

Short of being actually conquered, there is no evil worse than submitting to wrong or violence for fear of war. Once you take the position of not being able in any circumstances to defend your rights against the aggression of some particular set of people, there is no end to the demands that will be made or to the humiliation that must be accepted.
It is because I believe that to be as true today as it was on the day it was written, because I believe it to be eternally true, that I urge the Committee to reject this attack upon the Government's policy with the contempt it deserves.

7.21 p.m.

Mr. J. Grimond: I find the speech of the hon. Member for Norfolk, Central (Mr. Collard) rather alarming, chiefly for the light it throws on the Imperial Defence College. If that College really believes that what is said in the Labour Party's statement is nuclear disarmament, then it is time that the Minister of Defence looked into what goes on there. It is really the equivalent of not knowing the difference between the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) and the right hon. Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head), and most people in the House of Commons have learned, after some difficulty perhaps, to distinguish between them after being in the House for quite a short time.
The Minister spoke of the dangers in the world and he exhorted us to look round on them with calm, with reason, and so forth. Can he really think that the Government's defence policy is either lessening the dangers or protecting us against them? The Government's defence policy, over the years, has not been notable for its great calm, reason and coherence. After all, the world today is dominated by certain enormous powers, Russia, America, China soon, and possibly Europe. Quite candidly, we are not on that scale. Last year, the Americans spent £4,300 million on rocketry alone. That is the scale of their effort.
Is it really suggested that we should attempt to keep up with them? Of course not. Then what is suggested? What is suggested for this country which cannot supply rifles to its Territorial Army? The "exciting" statement made by the Secretary of State for War today was to the effect that one or two Territorial battalions might have a rifle to look at. If they were good, they might even be


allowed to fire it, but there is no question of their being equipped with it.
I notice that the Government's language has changed during the various debates we have had. They used to talk about the British independent deterrent. They now talk about an independent contribution to the Western deterrent. I am not quite sure what the significance of that is. I hope it means something. What could it mean? The whole argument for a British deterrent used to be that it was independent. If we are now merely to make a contribution to a general Western deterrent, do we add to the strength of that deterrent? Is the possession by this country of Sky-bolt likely to make any great difference to the Russians? If our possession of Skybolt is in any case to depend upon our being given the essentials of it by the Americans, can it really be called an independent deterrent at all?

Vice-Admiral John Hughes Hallett: The hon. Gentleman asks whether it is independent if it comes from America. Does he think that it would make any difference to Russia, if one of these weapons dropped and exploded there, whether it was made originally in America, in this country or anywhere else?

Mr. Grimond: I entirely agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman. This seems to be the whole case for a Western deterrent. I absolutely accept his point, which, I think, is a devastating one for his own Government.
There is a sense in which we might make a contribution, the sense spoken of by the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) in the debate on Blue Streak. He said:
I believe, therefore, in a contribution to the alliance in this sense—not a contribution in the sense of weight of hitting power but a contribution in technique, in thought. That is the kind of contribution which we have made in the field of nuclear warheads. I assert as a matter of historical fact that that has led to a tightening of the Anglo-American Alliance."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th April, 1960; Vol. 622, c. 280.]
Just to interpose there, I must say, in reply to the hon. Member for Norfolk, Central, that I really do not believe that the French Government have greatly enhanced their prestige in the world by letting off some sort of nuclear device

in the Sahara, and I very much doubt whether the high influence of the Germans in the world is seriously impaired by the fact that they have not yet made hydrogen bombs.
In my view, therefore, we can make a contribution, as the right hon. Member for Hall Green says, in technique or thought, but I do not believe that we can make a significant independent contribution to the Western deterrent, and I do not believe that it is necessary.
I greatly welcome the conversion of the Labour Party to this point of view. When I advanced it some years ago, I got into rather hot water on this side of the Chamber——

Mr. Wigg: No.

Mr. Grimond: Not from the more enlightened, liberal wing of the Labour Party, but from some of the die-hard members who were at that time dedicated to a different view. Now, the Opposition have abandoned that view, and I welcome the conversion, but I hope that it is firm and lasting. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition used to make out a very cogent case for a really independent deterrent, on lines which have been referred to today, that is to say, that we needed it, to put it candidly, to ensure that we were not abandoned by the Americans. On 1st April, 1957, he said:
I think it is as well to restate this. We felt that a situation might conceivably arise in which Soviet Russia might threaten us in some way or other and in which we then, faced with this threat, had to turn to some future American President and Congress who might—one cannot be sure of this—not be too well disposed to us. We might have to say to them, 'Will you now please threaten to use the ultimate deterrent? We have not got it.' Could we be sure in those circumstances that the American President and Congress would be prepared to risk the wholesale destruction of American cities merely to meet our point of view…?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st April, 1957; Vol. 568, c. 71.]
I regard that as a powerful argument, but, if it was a powerful argument in 1957, it remains a powerful argument today. I am not quite certain about the Labour Party's present position on this. Have hon. and right hon. Members changed their policy simply because the Government have not provided the deterrent? If, for instance, they had been in office and, as a much more


capable Government, they had produced an effective Blue Streak, or if, again, at some future date, the Government provide a satisfactory deterrent or if it becomes possible for countries to manufacture deterrent weapons within their capabilities, would the Labour Party say that Britain should have its own independent deterrent?
For my part, I say "No". I believe that the Western Alliance stands or falls together. I believe that the idea of each country defending itself within the Alliance is completely out of date. I do not believe that our contribution to the deterrent frightens the Russians, and I believe that our most useful contribution can be made in what are called conventional arms. I should like to see this country take a stand on N.A.T.O. being built up with conventional arms. Incidentally, I did not quite understand the Minister's view about this. He spoke as though we should not talk about N.A.T.O. policy until it had all been discussed through the proper machinery. Surely, the machinery will never start until Governments put forward proposals for it to consider.
In my view, the proposal we should put forward is that there should not be nuclear arms sited forward in N.A.T.O. but we should build it up with conventional forces to enable it to do just what the hon. Member for Norfolk, Central rightly says we should be able to do, that is to say, resist attack. If we have no means in Europe of resisting any attack from the East except nuclear weapons, there is a very grave danger that people will revolt against that and that such an attack will not, in fact, be resisted. It is because I should like to see N.A.T.O. in a position to resist attack by conventional weapons that I should like to see it armed in such a way that it can do so without relying entirely upon the nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Collard: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that deterring attack is better than resisting attack?

Mr. Grimond: We must have that as well. We must have a Western deterrent which deters, we hope, the ultimate nuclear war. But there is always the danger that one may have in the Middle

East or Europe a situation in which conventional war breaks out, and it would be disastrous if all that the West could do in that situation was either to threaten or to drop nuclear bombs.
I now wish to say a word about disarmament. I believe that defence and disarmament are linked. I accept the position that we want to maintain a nuclear balance overall and within that to try to scale down armaments and make some practical advance in mutual disarmament. I do not believe that there was ever very much hope of an overall agreement about disarmament being reached at Geneva. I do not think that the political conditions for it exist. What we ought to be looking at is practical work in which the experts gradually get together and in which at any rate some fields of the present competition in armaments are tackled and some of the tensions perhaps relaxed. I attach great importance to keeping on with the negotiations over nuclear tests.
Incidentally if there is any difficulty about the constitutional position of the Americans in this matter, as I understand there may be—that is to say, by the Constitution of America they may be unable to allow the Russians to see the nuclear devices which they wish to explode underground to find out whether the tests can be detected—why do we not offer to have some of the tests in the Commonwealth?
I believe, too, that the Government should look again at the various proposals for disengagement. It is impossible for any back bench Member to say in detail whether this or that is possible, but the general idea of some disengagement in Germany should not be allowed to disappear entirely from our ken.
Lastly, there is Berlin. Berlin may not be a matter for disarmament, but it is a very dangerous spot in Europe. Whoever it was who asked the question whether we would defend Berlin was wittingly or unwittingly, touching a very delicate nerve, because as time goes on—I say it with regret, but it ought to be said—there will be less and less inclination to fight for Berlin. Therefore, I believe we should try to associate in some way the United Nations with the situation in Berlin. Otherwise, if we allow it to drift on, the position will


become less and less realistic. My own fear is that we may reach a position in which Berlin falls, so to speak, simply because the West is no longer prepared to maintain it. I do not want that—I wish to make this clear—but I believe that that is the ultimate danger.
I welcome the movement which has taken place in opinion in this country. I would draw to the attention of the hon. Member for Norfolk, Central the curious fact that not only is the view that this country cannot compete in major nuclear weapons with Russia or America held by the Observer, really a respectable paper—in spite of the views propagated about it at the Imperial Defence College it is an intelligent paper—but this policy is supported to a great extent by The Times and the Economist. It is also supported by at least one ex-Minister of Defence and one ex-Minister of Supply. I must warn the hon. Member for Norfolk, Central that he is sitting over a very dangerous subterranean movement in the Tory Party. If he is not careful he will be found still defending the British deterrent while the Tory Party has folded its tent—

Mr. Wigg: And silently faded away.

Mr. Grimond: —yes, into the Liberal Party.

7.34 p.m.

Sir Fitzroy Maclean: I find myself in agreement with one or two of the points made by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond). I should like to examine them in detail a little later in my speech. Meanwhile I hope he will not think I am paying him an excessive compliment when I say that I think his party has a better shadow Minister of Defence than the Labour Party.
There are one or two subjects about which I will not talk. I will begin by enumerating them. The first is rockets, because I think that enough, or possibly even too much, has been said on that subject already both in the House of Commons and outside it. The second is the defence policy of the Labour Party, because I do not think that until after the Labour Party Conference has been held we can really tell what that is, and possibly not even then. I noticed that the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) was also very careful to keep off it.
What I am going to talk about is what I think really matters—namely, conventional forces, the men on the ground, because I am convinced that that is what we really need and what matters most of all.
In 1958, the Government proclaimed in their White Paper that we were poised between total war and total peace. I believe that assumption, on which our defence policy has been based for the last three years, to be totally erroneous. It seems to me that there is at the present time very little likelihood of total war—and I am very glad of that—and no chance whatever of total peace. I think that what we can look forward to—if that is the word—is a long period of cold war. Surely that must by now be clear to almost everybody. Surely that is clear from everything that is happening in the world today—from Cuba to the Congo.
Earlier this week the Prime Minister wrote a letter to Mr. Khrushchev in which he said that he could not understand what Mr. Khrushchev's purpose was. It seems to me that Mr. Khrushchev has thrown some light on that already. He threw some light on it when he said the other day:
We will make the imperialists dance like fish in a frying pan.
And again:
I want to see the Red Flag flying over the whole planet with my own eyes in my own lifetime.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear.

Sir F. Maclean: Judging by the applause from my constituent sitting opposite, I am afraid that he is not going to vote for me after all.
Mr. Khrushchev talked a great deal about competitive co-existence, peaceful co-existence and so on. I am sure that that is what he wants. What is interesting is his own definition of it as given to a Soviet audience at Novosibirsk not long ago when he said:
Competitive co-existence means the continuation of the struggle without war.
Mr. Khrushchev thinks of it, quite rightly, in terms of "the struggle", and that is how we should think of it. When it comes to divining what his purpose is. there is no doubt about it. We are told out of Mr. Khrushchev's own mouth that that is his purpose.
I believe that that is the threat that we have to face, a threat of continuous and ubiquitous subversion and infiltration; of constant military, economic and political pressure; a threat of brush fires being fanned by what the Prime Minister has called "the wind of change" into a burning, fiery furnace. If we are to stand up to that threat and hold our own against it in the world, what we need is not so much rockets or missiles as adequate conventional forces—men on the ground.
The question we should ask ourselves in this Committee today is: Are we going to get the men we need? That is the question that some of us on both sides of the Committee have been asking anxiously for the past three years ever since the Government announced their intention of abolishing conscription. I was amused at the righteous indignation of the right hon. Member for Belper at the belated discovery that there is something the matter with the Government's defence policy, a policy which the Opposition Front Bench have been supporting loyally for the past three years in spite of the persistent and I would say enlightened criticism from the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and a number of us on this side of the Committee.
Quite frankly, I do not believe that we shall get the men we need. The Army bears the brunt of the cold war. That is something we should never forget. Three years ago or more, when the strength of the Army was in the region of 400,000 men, it was decided after long deliberation by the Hull Committee, under General Hull, and consisting of a lot of highly qualified experts, that the lowest figure to which the Army could be safely reduced, if it was to fulfil its commitments, was rather over 200,000 men.
That figure was brushed aside by the new Minister of Defence and the strength of the Army fixed quite arbitrarily at 165,000 men. That figure was arrived at in one way and one way only. It was nothing more than an optimistic guess at the number of men that we might, with luck, be able to raise by voluntary recruitment. It was not what was needed but what could be got. I do not pretend to have any particular knowledge or to speak with any particular authority on this subject, but I was impressed by

someone who could speak with perhaps more authority than anyone else in this country, Field Marshal Lord Harding. He referred to that occasion in another place last week as
The grave mistake that was made in 1957."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 13th July, 1960; Vol. 225, c. 219.]
That was in April, 1957. By February, 1959, two things had happened. First, it had become clear to those concerned that 165,000 men was nothing like enough, and, secondly, that the Ministers concerned, in a fit of optimism or possibly of wishful thinking, had come to the conclusion that they might, if lucky, be able to raise a few more men.
And so the target, or ceiling, was raised to 180,000. It was still, as I would point out, not the number needed to fulfil our commitments, which was, as we know, 200,000 or more, but it was a figure which once again, with luck, could be got. So far as I know, and it was confirmed as recently as March last by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, that figure of 180,000 still remains the target. But then Ministers have been optimistic all along. Ministers even offered as much as 10 to 1 on their getting the recruits they needed. Ministers have been offering to eat their hats if they did not. My advice to Ministers, particularly to the Service Ministers, is not to offer to eat their hats, which may very likely turn out to be bowler hats, and indigestible bowler hats at that.
Meanwhile, in order to make both ends meet, the Government have been frantically cutting down on their commitments and skimping or only half meeting their obligations. Everywhere oversew—as anyone who has any connection with the Army must know—units are under strength; platoons, companies, battalions, brigades and so on, all lamentably under strength, with all the additional strain on the men which that involves.
Everywhere spells of duty abroad are being extended. My right hon. Friend asked us in his speech to think of the men and women in the Forces. I would ask him 'to think of the Royal Horse Guards. After spending three years in conditions of great stress and strain in Cyprus, they came back to this country, only to be sent back again immediately to Where they bad come from. Meanwhile in Europe our contribution has


been reduced from its original level and now is to be reduced again still further.
What possible basis could there be for such a policy? Presumably it is based on the assumption of the 1958 White Paper of total war or total peace. On the prospect of streamlined nuclear forces, including, presumably, that nebulous article the independent British deterrent, serving all purposes simultaneously. It was based, I suppose, on the prospect of early liquidation of most of our imperial commitments. Finally, and strangest of all, it was based on the prospect of early success art the Summit.
In fact, things have turned out very differently indeed. First we have been left behind, and badly left behind, in the rocket race. The idea of an independent British deterrent has been jettisoned by the Government. Some of our overseas commitments, it is true, have been liquidated, but only some. What it comes to is that even when we are trying to liquidate commitments it is very much harder to negotiate from weakness rather than from strength. Meanwhile, we have today the example of the Congo to give us a hint of what may well lie in store for us in Africa. Finally, the Summit Conference on which so much store was set was not a success but a most resounding failure.
In my view, the failure of the Summit does not, in fact, change anything. It certainly does not bring the hot war any nearer, just as the success, or apparent success, of the Summit would not have really made any difference to the continuation of the cold war. We have to realise that Russia's dislike of the hot war, a very understandable dislike, and Russia's equally understandable liking for the cold war and her desire to see us, as Mr. Khrushchev would say, "dance like fish in a frying pan," are constant factors in the world situation and likely to remain so for the rest of our life time.
What I believe recent events should have done is to cast some badly needed light on the facts of the situation and to make clear to everyone, or almost everyone, how completely unfounded is the assumption on which the Government's defence policy is based, namely, the assumption of total war or total peace, and to make clear to everyone that the time has come for a reappraisal,

however agonising, of our defence policy. As Lord Salisbury said in another place last week, it is indeed
a queer moment..to be disbanding our best troops."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 13th July, 1960, Vol. 225, c. 233]
What seems to me to make such a reappraisal of our defence policy all the more necessary is the deeply disturbing character of the latest recruiting figures. Despite all the pay increases—and the latest pay increase has had, as the hon. Member for Dudley knows better than I do, little or no effect on recruiting—despite all the assurances of Ministers that everything was going to be all right on the night, despite 'the cries of "defeatist" at any suggestion that things were not going too well over the last three years, it seems all too likely that even the miserable figure of 165,000 will not be reached, let alone the more optimistic figure of 180,000 or that of 200,000 which we all know is the only one that corresponds to reality.
Minister may continue to be optimistic, but the experts—the generals, the soldiers, the people who have made a lifetime's study of these things—are not. I draw attention once again to the letter, which already has been mentioned in this debate, from General Poett, which was recently reproduced in a leading article in The Times. I also draw attention once again to the recent speech in another place by Lord Harding.
This unsatisfactory recruiting trend is not altogether surprising. We are always being exhorted not to say anything that will upset or interfere with recruiting. Honestly I do not believe that most of the speeches made by back benchers in the House of Commons have much effect one way or the other on recruiting. What has much more effect upon it is what is said in the country and in the House by Members of the Government.
For the last three years, until one is sick of it, the talk has been of nothing but rockets and "streamlined nuclear forces." That is extremely bad for recruiting, because the subjects of this propaganda see the armed forces as nothing more than boffins pressing buttons. To the ordinary, healthy young man, that is not an attractive prospect. That is why the recruiting figures, not only for the Army but also,


I believe, for aircrew, are not at all good. What we need—I repeat it once again—are men on the ground, trained soldiers in sufficient numbers to fulfil the duties that they are called upon to fulfil and units and formations that are up to strength and properly equipped. That is the direction in which the Government's sales talk should be directed.
To sum up, I do not believe that we can be sure of getting even 165,000 men. I did not much like what my right hon. Friend the Minister said when he expressed his opinion that we were "in sight" of the minimum requirement. One can see something a very long way off before one gets to it, if one gets to it at all. In any event, I do not believe that 165,000, or even 180,000, is anything like enough. The figure of 165,000, when it was fixed, assumed a drastic reduction of our troops in Germany and a quiet time everywhere else. But neither of those expectations has been fulfilled. The Government cannot now possibly reduce our N.A.T.O. contribution and Africa is anything but quiet.
I make no apology for referring once again to the speech of Field Marshal Lord Harding. He is a man who speaks with more authority than anyone else. He has served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and no one is more closely in touch with military opinion at all levels. What he said was needed was an army 200,000 strong. I profoundly believe that to be true. I also believe that there is only one way in which to get that number of men, and that is by selective conscription.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War gave some encouraging news about the Territorial Army, and I was delighted to hear it. I was delighted to hear that it was to be reorganised. I played some small part in reorganising the Territorial Army some years ago. I am also delighted to hear that it is to have better equipment. That is very good news. Nevertheless, I still do not think that this is in any way an answer to the manpower problem. What is needed is troops to hold positions. I do not see how that can be done by men who have ordinary careers and professions to pursue. If a man works at a gas works or as a plumber, how can he sit for three years in Cyprus? Nor, for

that matter, can such men replace Regular troops for long periods in this country.
I hope that in saying that the only answer to this problem is a return to a measure of conscription, I may be wrong. I do not like the idea of conscription either from the general point of view or, indeed, from the military viewpoint. If, however, that is the only way in which we can get the troops that we need, we must face up to it.
And so I conclude by calling on the Government to repeat, and, if necessary, even to honour, the pledge which they gave in 1957, when they said that if voluntary recruiting failed to produce the number of troops required, they would resort once again to some form of compulsory service.

7.56 p.m.

Mr. K. Zilliacus: The hon. Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) has posed the other side of the dilemma of this country if it assumes that it must remain on a preparation-for-war footing against one-third of the world. Whereas the nuclear deterrent strategy is insane and suicidal, the hon. Member's remedy of relying on conventional forces to deal with the winds of change is impracticable and mistaken. I do not believe that the people of this country would stand for the idea of any form of conscription in order to use conscripts to put down revolutionary movements in other countries. I am certain that there would be a violent revolt against that from this side of the House of Commons.
I speak as a representative of those, who are already in a large majority in the Labour Party, who reject the nuclear deterrent strategy to which both Front Benches adhere. From my point of view, the difference between the two Front Benches on the issue of defence is like nothing so much as the old definition of the difference between a psychotic and a neurotic. The psychotic is certain that two and two make five. The neurotic suspects that two and two make four, but he cannot bear the thought. The Government cling to the nuclear deterrent strategy and delude themselves that we can be a nuclear


Power taken seriously by the United States and, therefore, have something to say in the alliance.
For what the Americans think about that, I refer to the Observer of 17th April which contained a report from Washington summarising the opinion of the Pentagon, the Atomic Energy Commission and the experts on defence in Congress—that is, the U.S. brass-hats and power politicians. What they said about us was that they had always thought that our attempts at being a nuclear Power independently were a sop to our national pride and a tribute to our past. Nor would there be any sense in our trying to share in an overall Western deterrent, because we were too small, too near the scene of activities, would get no warning, and would all be wiped out by fall-out. "The best thing", said a Pentagon general who was quoted, "you can do when we no longer need British territory for our strategic air command bases is to cease being a target, because that is all you can ever be."
Parallel with that report there was another one in the U.S. News and World Review as to what the Americans think of our status as an ally. The report said that we were outsiders in Europe, where the balance of power is now held by Bonn and Paris, and a junior partner of the United States in world affairs. The United States has more wealth and more military power than all her allies combined. She has bases in their territories and supreme command of their forces, and as regards a good many of them, through the Mutual Security Programme, controls the pursestrings.
In those circumstances, naturally, the United States will take all the vital decisions unilaterally. If there is time we may be consulted, but mostly there would not be time. And of course when matters of life and death are involved the United States will put its own interests first and treat her minor allies as expendable.
It is no use blaming the Americans for that. That is the harsh logic of power politics. That is exactly how we should behave if the position were reversed. N.A.T.O. is not a charitable institution or even a democratic institution. It is a military alliance and a power-political

combination, where the country with most of the power decides on the policies.
The Government refuse to recognise these facts. I understand that. The Tories are a little old-fashioned and a bit hazy as to what century they are living in. Most of them still see Britain clad in the shining armour of a first-class world power. The few who have noticed that this is not 1860 but 1960 have an emperor's clothes complex. They cannot see that the emperor is down to his G-string and that even the G-string has got a bit frayed.
Their idea of defence is chasing someone else's pie in the sky. That is what the Skybolt project amounts to. Nobody knows what the next United States Administration will do. It cannot be bound by the present Administration. The one thing we do know is that, whether the Republican or the Democratic candidate comes in, he is pledged to a greater defence effort than before, which means that the United States Air Force will get priority with Skybolts, if and when available, and we shall be lucky if we have any by 1970. The whole thing is hypothetical and remote in the extreme.
There are three facts, three awful realities, which really should be recognised. The first is that nuclear weapons embody the fact that man's malign genius has at last developed greater destructive power than his own capacity to survive. As a result, for whatever reason nuclear weapons were used, their use would be the greatest conceivable evil in any possible circumstances. The Government have paid lip-service to this idea. They have, if I may say so, come relatively clean about it, a sort of political off-white, appropriate to Ministers using the wrong deterrent. They have said in the 1957 Defence White Paper and in the pronouncements of subsequent Defence Ministers that as there is no defence against nuclear weapons it is essential to prevent war from ever breaking out, that once it has broken out we are sunk: "We are dead anyway". But instead of drawing the correct conclusion from that, which is that it is literally vital to have a policy for making peace, for putting an end to the mortal danger of the nuclear arms race, they say, "We are going to prevent war by preparing for it".
Therefore they call nuclear weapons deterrents and they call the nuclear destruction strategy a nuclear deterrent strategy. Of course, these are misnomers, misleading the country into thinking that if we pile up arms and get ready to use them at the drop of a hat we are preserving peace, "preventing" war. On the contrary, this policy produces a situation where sooner or later there will be a war, even when nobody wants to go to war, a situation where any diplomatic incident might turn into a catastrophe, into atomic annihilation by accident.
When we are told that we should go in for these brush fire wars to put down revolts and revolutions I counter by asking, should we have intervened in South Korea to put down the revolution there? Should we have intervened in Japan when Mr. Kishi was thrown out? Or should we have intervened in Iraq or in Turkey or in Cuba? We were right to say, "We will not intervene in the Congo". We were right to send troops only through the United Nations at the request of the Government in the Congo, and to exclude the troops of any of the great Powers or of any State with any colonial possessions.
Military power is quite irrelevant to dealing with the problems presented by the forces of social and colonial change in the world, and the price for being part of this set-up, part of the nuclear deterrent strategy, is complete subservience to the most powerful ally and annihilation without representation in defence of policies over which we have no control and with which we disagree. That is so whether or not we pretend to be a nuclear Power.
The leaders of my own party for a long time shared with the Government the delusion that on the strength of an output of nuclear warheads about 3 per cent. of that of the United States, and with no means of delivering them except obsolescent bomber forces, we could somehow share in the control of N.A.T.O. I am glad that that delusion has been abandoned by the leaders of my party. But as a result they have impaled themselves on the other horn of the dilemma. Because now they also are talking about more reliance on conventional forces. I do not believe that

we can enlarge conventional forces without spending still more on armaments and without having some form of conscription. And I am quite sure that the people of this country will not stand for that. It would certainly be political suicide for the Labour Party to attempt to put that over.
The other aspect of this policy is that we are now invited to stay in N.A.T.O. on the basis of the United States having the monopoly of nuclear weapons. But only a few months ago, as late as 1st March, in the defence debate, the leader of my own party said that on that basis we should be in a position of helplessness and of unilateral dependence on the United States and unable to resist American policies being thrust upon us with which we disagreed and that could land us in war. That is in any case the position, whether or not we go on with the Government's policy of deluding themselves that we are a nuclear Power.
Whether or not we accept the position that we cannot be and are not a nuclear Power, the price of remaining in the American alliance, of remaining a loyal supporter of N.A.T.O., is complete subservience to American purposes and policies and the utter impossibility of carrying out any policy of our own.
A very good example of that is the recent communication from the Prime Minister to the Soviet Government, in which he uncritically accepted the American version of what had happened over the RB.47. He endorsed it immediately. He said that the Americans were never within 30 miles of the Soviet coast. But, after all, the Americans said a few days before that that they did not know where the plane was or what had happened to it. So that they obviously did not know its position or whether it was or was not within 30 miles of the Soviet coast.
The only thing we know about it is that the American version to the effect that this plane was on an investigation into electromagnetic disturbances in the Arctic zone was completely untrue. If that is all it was doing, it could have flown between Spitzbergen and Norway or between Spitzbergen and Iceland, instead of skirting the Soviet coast.
It is quite clear that this was some form of military reconnaissance mission. The Prime Minister virtually admitted


that. He went even further. He alleged that if they had even flown over Soviet territorial waters it was wrong to have shot them down. But after all, a Soviet fighter had told them to land. They would not do it. The U.S.A. had had fair warning about what would happen to reconnaissance planes doing this kind of thing. I do not like these kinds of methods. I do not like Mr. Khrushchev borrowing a leaf out of the late Mr. John Foster Dulles's book and threatening massive retaliation with nuclear weapons at times and places of his own choosing, to deter minor aggressions with conventional arms. I think that that is wrong and that it is dangerous. But we cannot condemn it so long as we stick to the nuclear deterrent strategy and justify the Americans.

Mr. Rankin: Will my hon. Friend agree that yesterday the Prime Minister declared the Tory policy as being "America right or wrong"?

Mr. Zilliacus: Yes. He said that long ago. He said it in the case when Mr. Dulles was threatening war over Quemoy; when pressed by the Leader of the Opposition to say that we were opposed to this kind of thing he said that it would be better to be wrong with America than to be right and stand alone. It is quite true that the Prime Minister is prepared to pay any price whatever in subservience to the United States for remaining in the alliance. He kids himself or tries to delude the people that he can be a mediator, a sort of fixer, between the Soviet Union and the United States, on the basis of sitting in the pocket of Uncle Sam. He cannot do it, unless he is prepared to stand on his own feet—and that goes for the Labour Party as well.
The only realistic policy is to say that we part company with the delusion that we can or should make or possess nuclear weapons, that we intend to clear out the American bases here, and that we will apply to the military alliances the principle that we will not be committed to war by allies who refuse to come to terms with us on how to make peace. That is not pacifism or isolationism. It is a policy of taking our stand on the United Nations Charter, which is based on the assumption that the permanent members of the Security

Council have a common interest in peace.
The Prime Minister a year ago in Moscow paid lip-service to that idea and said that we had a common interest in peace. The first step in such a policy is to put a stop to this murderous nonsense of the nuclear deterrent strategy so far as we are concerned. The second is to put forward our own proposals for a settlement. The third is to be ready to negotiate on them with the U.S.S.R., whether or not some of our allies come in, and to bring any agreement reached before the United Nations General Assembly for approval as a basis of settlement The fourth is to say that, if and when the Soviet Union accepts our proposals for peaceful settlement as a basis of negotiation, any ally who refuses to negotiate on those terms can no longer claim to be the victim of unprovoked aggression under N.A.T.O., C.E.N.T.O., and S.E.A.T.O. and therefore is not entitled to British help. This is a policy on which we would gain such prestige and bargaining power in Moscow and Washington, and in public opinion all over the world. as to enable us to give an effective lead for peace.

8.12 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg: I have waited a long time, but it has been worth waiting if only to say a few words in defence of the Labour Party policy. I am delighted that my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) today put forward the case that he did, and made the plea that he did. I know only too well the agony that men whose lives have been devoted to the cause of peace must feel 'when they are brought face to face with these horrible realities. But we live, and if we are to survive we must face the facts of the world not as we would wish them to be but as they are.
It is a commentary on our affairs that I am the second successive speaker from this side of the Committee and there is a complete absence of hon. Members opposite. I do not regard that as any slight upon myself, although there is plenty of excuse because I have had many opportunities of speaking on defence and I shall say many things that I have said before.
The first fact that hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have to


face is that the policy announced in the 1957 Defence White Paper has failed in every detail. The country, the Government and the Labour Opposition have to face it. We on this side of the Committee have faced fairly and squarely the fact that the 1957 White Paper is finished. The hon. Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) made a point which I have often made myself, that the foundation of the policy, the first paragraph of the 1958 White Paper, can no longer be defended.
The idea that the world stands poised between total war and total peace is disposed of. One has only to look at the world—at Cuba, the Congo, Mr. Khrushchev's speeches, the happenings with the U2 and the R.B.47. These certainly show that we are nowhere near total peace. We have to accept that. Hon. Members opposite, for a variety of reasons, cannot bring themselves to do so. It would not be so bad if that were true only of back benchers. The Minister of Defence made a speech today which politically could be justified, because he was probing all the time at what he thought were the Labour Party's weak spots, but which from a defence point of view was tragic.
The right hon. Gentleman has invented a gimmick of his own. Presumably, he has been reading Mr. Priestley on experiments with the time-scale and he has got stuck with the time-scale. I wish that the right hon. Gentleman were here now, because one can learn from the look on his face when one says these things. He applies the time-scale of Blue Streak to every piece of hardware, but when we want to apply it to manpower and we ask whether the winning post is 1963 he keeps absolutely mum. There is not a word from him. The right hon. Gentleman has come to the office a little late. He has net had the advantage of serving in the Army. Unfortunately for him, he served in the Navy and that is not a substitute. The hon. Member for Norfolk, Central (Mr. Collard) has also obviously missed that experience and he has clearly not read the 1957 White Paper. Does he not know what it says about the V-bomber?
It was not my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper or my hon. Friends who said that there was net to be a

successor to the V-bomber. It was not my hon. Friends who said that there was to be no successor to the fighter. It was not my hon. Friends who said that they were putting all their money on Blue Streak. It was the Minister of Aviation. It was he who committed the Government to the production of an atomic force. He said that we did not need V-bombers any more.
I agree that in their sphere they are powerful engines of destruction, but they are not quite as powerful as the hon. Member for Norfolk, Central would have us believe, even though he attended the Imperial Defence College. There are 200 V-bombers, and 100 of them are Valiants which are pretty old by modern standards. In any case, even if they are of the Mark II type and capable of doing their job they would still not be 5 per cent. of American atomic potential.
I need not labour the point. I have a quotation here which I think sums up the Government's atomic policy, the whole spectrum of the atomic philosophy. It is from a very gallant soldier whom the Secretary of State for War knows very well. General Cowley made a speech to the Royal Institute in November, and may I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on defending him? If rumour does not lie, the late Minister of Defence was after his blood and he tried to stop him becoming Master-General of the Ordnance, but he is now the Master-General.
Let us see what he said about the atomic philosophy, and this is not a year but eight months ago. He put it into verse which reads:
I also have a plan to spend a thousand million pound
To buy some guided missiles and hide them in the ground,
And then to clearly paint on each 'These things must not be used';
No wonder that our citizens are getting so confused.
That is the description by a distinguished Service officer given to the most distinguished Service audience in the country—so distinguished that I was not even admitted. He is still serving in a key position. That is what he thought. The poor chap got himself in a jam, became, like so many hon. Gentlemen on the benches opposite, at least in the early stages, he was a man with a high degree


of integrity and he had been reading the staff papers.
He first put forward for the approval of the Secretary of State for War a synopsis, and later, of course, his lecture was also submitted for inspection. The right hon. Gentleman doubtless read it, and approved it, and nobody thought that there was going to be any row because General Cowley's views were taken from current policy papers although it was not politically convenient to say so. He had known for a long time that Blue Streak was a dead duck, but, needless to say, with a General Election coming along the Government had not the guts to say so.
In November General Cowley came along with his verse and with his philosophy based on the simple fact that this country could not be an independent nuclear Power, and that, in the kind of world in which we live, if one runs into an atomic stalemate one is still left a long way on the side of hell, away from peace: The hon. Member for Bute and North Ayrshire was absolutely right. One has to fall back on one's own conventional forces.
The second point of the Minister's case was on equipment. I do not know if the right hon. Gentleman was watching me at that point. I got excited because if at this stage a right hon. Gentleman, a member of the Cabinet holding a senior defence post, gets at that Dispatch Box and starts to give a list of equipment which includes the Sterling, the F.N. rifle, the Salad in and the Saracen and the like, at least he knows enough about me to know that I know that that means that some civil servant away in the dungeons has been asked to produce a list, and the Minister of Defence has not a cat in hell idea of what it all means. He just reads it.
Here, again, let me read something else, something which I have read to the House before, and I rely again on the authority of a serving officer. The report is not a year old. Again I apologise to the right hon. Gentleman because he has heard all this before. The Director of Munitions and Stores said:
The equipment to fight a war exists in the form of war Reserves.
Unfortunately at present we have no plan, anti therefore, no war Reserves to implement it. This needs some explanation. Plans have been forwarded. But in the strictly practical

sense a plan is no more than a piece of paper or an attitude of mind unless it can be translated physically into the stores, vehicles and ammunition necessary for its execution. This has not happened. For several years no decision has been made by the Ministry of Defence and Treasury which will enable equipment to be brought to bring our Limited War Reserves up to the level necessary to implement the latest tactical and strategic doctrine. It follows that the means to fight a Limited War are confined to what can he retained from the residue of an incomplete re-equipment programme which was stopped several years ago. This process is officially known as 'living on our fat'. We are not even supposed to make up deficiencies in Unit War Equipments from maintenance as this would mean earlier buying for peace maintenance. All operations, including Suez, have had to he equipped by improvisation using out of date, incomplete mobilisation packs and feverishly making scaled issues from stores left over from the last war. In relation to its small size and large commitments the British Army must be one of the worst equipped in the world. Yet the Treasury continues to urge us, with loud cries, to avoid over-insurance. It is rather like advising a starving man to avoid over-eating.
That was a statement made by Brigadier Fernyhough, the then Director of Munitions and Stores, and I have read to the House before. It means that that assurance from General Cowley and Brigadier Fernyhough destroys two points in the case made by the Minister of Defence.
Now let me turn to the third point. I could not make this point until the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Aviation arrived. I am glad that he is now with us. I gave him notice this morning that I had something to say about him, because if ever the House of Commons took to itself impeachment, it would impeach him, not because he is wrong—because in this game no one can be sure that he is right—but because he knew at least a year ago that both the recruiting programme and Blue Streak were out, and he continued to gamble with public money and with the defence of this country even though he knew that he was following policies that were bound to fail.
We have had some interesting utterances by the right hon. Gentleman and I propose to weary the House with one or two of them. He made this speech at the Royal Tournament. It was reported on 4th June, 1958. He there offered to lay 10–1 that he would get his recruits—then 165,000. Later on that year he made another speech at the Conservative Party Conference at which he said—I


need not add to loud and enthusiastic cheers—
This is largely the personal work of our leader and Prime Minister.
There we are, he and the Prime Minister, in happy combination, committed to this great defence policy which has failed.
Later on in his speech he said, "We are not suckers". Needless to say this was also again received with loud cheers. I ask my colleagues, particularly those who served on the Betting Bill, what they think of a man who wants to lay 10–1 on getting his recruits when the odds are at least 20–1 against. If he and the Prime Minister are not suckers, will somebody lead me to one?
We have been told over the months and over the years that the figure of 165,000 would be achieved for certain. A year ago when recruiting looked to be getting better and the Government were faced with the need for raising the establishment—after all we need to remember that battalions in Cyprus were asked to undertake active operations with establishments of only just over 600 men and the Secretary of State for War said that establishment had to be raised to 800—the figure that was then required was 182,000. We have been reminded today that Field Marshal Lord Harding gave a figure of 200,000. The right hon. Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head) also referred to a figure of 182,000.
As recently as 12th November the Secretary of State for War said:
I can still give a confident answer to that question. I believe that the beginning of 1963—I base my thought on the evidence that we have had now over two years of the new terms of service—will find us with an army with a strength of at least 165,000 all ranks, which was the target set in 1957…we can fill the gap between our old target of 165,000 and our new one of 180,000."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November. 1959; Vol. 613, c. 624–5.]
There we were, last November, being told that the new target was 180,000, and that the right hon. Gentleman was confident of getting it. Then we had the present Minister of Aviation making a speech—which he was kind enough to send to me this afternoon, for quite another purpose. It is a hand-out of his speech of 29th June. He then said:
Our target for our future Regular Army remains unchanged at 165,000…".

He was hedging then. He knew by that time that he was faced with complete failure.
The story moves to last week, and here again I must draw the hon. Member's attention to a very curious thing. The Secretary of State for War made a speech at a luncheon of the Army League—another distinguished gathering—in which, for the first time, he admitted that the Government were not going to get their recruits. He said that they would not get 165,000 on 1st January, 1963. He went on to tell the gathering what was needed in the cold war—and I agree with every word he said on that. He then went on to outline the worldwide deployment to which our troops are committed—and again I agree with every word. But the point is that he knows what the consequences of the failure of his policy means. He also knows that the Government could never have sold this policy to their back benchers but for the existence of paragraph 48 of the 1957 White Paper.
On 22nd June of this year I asked the Minister of Defence—an honourable man—if the Government still stood by that policy. My right hon. Friend asked the same question this afternoon, and I ask it again now. We now have the Secretary of State for War admitting that we are not going to get the 165,000. He said that we should get it later in 1963.

Mr. Soames: Mr. Soames indicated dissent.

Mr. Wigg: In that case I must read what the right hon. Gentleman said at the luncheon to which I have referred. He said:
This is a grave and vital task and I would like now to say a few words about the sort of Army we need to fulfil it. The target which the Army has been set is to reach a voluntary strength of 165,000 by 1963 when the last National Service man will have left. In the view of the Government this is the figure which will enable the Army to meet its commitments as we now see them. But this would not be sufficient in the long term, for it could not provide that stability which is necessary for a peacetime Army dependent on volunteers. And so we have the higher target figure of 182,000. Let me tell you what the recruiting situation is now. Projecting forward the present trend of recruiting figures, we will reach 165,000 in the early days of 1963.
That is not 1st January.
As I pointed out, one of the gimmicks of the Minister of Defence is to refer to the time scale. If any question is raised


concerning any hardware we must ask ourselves whether it will fit into the time scale. It was not I who tried to fit 1st January, 1963, into the time-scale. It was the Government, and they must now admit that their target will not be reached by that date.
Again I will go out on a limb and prophesy what will happen. There is a new force at work in the recruiting field. I am as anxious as the right hon. Gentleman that the target should be reached, but it is clear that, for the first time. a pay increase has not produced the necessary increased rate of recruiting, and the Committee needs to remind itself that the last National Service registration was in the early days of 1959. That being so, if the removal of National Service has removed a feeling of urgency from our young men, next January the rate of recruiting will fall still further. In view of the collapse of the Government's policy, down to the very last detail, surely it is now up to them, if they have to admit that they will not get the necessary recruits, to honour Paragraph 48 in the 1957 White Paper, which enabled them to get it through three years ago.

8.35 p.m.

Mr. Denis Healey: This has been an interesting debate. I hope that the Secretary of State for War will answer the extremely important question put to him by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg).
I want to broaden the scope of the debate. I do not think I can do better than start with some words of the Prime Minister which the whole House applauded yesterday. He said in his letter to Mr. Khrushchev:
If the present trend of events in the world continues, we may all of us one day, either by miscalculation or by mischance, find ourselves caught up in a situation from which we cannot escape."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th July, 1960; Vol. 627, c. 255–6.]
All of us felt that those words went to the very root of the problem with which we are confronted.
Most of us agree that the main responsibility for the trend to which the right hon. Gentleman referred lies with Mr. Khrushchev and the Governments which preceded him.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: And America.

Mr. Healey: But can we be sure that we on this side of the world have no responsibility for the general trend which has dominated world affairs in the last ten years or so? I cannot escape the feeling that some military decisions, either taken by N.A.T.O. as a whole or by our own Government, have played their part in setting the general style of world policy which we all deplore. I do not believe that responsibility for these decisions lies with any original sin of the soldiers. The basic failure of Western policy is that we have not related our military decisions to their political context. The responsibility for this lies the whole time with the politicians, not with their military advisers. The politicians of the Western countries in the last ten years have increasingly abdicated their real duty to military technicians whose job is not to take decisions nor to decide ends but simply to advise on the best means by which to reach those ends.
One can see very easily the reason why we have fallen into this predicament. It has often been said in the House that military decisions must be taken five or even seven years before they can become effective. The result is that Governments are always finding themselves in a situation in which their freedom of action is limited by military decisions which were taken five or seven years before because the only hardware they have is that which they decided to get long ago.
In summing up, I do not want to deal with the technical arguments against the Government's defence policy, although, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) pointed out, the fact that this Government have spent over £15,000 million since they first won office in 1951 without providing the capacity to carry out even a minor operation of war is something which deserves the highest censure which this nation can offer against it. The burden of my complaint will be that our defence policy has not been governed as it should have been by our political aims and that in fact in many respects our defence policy is making it impossible for us to carry out our political aims.
I should like to concentrate on two major political aims to which I think all of us in the House have often given


security must be the Western Alliance to which we belong. It is impossible for any one member of that Alliance to achieve security by itself. In other words, we must seek our military security in interdependence and not in independence. My charge against the Government in this respect will be that the defence policies they are adopting are going to wreck the political solidarity of the Western Alliance, which is the first bulwark on which we rely for our security.
It has often been said in the House, on both sides—I remember a most moving passage in a speech by the Minister of Aviation when presenting a defence White Paper a few years ago—that there can be no absolute or total security in the atomic age by pursuing an arms race against one's enemy. The only absolute security any of us can hope for in these days is through some form of agreement with our enemy, an agreement which we all hope will take the form of general and complete disarmament. My second major charge against the Government's defence policy is that it has worked against the mutual confidence which is a necessary precondition of reaching agreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union on disarmament, and that it has immensely increased the physical difficulties of ever imposing any effective control on the armaments of both sides.
Much of this debate has centred on the Government's decision to try to buy a missile, which does not yet exist but which has already been given the name of Skybolt, from the Americans and on the Government's refusal to state their position on a proposal made by General Norstad for supplying another missile, which does exist, called Polaris, to the European members—I believe to the Continental European members of the Western Alliance. As I understand it, the Government's case for buying the Skybolt missile is that Britain can no longer hope to produce the whole of an effective deterrent system for herself and, therefore, she must buy the most costly and complicated component of her deterrent system from the United States.
I do not want to deal with the practical problem, to which my right hon. Friend devoted much time, of whether or not Skybolt will ever exist,

whether if it does exist we shall be able to buy it, and whether, if we are able to buy it, we shall be allowed to use it without the Americans keeping control of it. I am absolutely convinced that my right hon. Friend is right in suspecting that the answer to each of those questions is No, or that the answer to the first is No and, therefore, the answer to the other two will never arise.
I want to concentrate, not so much on the practical feasibility of the Government's policy on Skybolt, but on its political wisdom. As my right hon. Friend said, it is quite obvious that the favoured military position which Britain has been accorded by the United States inside N.A.T.O. for the last eleven years is not going to last much longer, if indeed it has survived to this moment. It is certain that by the time the missile called Skybolt is actually available, if it ever is—that is to say, on the Government's most optimistic estimate, by about 1963—it will be absolutely impossible for the United States to give us this essential component of an atomic deterrent system unless they are simultaneously prepared to offer the rest of their N.A.T.O. Allies missiles to meet their strategic demands.
I challenge the Secretary of State for War to dispute this. There is no question whatever that even if it is not the case today, by 1963, if the Americans give us a missile, they will have to agree to give other missiles, perhaps not the same one, to any of their N.A.T.O. Allies who demand them. The result of this will be a tremendous incentive to all the other European countries who produce their own atomic warheads. France has already done so, but she lacks an effective delivery system, as she will unless she gets missiles from the United States.
Germany, Belgium and Italy are already capable of producing their warheads and may well have started to produce them by 1963. The only disincentive to the independent production of atomic warheads in Europe is the irrelevance of those warheads unless one has an effective delivery system, and if Britain breaches the dam on this issue and forces America to offer delivery systems to her Allies, then it is as certain as the night follows the day that three or four, if not more, of the


other European countries in N.A.T.O. will then decide to go ahead with producing their own warheads and to try to produce for themselves their own independent deterrent, as the Government call it.
If six or seven other members of N.A.T.O. all have the power, independent of an Allied decision, for that is what an independent deterrent means, to start total thermonuclear war against the Soviet Union, I suggest that the N.A.T.O. Alliance will disintegrate, because membership of the Alliance will then confer far more risk than security on all its members. The result is that the Government's aim of political solidarity in the North Atlantic area, the basic political principle of interdependence which the Government claim is the basis of all their policy, will be utterly destroyed, and that, of course, provides the answer to the question asked by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond)—why is it that, instead of talking about an independent deterrent, the Government have started to talk about an independent contribution to the Western deterrent? It is because the Government are conscious of this danger and are anxious by some sort of semantic jugglery to discourage the European countries from following the precedent which they themselves are setting.
Let us look for a moment at the wisdom and military necessity of a European contribution to the Western deterrent or a British contribution to the Western deterrent. The deterrent forces of the Western Alliance are the only part of the Western Alliance Forces which need no reinforcement by anyone at all, because nobody can deny that the deterrent forces possessed by the United States are, and are likely to remain, perfectly adequate for their task of deterring Soviet aggression on the Alliance.
It is rumoured that the Government are thinking of buying 200 Skybolt missiles from the United States as a contribution to the Western deterrent. Let us look for a moment at the forces which the West already disposes under the control of United States administration. There are over 2,000 long-range strategic bombers; two wings of tactical bombers; four aircraft carriers, all carrying atomic-armed aircraft; fourteen wings of nuclear-capable tactical fighters; operational Atlas missiles along

America's West Coast; an operational squadron equipped with Snarks; two cruisers and five submarines equipped with Regulus I; and four operational squadrons equipped with mixed Matador and Mace Missiles. Is anybody suggesting that with America already in possession of this type of strategic fighting force there is any need whatever for a contribution in this field from any of her Allies?
Moreover, if we add, to what the Americans have, the further strengthening of their deterrent forces which they have planned—I will not go into the details although I think they were recently listed in an interesting paper by the United States Defence Department—nobody can deny for a moment that the deterrent force of the West is more than adequate for its basic purpose of deterring deliberate aggression against the West. Why on earth are the Government planning to make a contribution to this type of deterrent force? Let us look at the cost of it to Britain.
The Daily Telegraph, a newspaper which cannot be expected to be deliberately unkind to the Government, has estimated that these 200 Skybolts by themselves are likely to cost £25 million. I remember a time when the Minister of Defence told us that the Sea Slug missile for the Royal Navy would cost £2 million. It has already cost £40 million and we have not yet got it. The Minister is very interested in time scales and extrapolation. If we have the same experience with Skybolt as we had with the Sea Slug, it will cost us £500 million before we even have aircraft to put it into.
It is not just that going in for this sort of deterrent system is a waste of money. It is a positive danger to the Alliance, because if we insist on having an independent contribution or an independent deterrent,—call it what you will—we cannot oppose the supply of similar missiles to other members of the Alliance.
This is the real reason why the Minister of Defence, who hates the Polaris project probably as much as we do, feels himself not in a position to say anything against it, because if we are getting Skybolt from the United States how on earth can we say that the United States


should not supply Polaris to the rest of its allies?
It is no good the Government saying, as the Prime Minister said the other day, that the Polaris problem is not an urgent problem and will not arise for five or six years. The Minister of Defence knows full well that the decision on Polaris must be taken this summer. He knows also that, if the decision is taken this summer, the Polaris missile will be deployed in Europe within two years. This is the missile with a range of 1,500 miles, which can carry an atomic warhead more destructive than those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Most of these missiles would be based in Western Germany. No one, not even General Norstad, has the slightest idea of how they are to be controlled. One of the most dangerous things inside N.A.T.O. at present is that again and again the N.A.T.O. Council takes a decision to put armaments on the ground—sometimes very destructive armaments indeed—without first getting watertight agreements on how the use of those armaments is to be controlled.
What is the reason which the Government or N.A.T.O. have put forward for the Polaris project? The official argument put forward by General Norstad himself is lunacy, yet it was repeated this afternoon by the Minister of Defence. The official argument, to which the Minister of Defence gave his assent as an argument, is that before long the tactical air forces at present under N.A.T.O. command will be incapable of penetrating Soviet anti-aircraft defences and therefore we must replace them with these 1,500-mile missiles.

Mr. Watkinson: This is very important. I made it quite plain that we did not see a time when missiles would replace every aircraft in N.A.T.O.

Mr. Healey: I accept that correction, but the Minister maintained that we should have to have some missiles to replace some aircraft. That is my point.
There is an essential difference between aircraft and this type of missile in a so-called tactical rôle. First, aircraft can fly short distances or they can fly long distances. Secondly, they can carry conventional bombs—smoke bombs, if you like—and they can carry nuclear wea-

pons. But a missile of the Polaris type is essentially a long-range missile. In fact, this missile is being recommended entirely on the ground that it can hit targets at and beyond Moscow inside the Soviet Union. Moreover, this type of missile is useless unless it is armed with a nuclear or thermo-nuclear warhead.
It is absolutely impossible to reconcile a Polaris missile strategy for N.A.T.O. with the declared aims of N.A.T.O. strategy. If atomic bombs are dropped round Moscow in what the Minister would call a tactical rôle, it completely rules out the whole of N.A.T.O.'s military purpose, because it makes total war absolutely inevitable from the word "go".
Quite apart from the fact that some of the forces controlling these missiles might decide to fire them at Moscow itself rather than at airfields round Moscow—I cannot conceive any way whatever of preventing these eventualities—I do not believe that anyone in the House thinks that the Soviet Union would submit to the bombardment of a large number of military targets deep inside its own territory without responding with an all-out thermo-nuclear attack on the whole Western Alliance.
In this case, what happens to the N.A.T.O. concept of forcing a pause if there is a local attack in Europe? What sort of pause will there be once Polaris rockets start dropping their atomic warheads on the Soviet Union? Of course, it may be that the real reason for Polaris is to produce all-out war. In that case, why should we be putting a lot of strategic weapons in Europe? Why not rely entirely on the overwhelming thermo-nuclear retaliatory power already in the Strategic Air Command, outside Europe altogether? The plain fact is that the proposal for putting Polaris in Europe has no military justification whatever. In fact, it contradicts every basic concept on which N.A.T.O. strategy has been based for the last ten years.
Much worse than that, I think, is the fact that to place these missiles physically all over the territory of Western Europe, as General Norstad proposes and as the Government are prepared to permit, would mean a tremendous increase in political tension. One thing I have never been able to understand


about Western military policy is the assumption that the West can always do something to strengthen its military position without the Soviet doing something to counterbalance that. It is as certain as night follows day that if N.A.T.O. distributes these missiles under national control, or under collective control, all over Western Europe, the Soviet Union will respond by taking similar steps in Eastern Europe—and the Soviet Union may find it impossible any longer to withstand Chinese pressure for Chinese thermo-nuclear weapons.
Let hon. Members just imagine the situation that will develop when these hundreds of missiles are deployed on both sides of the Iron Curtain in Europe, with all the tremendous temptation for pre-emptive attacks—because the great danger of these deterrents is that they must be fired before the enemy missile gets there, but also before one can ever be certain that the enemy missile is ever going there. Does anyone in the Committee or outside it think that the security of the West will be advanced if there are hundreds of trigger-happy soldiers scattered all over Europe on both sides of the Iron Curtain, in the most explosive political area in the world?
The plain fact is that this proposal is not only politically appallingly dangerous, but militarily totally unnecessary. The extraordinary thing is that the same General Norstad who makes this proposal, and Lord Montgomery who preceded him in high military rank there, have said again and again that they do not think that there is any serious danger of large-scale deliberate Soviet aggression in Europe and that, anyway, the existing deterrent pattern of Western strategy is perfectly adequate to prevent all-out war. Incidentally, I think that the speech of the hon. Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) was extremely important and convincing in this respect.
The real danger in Europe, and we all know it, is not the danger of the large-scale deliberate Soviet attack on the West but of a local conflict developing, perhaps out of a spontaneous rising of discontented people living in Eastern Europe, as happened in Hungary, in Poland and Berlin, perhaps out of miscalculation. In other words, the danger of a conflict arising essentially in a situa-

tion to which deterrence is irrelevant, because deterrence as a strategic concept depends entirely on the person being deterred being a rational person in control of a rational Government. We cannot deter a rising in Hungary by having atomic weapons in Britain—or in the Soviet Union for that matter, as has already been proved. What is really vital is that N.A.T.O. should have forces that are capable, if that type of conflict develops, to stop it without recourse to atomic war.
As many Members have already said in this debate, the biggest single weakness in British strategy and in Western strategy is the lack of efficient mobile forces for putting out local conflict without recourse to atomic weapons. The trouble is that the Government and N.A.T.O. are sacrificing this in a wild-goose chase after weapons like Skybolt and Polaris which are totally irrelevant to the real danger but which create all sorts of new dangers of their own.
I must say a word here about the present weakness of the N.A.T.O. forces in the conventional field. I do not know if the Minister of Defence read a very interesting article, I think in this morning's Guardian, by a Swiss general of infantry, a neutral observer if ever there was one about the shocking state of N.A.T.O.'s conventional forces. He said they were short of tanks, armoured transport, airlift, rockets and radar.
The Minister of Defence was being a little unworthy of himself when he suggested that when we on this side of the Committee or, indeed, his hon. Friends point out the weakness of the West in conventional weapons, we are somehow discouraging recruiting. I would remind the Minister of Defence that his colleague on his left, the present Minister of Aviation, before he became a Minister of Her Majesty's Government, once did this country a great service in the defence field. It was when he was a young officer in the British Army in 1939. He came to the House and spoke of the appalling state of armaments of the British forces which were just on the point of being sent to battle against Hitler. I tell Her Majesty's Government that the real guilt and blame lie not with those who point out the weakness of the forces' armaments but with those who send young men into battle hopelessly ill-equipped


for the task which they are given to perform.
I do not want to spend any longer on that matter. I would just say this. We have had a lot of sneers from the benches opposite during this debate about the absurd defence policy which my right hon. Friend and I have been putting forward. I would point out that this policy is also supported not only by the hon. Member for Bute and North Ayrshire but also by a previous Conservative Minister for Defence, the right hon. Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head) who has just been banished to Nigeria in a mink-lined bowler hat, and by a previous Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, the right hon. Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch); and, most important of all, our defence policy is supported by the Democratic Party in the United States with which the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence may soon have to deal.
I must conclude my remarks with some more general reflections. Even if all these arguments which I have deployed were of no importance whatever, the decisive argument against the Government's defence policy is that it is making a disarmament agreement infinitely more difficult to achieve and more difficult to control, although it is admitted by all of us on both sides of the Committee that a disarmament agreement is the only real road to security in the modern world.
It is a sad reflection for all of us that more than once in the last ten years it is the West which has taken the initiative in the arms race. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Yes, it is the West which first adopted the policy of massive retaliation which is now being taken up by Mr. Khrushchev. I agree that there were reasons for this—I am not denying it—but what I am saying is that it takes two to carry out an arms race and we are both involved in it at the present time.
What I am appealing to the Government to do—and I do this in no party spirit whatever—is to reflect before it is too late, to take into account the fact that if our defence efforts are to serve any useful purpose in the modern world they must make disarmament easier and not more difficult. At the present time,

as I have shown, our defence efforts are making it infinitely more difficult even to start negotiations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Government seem to have given up their disarmament effort in some respects for the sake of getting Skybolt from the United States. This is the fundamental reason why my right hon. and hon. Friends and I will divide the Committee against the Government's defence policy at half-past nine.

9.5 p.m.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Christopher Soames): I look forward to taking up some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) later, if I have time, but I must first deal with a matter which was put to me by the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) about the manpower situation in the Army. The right hon. Member for Belper quoted several remarks that I had made during past months and years about the figure we expected to achieve by way of all-Regular recruitment in 1963 onwards. He said that he thought there were discrepancies in what I had said and that I was not, perhaps, being altogether forthright. I assure the Committee that it is no lack of desire to be forthright which has brought about a discrepancy, and I wish to explain how it arises.
The only way in which one can form a view about what the manpower of any Service will be two, three, four or five years ahead—as we have tried to do over the past years—is to take, first of all, the existing number of Regular soldiers serving in the Army at a given time and also the rate of recruitment during the past twelve months, projecting that forward for the years ahead. One then arrives at a certain figure. Obviously, I have been at great pains never to be too precise about 1,000 here or there, because a matter of ten more or less, literally, in a month during the past year will, when projected forward over four or five years ahead, make a considerable difference.
The recruiting story is that it was good for the year April, 1958 to March, 1959. There were various reasons for this. The Grigg Report was an important factor, and so, of course, was the very considerable pay increase given to the Forces at the time. A decline set in in


April, 1959, or thereabouts. In my view, there were two principal factors contributing to that decline. The first was that the number of young men in the country at the age at which they join the Army was lower then than it will be for many years to come. Secondly, it was a period of considerable disturbance in the Army brought about by the amalgamations and disbandments which went on during those months.
Looking back over the past months, it seems now that recruiting is levelling out. Again, I ask the Committee not to invite me to be too precise because the figures upon which one bases one's calculation are inevitably somewhat fluid, and one cannot be too precise about what the position will be two-and-a-half years from now. But the best forecast I can give, on those assumptions, taking the number of men in the Regular Army at present and the rate of recruitment over the past twelve months, which have not been good months, that is to say, May. 1959, to May, 1960, is in accordance with what I said at the luncheon the other day to which the hon. Member for Dudley referred. The forecast is that we shall reach 165,000 in the early days—I mean early days—of 1963. If I am asked whether it will be 165,100 or 164,800 on 1st January, I really could not say, as I am sure the hon. Member appreciates. The best forecast which can be made on the figures available is that, in the early days of 1963, we shall have achieved an all-Regular Army of 165,000.
I have been visiting a number of recruiting offices round the country lately and discussing with those who are responsible for recruiting what can be done to help. I think there are two things. First of all, as the Army shrinks, fewer people will, of course, be in contact with it. It is important that we should carry the Army to the people. We should have more units visiting different areas of the country, having marches, tattoos and the like, carrying the Army to the public. Also, since every hon. Member hopes that we shall achieve the target necessary to fulfil our commitments. I would ask hon. Members when they visit their constituencies to talk about the importance of recruiting to the Army and encourage recruitment into it. I hope and believe that they will be forthcoming.

The Territorial Army was referred to by the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon). I am confident that the reorganisation which I announced earlier in the day will give a considerable invigoration to the Territorial Army which has been looking forward, and in some cases looking forward anxiously, to the reorganisation which it knew perfectly well was inevitable.
There were three main causes for its anxiety. The first was that the rôle of the Territorial Army had not been restated since the reorganisation of the Regular Forces to fit the nuclear age was announced. Secondly, the Territorial Army realised that its units were geared to a strength of 300,000, which was not a realistic figure. Thirdly, the growing discrepancy in equipment. As equipment came into the Regular Army, it had the effect of a greater discrepancy between the standard of equipment for the Regular Army and that for the Territorial Army, which was entirely of last war vintage.
I believe that this reorganisation will give a greater sense of purpose to the Territorial Army for a number of reasons. First, its units will be at a better establishment. Secondly, it will be reorganised on a realistic basis of brigades instead of divisions. Thirdly, it will be better equipped than it has ever been before.
The right hon. Member for Easington asked me a specific question about the bounty to the Territorial Army. We are not intending to alter the bounty arrangements for those who serve in the Territorial Army. Indeed, the fact that there has been this increase from 70,000 in 1957 to 120,000 today shows, I think, that there is not much wrong with the terms of service of the Territorial Army. It shows that, even in the situation through which it has been going these past few years, with the anxieties that it has had to live with, the Territorial Army has still been able to attract volunteer recruits at this satisfactory rate.
There is another point put to me by the right hon. Member for Easington which definitely needs answering for the record. He said that he believed that in the not very far distant future we


should find it necessary to give a pre-proclamation responsibility to the Territorial Army. If that were so, it would obviously be in the forefront of the minds of those who were considering joining the Territorial Army. I should like to assert definitely that we have no intention at present of so doing.
There is one more point mentioned by the right hon. Member for Easington to which I must refer. He said that neither the V-bombers nor the Thor missiles were able to reach their targets if required so to do today.

Mr. Healey: My right hon. Friend said that they would not get off the ground.

Mr. Soames: The right hon. Gentleman said that they would be unable to reach their targets. He asserted that they could not He did not make the point that they could not get off the ground, that they would be knocked out beforehand. He asserted that the V-bombers and the Thor missiles would not be able to reach their targets. For the record I must assert that that is absolutely incorrect. I cannot understand on what basis the right hon. Gentleman could have decided that that was so.

Mr. Shinwell: The right hon. Gentleman misunderstood me. What I did was to ask the Minister of Defence whether he would be good enough to tell us what the target was.

Mr. Soames: That was not the question which the right hon. Gentleman asked. There are a variety of targets. He asserted that the V-bombers and the Thor missiles could not reach them. That is not so.
An important contribution to our national defence thinking in recent times is the new Labour document to which the right hon. Member for Belper referred—and he made quite a bit of it at the end of his speech. There are many statements in it which we believe to be totally unrealistic. This is not the time to go into them in detail, but I should like to concentrate on the first paragraph which sets out the premises on which the whole policy of the Labour party towards defence now rests.

Mr. G. Brown: I hope that in doing so the right hon. Gentleman will be answering our questions about Skybolt.

Mr. Soames: I must get on. I shall talk about Skybolt.
I believe these premises to be utterly false. The first paragraph reads as follows:
Two events—the break-up of the Summit Conference and the cancellation of Blue Streak—combine to create a new situation demanding fresh decisions by the British people.
To take the first proposition—

Mr. Brown: Mr. Brown rose—

Mr. Soames: I cannot think why the right hon. Gentleman is so anxious about this particular document in which he had so important a hand.

Mr. Brown: May I make it quite clear? There has been a very long case deployed against the Government. Many questions have been asked. I am wondering why, after only ten minutes of his speech, the right hon. Gentleman has now decided to answer no more of them.

Mr. Soames: I have answered a good many and I shall be coming to a good many more.
To take, first, the proposition that the break-up of the Summit Conference would demand fresh consideration of our defence policy, surely the broad approach to this period of uneasy peace and cold war, which is being forced upon us, must be a firm and resolute defence posture while striving to reach agreement on disarmament and points of friction between West and East. What would be quite fatal would be to alter our main policies from day to day, according to whether Mr. Khrushchev growled or smiled. The one thing that would really encourage Mr. Khrushchev to continue to play the hand by blowing first hot and then cold and never coming to the point of agreement would be if he thought that by so doing he could disrupt the defence arrangements of the West to the extent that the Labour Party are now suggesting. I am sure that in his wildest dreams Mr. Khrushchev never thought that his action in Paris would lead the party which is the alternative Government in this country to publish a document advocating that we should opt out of the deterrent.
Now for the proposition that the cancellation of Blue Streak should lead to this fundamental reappraisal of our deterrent policy. Our view is that this is


equally fallacious because it is a serious confusion between means and ends. Blue Streak was not a policy in itself but a weapon designed to implement it. For reasons that are well-known in the House—this was thoroughly debated earlier in the year—further development of this weapon was cancelled, and we have instead a firm understanding with the Americans to purchase from them one of a number of missiles which they are developing and which we believe will be available to us in the middle 1960s.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper has made much of the fact that the missile—Skybolt—does not at present exist. It would not be any use to us if it did exist because if it existed now it would be out of date by the middle 1960s. [Interruption.] We do not wish to add to the contribution that we can make to the deterrent as of today. What we wish is to be able to add to the contribution that we shall be able to make between 1965 and 1970. Today we have our independent deterrent with V-bombers and the free-falling bombs, to be followed by Blue Steel, which will give the V-bombers some years of extra life. Military advice is that this will be a credible deterrent up to the middle 1960s. What matters is not whether the deterrent rests in a particular weapon of a particular name, be it dug into the ground or carried under the sea or in the air. What matters is that it shall be an effective deterrent and that we maintain our deterrent power.
Members of the Opposition seem to rest their case against Skybolt on what seems to be, for some reason, their fervent belief that Skybolt will prove to be a failure. That is a very pessimistic assumption on which to pin a policy. In the nature of things today, with all the rapid progress that goes on in the scientific world, the strategic weapon which is to be credible over the period of, say, from 1965 to 1970 must and can only be in a state of development between 1960 and 1965.
I agree that the Americans have many eggs in their strategic nuclear basket and that we cannot afford this, but they have every intention of producing Sky-bolt for their own armoury apart from ours. All the information that we receive leads us to believe that they will be successful. I fail to understand what

are the arguments that have been put to the right hon. Member for Belper to lead him to believe that Skybolt will not be an effective weapon.
The other point of which the right hon. Gentleman has made a great deal concerning Skybolt is that once we have it, we will no longer have an independent deterrent. The right hon. Gentleman has no ground for saying that. We are buying from the Americans a delivery system on which we put our own warhead. It fits into our own V-bombers. We believe, and the Americans realise—the right hon. Gentleman is the only odd man out—that that will be as independent a deterrent—

Mr. G. Brown: Do not believe it.

Mr. Soames: —as will be Blue Steel, which will be manufactured in this country, in exactly the same way as a gun which we buy from abroad and for which we make the ammunition at home is entirely for our own use wherever we will. It is an entirely independent deterrent.
Where the right hon. Gentleman did not make himself sufficiently clear was whether he thinks that we should opt out of the deterrent because he fears that Skybolt will not work or will not be an independent deterrent from our point of view; or whether, even if he became satisfied on both points, as he will as the years and months go by, he would even then suggest that we should not take advantage of the arrangements that we have made with the Americans and fix our own warheads to the missile and arrange for it to be fitted into our V-bombers, so as to continue the effective life of our V-bombers and thus be able to make our own contribution to the deterrent in the further years ahead.
Over the past few years, we have felt very much for the right hon. Member for Belper in all the defence debates. The right hon. Gentleman has affirmed and reaffirmed his belief in the deterrent policy and in our national policy of making an independent contribution to it. He has striven hard to prevent his party from ignoring the military facts of life with which we have to live. The right hon. Gentleman was fighting a rearguard action which might, perhaps. have been successful had the Labour Party won the last election and, therefore, had to deal in realities instead of suppositions.
The tide of unilateralism was, however, building up fast against the right hon. Gentleman and he has now had to fall back to an unprepared position on ground not of his own choosing and pronounce a cockeyed policy which I doubt very much whether he thinks, any more than we do, is worth the paper on which it is written.
It is anybody's guess how long even this will last. Great were the right hon. Gentleman's hopes that the form of words so carefully chosen would satisfy that considerable element of his party which yearns to bury its head in the sand of pacificism. But having since realised what will happen in October, he no doubt wonders what will be the fate of this document at the party conference. Time will tell. It certainly does not seem to have got off to a very propitious start.
I now have to throw away a lot of good material.

Mr. G. Brown: Why not throw away the bad?

Mr. Soames: Of course, the country knows why the Labour Party is now proposing that we should cease to make a contribution to the deterrent. It is not because Blue Streak was cancelled. Nor is it because the Summit Conference in Paris did not take place. It is simply because of the increasing inability of leaders of the Labour Party to carry their rank and file with them in policies which they believe to be right. Evidence of this can be seen in the numbers of trade union leaders and their followers who are climbing on to the wagon of unilateral nuclear disarmament when, in the nature of things, they have not been able to study the complicated ramifications of defence problems to the same

extent as can, for instance, the right hon. Gentleman.

There is a quotation from happier days which I must read to the Committee. It is a quotation from some years back:
Until world disarmament can be achieved weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Britain and her allies in N.A.T.O. form the most effective deterrent against aggression by a potential disturber of the peace possessing not only these weapons but also overwhelming force in what are called conventional weapons. As long as this great disparity remains, unilateral disarmament is folly. It is equally foolish to suggest that these weapons will only be used if an aggressor uses them first. It is in the knowledge that in the last resort these terrible weapons will be used that makes them an effective deterrent.
That forms part of the resolution—the right hon. Gentleman knows it—of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party in 1955.

Mr. Brown: What is wrong with that?

Mr. Soames: It represented then, and it represented up to this year, the views of the leaders of the Labour Party, and they know that it is still the right policy for today. They have certainly failed to make out a case for such a radical reversal of policy which is contained in their new document. This new policy is not in the best interests of the country, and we are convinced that the vast majority of the people utterly repudiate it.

Mr. Brown: Since neither Minister has attempted a defence of the Government's policy, I beg to move, That Item, Ministry of Defence, be reduced by £1,000.

Question put:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 230. Noes 310.

Division No. 142]
AYES
[9.28 p.m.


Abse, Leo
Blyton, William
Cliffe, Michael


Ainsley, William
Boardman, H.
Corbet, Mrs. Freda


Albu, Austen
Bowden, Herbert W. (Leics, S.W.)
Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Boyden, James
Cronin, John


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Braddock, Mrs. E. M.
Crosland, Anthony


Awbery, Stan
Brockway, A. Fenner
Crossman, R. H. S.


Bacon, Miss Alice
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Cullen, Mrs. Alice


Baird, John
Brown, Alan (Tottenham)
Darling, George


Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)
Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)


Beaney, Alan
Brown, Thomas lnce)
Davies, Harold (Leek)


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Davies, Ifor (Gower)


Bence, Cyril (Dunbartonshire, E.)
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Davles, S. O. (Merthyr)


Benn, Hn. A. Wedgwood(Brist'I, S.E.)
Callaghan, James
Deer, George


Benson, Sir George
Castle, Mrs. Barbara
de Freitas, Geoffrey


Blackburn, F.
Chapman, Donald
Delargy, Hugh




Dempsey, James
Kenyon, Clifford
Robens, Rt. Hon. Alfred


Diamond, John
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Dodds, Norman
King, Dr. Horace
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)


Donnelly, Desmond
Lawson, George
Rogers, G. H. R. (Kensington, N.)


Driberg, Tom
Ledger, Ron
Ross, William


Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Royle, Charles (Salford, West)


Ede, Rt. Hon. Chuter

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.


Edelman, Maurice
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Short, Edward


Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)
Silverman, Julius (Aston)


Edwards, Walter (Stepney)
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Evans, Albert
Lipton, Marcus
Skeffington, Arthur


Fernyhough, E.
Loughlin, Charles
Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)


Finch, Harold
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)


Fitch, Alan
McCann, John
Small, William


Fletcher, Eric
MacColl, James
Smith, Eills (Stoke, S.)


Foot, Dingle
McInnes, James
Sorensen, R. W.


Forman, J. C.
McKay, John (Wallsend)
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Mackie, John
Spriggs, Leslie


Galpern, Sir Myer
McLeavy, Frank
Steele, Thomas


George, Lady Megan Lloyd
Mahon, Simon
Stewart, Michael (Fulham)


Ginsburg, David
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Stonehouse, John


Gooch, E. G.
Mallalieu, J.P.W.(Huddersfield, E.)
Stones, William


Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
Manuel, A. C.
Strachey, Rt. Hon. John


Gourlay, Harry
Mapp, Charles
Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)


Greenwood, Anthony
Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.
Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)


Grey, Charles
Marsh, Richard
Summerskill, Dr. Rt. Hon. Edith


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Mason, Roy
Swain, Thomas


Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Mayhew, Christopher
Swingler, Stephen


Griffiths, W. (Exchange)
Mellish, R. J.
Sylvester, George


Grimond, J.
Mendelson, J, J.
Symonds, J. B.


Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
Millan, Bruce
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Hall, Rt. Hon. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Mitchison, G. R.
Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)


Hannan, William
Monslow, Walter
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)


Hart, Mrs. Judith
Moody, A. S.
Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)


Hayman, F. H.
Morris, John
Thornton, Ernest


Healey, Denis
Mort, D. L.
Thorpe, Jeremy


Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur(RwlyRegis)
Moyle, Arthur
Timmons, John


Herbison, Miss Margaret
Mulley, Frederick



Hill, J. (Midlothian)
Neal, Harold
Tomney, Frank


Hilton, A. V.
Oliver, G. H.
Wade, Donald


Holman, Percy
Oram, A. E.
Wainwright, Edwin


Holt, Arthur
Oswald, Thomas
Warbey, William


Houghton, Douglas
Owen, Will
Watkins, Tudor


Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Paget, R. T.
Weitzman, David


Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Panned, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Pargiter, G. A.
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Hunter, A. E.
Parker, John (Dagenham)
White, Mrs. Eirene


Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Parkin, B. T. (Paddington, N.)
Whitlock, William


Hynd, John (Attercliffe)
Paton, John
Wigg, George


Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Pavitt, Laurence
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Irving, Sydney (Dartford)
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)
Wilkins, W. A.


Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas
Peart, Frederick
Willey, Frederick


Jeger, George
Plummer, Sir Leslie
Williams, D. J. (Neath)


Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)
Popplewell, Ernest
Williams, Rev. LI. (Abertillery)


Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)
Prentice, R. E.
Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)


Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)


Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech(Wakefield)
Probert, Arthur
Winterbottom, R. E.


Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Proctor, W. T.
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.


Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, s.)
Pursey, Cmdr. Harry
Woof, Robert


Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Rankin, John
Wyatt, Woodrow


Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Redhead, E. C.
Zilliacus, K.


Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Reid, William



Kelley, Richard
Reynolds, G. W.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:




Mr. J. Taylor and Mr. Howell.




NOES


Agnew, Sir Peter
Berkeley, Humphry
Bullard, Denys


Aitken, W. T.
Bevins, Rt, Hon. Reginald (Toxteth)
Bullus, Wing Commander Eric


Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)
Bidgood, John C.
Burden, F. A.


Allason, James
Biggs, Davison, John
Butler, Rt. Hon. R.A(Saffron Walden)


Alport, Rt. Hon. C. J. M.
Bingham, R. M.
Campbell, Sir David (Belfast, S.)


Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)
Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel
Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)


Amory, Rt. Hn. D. Heathcoat (Tiv'tn)
Bishop, F, P.
Carr, Compton (Barons Court)


Arbuthnot, John
Black, Sir Cyril
Carr, Robert (Mitcham)


Atkins, Humphrey
Bossom, Clive
Cary, Sir Robert


Balniel, Lord
Bourne-Arton, A.
Channon, H. P. G.


Barber, Anthony
Box, Donald
Chataway, Christopher


Barlow, Sir John
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John
Chichester-Clark, R.


Barter, John
Boyle, Sir Edward
Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)


Batsford, Brian
Braine, Bernard
Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)


Baxter, Sir Beverley (Southgate)
Brewis, John
Cole, Norman


Beamish, Col. Tufton
Bromley-Davenport, Lt. Col. W. H.
Collard, Richard


Bell, Ronald (S. Bucks.)
Brooman-White, R.
Cooke, Robert


Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)
Browne, Percy (Torrington)
Cooper, A. E.


Bennett, Dr Reginald (Gos &amp; Fhm)
Bryan, Paul
Cooper-Key, Sir Neill







Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho


Cordle, John
Jennings, J. C-
Profumo, Rt. Hon. John


Corfield, F. V.
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Proudfoot, Wilfred


Costain, A. P.
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Ramsden, James


Coulson, J. M.
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin


Courtney, Cdr. Anthony
Joseph, Sir Keith
Rees, Hugh


Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Critchley, Julian
Kerans, Cdr. J. S.
Renton, David


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Kerby, Capt. Henry
Ridley, Hon. Nicholas


Crowder, F. P.
Kerr, Sir Hamilton
Ridsdale, Julian


Cunningham, Knox
Kershaw, Anthony
Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)


Curran, Charles
Kimball, Marcus
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)


Currie, G. B. H.
Kirk, Peter
Robson Brown, Sir William


Dalkeith, Earl of
Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)


d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Langford-Holt, J.
Roots, William


Deedes, W. F.
Leather, E. H. C.
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard


de Ferranti, Basil
Leavey, J. A.
Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)


Digby, Simon Wingfield
Leburn, Gilmour
Russell, Ronald


Doughty, Charles
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Sandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan


Drayson, G. B.
Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. Alan
Scott-Hopkins, James


du Cann, Edward
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Sharples, Richard


Duncan, Sir James
Lilley, F. J. P.
Shaw, M.


Duthie, Sir William
Lindsay, Martin
Shepherd, William


Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David
Linstead, Sir Hugh
Simon, Sir Jocelyn


Eden, John
Litchfield, Capt. John
Skeet, T. H. H.


Elliott, R. W.
Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)
Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd &amp; Chiswick)


Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn
Longbottom, Charles
Smithers, Peter


Farey-Jones, F. W.
Longden, Gilbert
Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)


Fell, Anthony
Loveys, Walter H.
Soames, Rt. Hon. Christopher


Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby
Spearman, Sir Alexander


Fraser, Hn. Hugh (Stafford &amp; Stone)
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Speir, Rupert


Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)
McAdden, Stephen
Stanley, Hon. Richard


Freeth, Denzil
MacArthur, Ian
Stevens, Geoffrey


Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.
McLaren, Martin
Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)


Gammans, Lady
McLaughlin, Mrs. Patricia
Stodart, J. A.


Gardner, Edward
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Bute &amp; N. Ayrs.)
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm


George, J. C. (Pollok)
Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W)
Storey, Sir Samuel


Gibson-Watt, David
MacLeod, John (Ross &amp; Cromarty)
Studholme, Sir Henry


Glover, Sir Douglas
McMaster, Stanley R.
Summers, Sir Spencer (Aylesbury)


Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)
Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)
Talbot, John E.


Goodhart, Philip
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Tapsell, Peter


Goodhew, Victor
Maddan, Martin
Taylor, sir Charles (Eastbourne)


Gough, Frederick
Maginnis, John E.
Taylor, w. J. (Bradford, N.)


Gower, Raymond
Maitland, Cdr. Sir John
Teeling, William


Grant, Rt. Hon. William (Woodside)
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.
Temple, John M.


Green, Alan
Markham, Major Sir Frank
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Gresham Cooke, R.
Marlowe, Anthony
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)


Grimston, Sir Robert
Marshall, Douglas
Thomas, Peter (Conway)


Hall, John (Wycombe)
Marten, Neil
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)


Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)
Mathew, Robert (Honiton)
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter


Hare, Rt. Hon. John
Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)
Thomton-Kemsley, Sir Colin


Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)
Maudling, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.J


Harris, Reader (Heston)
Mawby, Ray
Tilney, John (Wavertree)


Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Turner, Colin


Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)
Mills, Stratton
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.


Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh
Tweedsmuir, Lady


Harvie Anderson, Miss
Montgomery, Fergus
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Hay, John
Morgan, William
Vane, W. M. F.


Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Vaughan-Morgan. Sir John


Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward
Nabarro, Gerald
Vickers, Miss Joan


Hendry, Forbes
Neave, Airey
Vosper. Rt. Hon. Dennis


Hiley, Joseph
Nicholson, Sir Godfrey
Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)


Hill, Dr. Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)
Noble, Michael
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek


Hill, Mrs. Eveline (Wythenshawe)
Nugent, Sir Richard
Wall, Patrick


Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Ward, Rt. Hon. George (Worcester)


Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Orr-Ewing, C. Ian
Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold


Hirst, Geoffrey
Osborn, John (Hallam)
Watts, James


Hobson, John
Osborne, Cyril (Louth)
Webster, David


Hocking, Philip N.
Page, John (Harrow, West)
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Holland, Philip
Page, Graham
Whitelaw, William


Hopkins, Alan
Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)
Williams, Dudley (Exeter)


Hornby, R. P.
Partridge, E.
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Patricia
Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)
Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)


Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Peel, John
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)
Percival, Ian
Wise, A. R.


Howard, John (Southampton, Test)
Peyton, John
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John
Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth
Wood, Rt. Hon, Richard


Hughes-Young, Michael
Pike, Miss Mervyn
Woodhouse, C. M.


Hulbert, Sir Norman
Pilkington, Capt. Richard
Woodnutt, Mark


Hurd, Sir Anthony
Pitman, I. J.
Woollam, John


Hutchison, Michael Clark
Pitt, Miss Edith
Worsley, Marcus


Iremonger, T. L.
Pott, Percivall
Yates, William (The Wrekin)


Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Powell, J. Enoch



Jackson, John
Price, David (Eastleigh)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


James, David
Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)
Mr. E. Wakefield and




Colonel J. H. Harrison


Question put and agreed to.

Original Question again proposed.

It being after half-past Nine o'clock, The CHAIRMAN proceeded, pursuant to Standing Order No. 16 (Business of Supply), to put forthwith the Question necessary to dispose of the Vote under consideration.

Question put and agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN then proceeded forthwith to put severally the Questions, That sanction be given to the application of the sums temporarily authorised in respect of Navy, Army and Air Services [Expenditure]; and that the total amounts of the Votes outstanding in the several Classes of the Civil Estimates, including Revised Estimates and Supplementary Estimates, and the total amounts of the Votes outstanding in the Estimates for Revenue Departments, and in the Navy, the Army, and the Air Estimates, including Supplementary Estimates, be granted for the Services defined in those Classes and Estimates:

NAVY EXPENDITURE, 1958–59

That sanction be given to the application of the sum of £1,451,653 8s. 3d. out of Surpluses arising out of certain Votes for Navy Services for the year ended 31st March, 1959, to defray expenditure in excess of that appropriated to certain other Votes for those Services and to meet deficits in receipts not offset by savings in expenditure from the respective Votes as set out in and temporarily authorised in the Treasury Minute of 18th February, 1960 (H.C. 122) and reported upon by the Committee of Public Accounts in their First Report (H.C. 219).

Question put and agreed to.

ARMY EXPENDITURE, 1958–59

That sanction be given to the application of the sum of £2.351,301 3s. 10d. out of Surpluses arising out of certain Votes for Army Services for the year ended 31st March, 1959, to defray expenditure in excess of that appropriated to certain other Votes for those Services and to meet deficits in receipts not offset by savings in expenditure from the respective Votes as set out in and temporarily authorised in the Treasury Minute of 11th February, 1960 (H.C. 118) and reported upon by the Committee of Public Accounts in their First Report (H.C. 219).

Question put and agreed to.

AIR EXPENDITURE, 1958–59

That sanction be given to the application of the sum of £573,720 8s. 6d. out of Surpluses arising out of certain Votes for Air Services for the year ended 31st March, 1959, to defray expenditure in respect of Balances Irrecoverable and Claims Abandoned for those Services and to meet a deficit in receipts not offset by a saving in expenditure from the respective

Vote as set out in and temporarily authorised in the Treasury Minute of 15th February, 1960 (H.C. 119) and reported upon by the Committee of Public Accounts in their First Report (H.C. 219).

CIVIL ESTIMATES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES, 1960–61

CLASS I

That a sum, not exceeding £11,045,002, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in Class I of the Civil Estimates, viz.:—



£


1. House of Lords
151,046


2. House of Commons
1,038,015


3. Registration of Electors
45,000


4. Treasury and Subordinate Departments
2,308,360


5. Privy Council Office
27,323


6. Privy Seal Office
6,310


7. Charity Commission
99,364


8. Civil Service Commission
394,185


9. Crown Estate Office
103,584


10. Exchequer and Audit Department
273,931


11. Friendly Societies Registry
59,121


12. Government Actuary
21,292


13. Government Hospitality
40,000


14. Royal Mint
90


15. National Debt Office
90


16. National Savings Committee
789,315


17. Public Record Office
96,194


18. Public Works Loan Commission
90


19. Royal Commissions, etc.
202,000


20. Secret Service
4,600,000


21. Miscellaneous Expenses
251,468


21A. Repayments to the Civil Contingencies Fund
46,760


Scotland:—



22. Scottish Home Department (Revised sum)
463,495


23. Scottish Record Office
27,969



£11,045,002

Question put and agreed to.

CLASS II

That a sum, not exceeding £63,267,498, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in Class II of the Civil Estimates, viz.:



£


2. Foreign Office Grants and Services (including a Supplementary sum of £1,692,160)
13,966,607


3. British Council
2,261,100


4. Commonwealth Relations Office
2,152,910


5. Commonwealth Services (including a Supplementary sum of £1,053,000)
11,505,070

£


6. Oversea Settlement
129,875


7. Colonial Office
1,247,565


8. Colonial Services (including a Supplementary sum of £4,129,940)
13,020,882


9. Development and Welfare (Colonies, etc.)
17,000.000


10. Development and Welfare (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and South African High Commission Territories
1,217,000


11. Imperial War Graves Commission
766,489



£63,267,498

Question put and agreed to.

CLASS III

That a sum, not exceeding £71,086,258, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in Class Ill of the Civil Estimates, viz.:



£


1. Home Office
5,572,870


2. Home Office (Civil Defence Services)
4,742,000


3. Police, England and Wales
36,851,866


4. Prisons, England and Wales
11,182,453


5. Child Care, England and Wales
1,726,100


6. Carlisle State Management District
90


7. Supreme Court of Judicature, etc.
109,757


8. County Courts
363,560


9. Legal Aid Fund
1,502,450


10. Land Registry
90


11. Public Trustee
90


12. Law Charges
497,776


13. Miscellaneous Legal Expenses
24,150


Scotland:



14. Scottish Home Department (Civil Defence Services)
741,475


15. Police
5,505,137


16. Prisons
1,074,656


17. Child Care (Revised sum) 
306,530


18. State Management Districts
90


19. Law Charges and Courts of Law
257,614


20. Department of the Registers of Scotland
90


Ireland:



21. Supreme Court of Judicature, etc., Northern Ireland
53,874


22. Irish Land Purchase Services
573,540



£71,086,258

Question put and agreed to.

CLASS IV

That a sum, not exceeding £137,810,315, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year

ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in Class IV of the Civil Estimates, viz.:



£


1. Ministry of Education
54,900,575


2. British Museum
504,450


3. British Museum (Natural History)
326,806


4. Imperial War Museum
36,036


5. London Museum
29,260


6. National Gallery (including a Supplementary sum of £75,000)
128,449


7. Tate Gallery
43,281


8. National Maritime Museum
49,276


9. National Portrait Gallery
22,262


10. Wallace Collection
29,608


11. Grants for Science and the Arts (including a Supplementary sum of £13,484)
1,011,905


12. Universities and Colleges, etc., Great Britain (including a Supplementary sum of £4,275,000)
41,273,780


13. Broadcasting
30,967,000


Scotland:



14. Scottish Education Department (Revised sum)
8,390.926


15. National Galleries
33,729


16. National Museum of Antiquities
13,806


17. National Library
49,166



£137,810,315

Question put and agreed to.

CLASS V

That a sum, not exceeding £542,178,092, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in Class V of the Civil Estimates. viz.:



£


1. Ministry of Housing and Local Government
11,323,973


2. Housing England and Wales
49,088,970


3. Exchequer Grants to Local Revenues, England and Wales
356,850,000


4. Ministry of Health
17,608,240


6. Medical Research Council
2,614,560


7. Registrar General's Office
402,114


8. War Damage Commission
240,135


Scotland:



9. Department of Health (Revised sum)
4,091,220


10. National Health Service
42,832,850


11. Housing
9,929,580


12. Exchequer Grants to Local Revenues
47,140,000


13. Registrar General's Office (including a Supplementary sum of £11,250)
56,450



£542,178,092

Question put and agreed to.

CLASS VI

That a sum, not exceeding £183,530,845, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in Class VI of the Civil Estimates, viz.:



£


1. Board of Trade
3,685,145


2. Board of Trade (Assistance to Industry and Trading Services) (including a Supplementary sum of £46,290)
9,222,120


3. Board of Trade (Former Strategic Stocks)
462,000


4. Board of Trade (Promotion of Local Employment)
12,813,010


5. Registration of Restrictive Trading Agreements
105,280


6. Exports Credits
90


7. Export Credits (Special Guarantees) (including a Supplementary sum of £10)
100


8. Ministry of Labour (including a Supplementary sum of £8,000)
15,043,000


9. Ministry of Aviation (Revised sum)
138,200,000


10. Civil Aviation (including a Supplementary sum of £10)
4,000,010


11. Ministry of Aviation (Purchasing (Repayment) Services)
90



£183,530,845

Question put and agreed to.

CLASS VII

That a sum, not exceeding £56,376,197, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in Class VII of the Civil Estimates, viz.:



£


1. Ministry of Works
5,430,000


2. Houses of Parliament Buildings
250,500


3. Public Buildings, etc., United Kingdom
21,969,000


4. Public Buildings Overseas (including a Supplementary sum of £175,000)
2,616,500


5. Royal Palaces
445,750


6. Royal Parks and Pleasure Gardens
623,500


7. Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments
816,000


8. Rates on Government Property
12,170,847


9. Stationery and Printing
9,485,100


10. Central Office of Information
2,569,000



£56,376,197

Question put and agreed to.

CLASS VIII

That a sum, not exceeding £202,828,123, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in Class VIII of the Civil Estimates, viz.:



£


1. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
12,829,345


2. Agricultural and Food Grants and Subsidies
134,267,030


3. Agricultural and Food Services
7,390,345


4. Food (Strategic Reserves)
1,400,000


5. Fishery Grants and Services
5,560,930


6. Surveys of Great Britain, etc.
2,230,200


7. Agricultural Research Council
3,320,000


8. Nature Conservancy
265,000


9. Development Fund
651,000


10. Forestry Commission
7,139,000


Scotland:


11. Department of Agriculture (Revised sum)
25,944,909


12. Fisheries (Scotland) and Herring Industry (Revised sum)
1,830,364



£202,828,123

Question put and agreed to.

CLASS IX

That a sum, not exceeding £243,755,157, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in Class IX of the Civil Estimates, viz:



£


1. Ministry of Transport
2,374,900


2. Roads, etc., England and Wales (including a Supplementary sum of £10,010)
69,647,720


3. Transport (Shipping and Special Services)
1,027,250


4. Ministry of Power
1,394,560


5. Ministry of Power (Services)
1,779,430


6. Office of the Minister for Science
52,500


7. Atomic Energy (including a Supplementary sum of £44,000)
43,571,000


8. Department of Scientific and Industrial Research
8,110,407


Scotland:


9. Roads, etc. (Scotland) (Revised sum)
10,797,390


10. Transport (British Transport Commission)
105,000,000



£243,755,157

Question put and agreed to.

CLASS X

That a sum, not exceeding £401,388,250, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in Class X of the Civil Estimates, viz:



£


1. Superannuation and Retired allowances
14,087,000


2. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance
3,214,850


3. War Pensions, etc.
63,479,250


4. National Insurance and Family Allowances
193,073,000


5. National Assistance Board
122,384,000


6. Pensions, etc. (India, Pakistan and Burma)
4,406,150


7. Royal Irish Constabulary Pensions, etc.
744,000



£401,388,250

Question put and agreed to.

ESTIMATES FOR REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, 1960–61

That a sum, not exceeding £290,370,600, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Services included in the Estimates for Revenue Departments, viz.:—





£


1. Customs and Excise
…
…
11,118,600


2. Inland Revenue
…
…
32,171,000


3. Post Office
…
…
247,081,000





290,370,600

Question put and agreed to.

NAVY ESTIMATES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1960–61

That a sum, not exceeding £229,276,010, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Navy Services, viz.:—



£


3. Medical Establishments and Services
1,462,000


4. Civilians employed on Fleet Services
7,942,000


5. Educational Services
1,546,000


6. Scientific Services (Supplementary sum)
10


7. Royal Naval Reserves
1,130,000


8. Shipbuilding, Repairs, Maintenance, etc.:—



Section I.—Personnel
43,445,000


Section II.—Matériel
46,989,000


Section III.—Contract Work
106,336,000


9. Naval Armaments
20,426,000



229,276,010

Question put and agreed to.

ARMY ESTIMATES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1960–61

That a sum, not exceeding £169,750,010, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Army Services, viz.:—



£


1. Pay, etc., of the Army (Supplementary sum)
10


4. Civilians
99,540,000


5. Movements
27,730,000


6. Supplies, etc.
42,480,000



169,750,010

Question put and agreed to.

AIR ESTIMATES AND SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1960–61

That a sum, not exceeding £128,060,010, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, for Expenditure in respect of the Air Services, viz.:—



£


4. Civilians at Outstations
39,200,000


5. Movements
12,530,000


6. Supplies
63,190,000


7. Aircraft and Stores (Supplementary sum)
10


10. Non-effective Services
13,140,000



128,060,010

Question put and agreed to.

Resolutions to be reported.

Report to be received Tomorrow; Committee to sit again Tomorrow.

WAYS AND MEANS

Considered in Committee.

[Sir GORDON TOUCHE in the Chair]

Resolved,
That, towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1961, the sum of £3,118,930,312 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.—[Sir E. Boyle.]

Resolution to be reported.

Report to be received Tomorrow; Committee to sit again Tomorrow.

FISHING INDUSTRY (SUBSIDIES)

9.46 p.m.

The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. John Hare): I beg to move,
That the White Fish Subsidy (United Kingdom) Scheme, 1960, dated 29th June, 1960, a copy of which was laid before this House on 30th June, be approved.
We have submitted three Motions that affect the fishing industry, and I wonder, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, whether it would be convenient to discuss with this Motion the next two Motions:
That the Herring Subsidy (United Kingdom) Scheme, 1960, dated 29th June, 1960, a copy of which was laid before this House on 30th June, be approved.
That the White Fish and Herring Subsidies (Extension) Order, 1960, dated 28th June, 1960, a copy of which was laid before this House on 30th June, he approved.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Gordon Touche): That will be convenient. It must be understood, however, that there will be only one debate.

Mr. Hare: Thank you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I hope that that course will commend itself to the House.
Before I deal with these Schemes, the House might find it helpful if I were to outline the Government's policy on assistance to the fishing industry. This assistance takes two forms. First, there are the grants and loans, administered by the White Fish Authority, which are designed to help the inshore, near and middle water sections of the fishing fleet to modernise and to bring itself up to date. Only a few years ago the near and middle water fleets consisted almost entirely of obsolescent coal-burning vessels. That will be recognised by anyone who has been in the House for any number of years. It has always been the object of our policy to see these old type vessels replaced by modern oil-burning or diesel vessels of high efficiency. Secondly, alongside this system of grants and loans there is an operating subsidy designed to keep in operation a fleet large enough to maintain adequate supplies of fish during the period of transition while new vessels are being built and then, having been built, brought into service.
As the House knows, the policy of the Government has been to accept fishing

subsidies as a temporary measure to keep the industry going during this fundamental reconstruction of the fleet. I should like to make this clear to the House. We do not intend to leave the industry in the lurch should the circumstances of the day be such that continuance of Government aid in one form or another is necessary.
I do not think there is any need for me to mention that the Fleck Committee is considering the whole subject of our fishing industry. Its Report will be available to us by the end of the year. We shall then have the benefit of its advice in time to give that advice full consideration before future subsidy arrangements are decided upon. It may well be that the House would wish to debate that very important Report together with the general state of the fishing industry after the Report is made available to us.
It has been very good to see the progress that has been made in reconstructing the fleets. There are now fewer than 150 coal-burners. Last year when we were debating this subject my right hon. Friend the then Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland told the House that there were 257 of those vessels in commission. At the end of 1956 the figure stood at more than 360. In contrast to this declining number of coal-burners, the number of diesel trawlers has risen from 179 at the end of 1956 to more than 330 today. Besides these, there are 90 more diesel trawlers now on order which are expected to join the fleet before the end of 1961. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that that is a satisfactory picture. It reflects both the enterprise of the industry and—with reasonable modesty—I think I can say that it shows the success of the policies that the Government have been carrying out.
I wish to mention briefly the considerations which have led us to recommend to Parliament the increases in the subsidies in the Schemes which are before the House tonight. In 1959 the total catch of fish declined compared with the previous year, but prices rose and the value of the catch increased slightly. This pattern applied to both near and middle water vessels and the inshore fleet. Hon. Members who study this matter will see that supporting figures


are given in paragraph 15 of the last Report of the White Fish Authority.
In the course of our review of the industry, we get figures of catches and costs from vessels operating in the different ports. Those figures bear out that, compared with 1958, results for 1959 in the near and middle water fleets showed a slight improvement, but we have to remember that last year the subsidy on coal-burning trawlers and the older oil-burning vessels was reduced. Taking this reduction into account, the 1959 results show an average reduction of £28 per vessel compared with 1958. Broadly speaking, the financial position of the industry was maintained over the two years, but we have to remember—and I think everyone in the Chamber at the moment would recognise this—that the averages I have just mentioned conceal a number of considerable variations. All of us know that there can be very substantial variation at particular times between the different classes of vessel and—what is very important—between one port and another.
By way of illustration, I might mention that in Aberdeen last year the coal-burners on average did much the same as in the previous year, whereas at Granton this class of vessel did worse. In England coal-burners at North Shields did better in 1959 than in 1958. At Milford Haven, in contrast, the coal-burners did very much worse, although, again to be fair and to complete the picture, the diesel vessels at Milford Haven showed an improvement.
Coming to the present year, the best advice which I can get shows that, when the known increase in costs which face the industry are taken into account, the probable outcome will be very much the same as it was in 1959.
Having said that, however, I want to emphasise that the Government fully recognise that an appraisal of this kind cannot make allowances for uncertainties such as those which face our fishing industry today. Let us make no bones about it. These uncertainties are very grave. There is the question of fishery limits. Following the failure of the Geneva Conference to secure the necessary majority—which I know both sides of the House dearly wanted to see—for a common rule of law, the Government

have been endeavouring to find other ways of achieving a satisfactory settlement. But, in the meantime, uncertainty in this vital issue is, as we all know, hanging like a black cloud on the industry's horizon.
There is also the question of foreign competition, although here, under the E.F.T.A. Agreement, we have done a good deal to provide for orderly and regulated arrangements. In addition—and this is of great concern to a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House—there is the fall in the price of fish meal, which not only affects the returns of our own vessels but also may lead foreign countries to switch from industrial trawling and so intensify their fishing effort in the North Sea. This adds to the industry's fears about fish stocks and foreign competition.
We have tried to take all these circumstances into account, and I am sure that hon. Members on both sides will agree that we were right to take these outside factors into account. We have come to the conclusion that an increase in the subsidies for white fish is justified. That is why we are proposing to Parliament an increase of £1 a day on the smaller diesel vessels or £2 a day on the larger diesel vessels, and a new subsidy of £2 a day on diesel vessels of the 130 to 140 ft. class which previously was unsubsidised. In one case only—a rather special case—are we proposing a reduction in subsidies. This applies to the five modern oil-fired steam trawlers which have previously been in a class of their own. The subsidy on them will be brought into line with that on diesels of the same size.
We have not forgotten the inshore fishermen, either, and for them we are proposing an increase of 2d. a stone on fish landed. I know that the pilchard industry and other sections of the inshore fleet would have liked to change to a daily rate of subsidy for their vessels, but I am afraid that I could not meet that point. Hon. Members will recall that I considered it last year. But the quite substantial increase in the subsidy which I have just mentioned, I hope and believe, will be of real value to them; and, of course, we shall look again at the whole matter after the Fleck Committee has reported later this year.
I should like to say a word or two about coal-burners. We have reduced the subsidies on them over the years and, as I have mentioned, the object of our policy has been to encourage the replacement of these out-of-date vessels by modern vessels, and the change-over is proceeding satisfactorily.
This year we propose to keep the subsidy at the same rate as last year. Had it not been for the satisfactory increase in the rate at which the coal-burners are dropping out, we might well have proposed a further reduction in the subsidy in order to maintain the pace of replacement. We have not done so. By leaving the subsidy unchanged, we have kept a fair balance between, on the one hand, our wish to help the industry in its difficulties and, on the other, our desire not to slow up the vital process of seeing that the replacement programme goes ahead.
I turn now to herring. The results of the Scottish vessels—the main part of the fleet—did not change greatly in 1959 compared with 1958, but the English fleet had what I can only describe as a disastrous year. Indeed, the fall in fishmeal prices would, in the absence of Government assistance, have meant that the Herring Industry Board would have been unable to maintain its existing guaranteed level of prices for surplus herring. As hon. Gentlemen from North of the Border will recognise, this would particularly have affected the Scottish fleet.
We have met this situation by substantially underwriting the Herring Industry Board's possible losses on meal and oil prices. I mention this in passing, because it does not arise directly on the Motions before the House. We are also proposing to meet the particular difficulties of the larger herring drifters by an increase of £4 a day for diesel-driven vessels of over 80 ft. and £2 a day for coal-burning drifters.
I admit that these changes will help the English vessels more than the Scottish vessels, but the last season was disastrous for the English fleet, whereas I am glad to say that in Scotland the season was nowhere near so bad. The oil and meal arrangements will, of course, to a very substantial extent benefit Scotland more than England.
I need not go into detail about the White Fish and Herring Subsidies (Extension) Order. The reasons for this are obvious. Under the provisions of the White Fish and Herring Industries Act, 1957, subsidies may be paid only if an application is made before 1st May, 1961. What we are doing under this Order is to extend the period up to 1st May, 1963. Obviously this extension is necessary if subsidy payments are to continue throughout the period covered by the Schemes. It will give us time also to develop our policies in the light of the recommendations of the Fleck Committee.
I am sorry to have detained the House, but I wanted to go into some detail on these important proposals. These then are our proposals. I hope that the House will agree that they should be helpful to the industry. No one should think for a moment that in framing them we have not been most mindful of the problems facing the industry. These problems have been given the fullest and most sympathetic consideration by Her Majesty's Government. I can truly say that our proposals have been formulated in accordance with our broad policy for the industry, which aims at the development of a thriving and efficient fleet. They have been tempered to meet the particular circumstances confronting the industry. Believing them to be fair and balanced, I accordingly ask the House to give them its approval.

10.5 p.m.

Mr. James H. Hoy: Let me first tell the Minister how grateful we are that he took some trouble to explain these proposals, but he went just a little far when he said that this plan "of ours" had created all these new trawlers. We should remember that all these new trawlers have been built as a result of an Act passed by the Labour Government in 1948. We are delighted that the Government should have continued the good work started by us, but let us not forget the foundation of this scheme.
I was also interested to hear that the Minister had taken into consideration the circumstances under which we are discussing these subsidies tonight. We cannot decide whether the subsidies are right or wrong unless we think of the state in which the fishing industry finds itself. In that respect, I should like


to repeat what I have said before—we are grateful to the Minister for what he sought to achieve at Geneva. Having said that, however, we also have to admit that the Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva was a failure from our point of view because we did not achieve what we set out to do. That is one thing with which the industry is concerned.
On top of that, of course, we have still to find a solution of the dispute with Iceland, which, as long as it continues, will hamper our fishing industry. Added to that, we have had in recent days the decision of Norway and Denmark also to extend their limits to twelve miles. It is true that Norway very kindly offered to negotiate with us on it, and it is a pity that that example was not followed by other nations. We are having trouble at the Faroes with our fishing fleet. It is not good to know that it is being knocked about just a little by the protecting country, Denmark. That is causing considerable concern to that section of our industry. It is amid all those difficulties that we are considering the Minister's proposals.
In addition to all that, we have, as the Minister rightly said, this very substantial fall in the industry's income from fish meal. Until the drop in prices, that income was running at a total of about £3½ million, on which the industry could depend, but I would hazard that it is not running at much more than half that total now. That means a very substantial fall in the industry's income, which is not only to the detriment of the fishing industry itself but to the associated fish meal industry. These things do not make for happiness in the industry.
It is true that the subsidies are meant, as the Minister said, in the main for the renewal of our fishing fleet, but they have another purpose that should be stressed. They have to make trading economically possible for those engaged in the industry. It has been suggested that these subsidies might come to an end as early as next year. I think that that was a pious hope, and I use the phrase "pious hope" because it has been used in this regard by the hon. Member for Banff (Sir W. Duthie) in the last two debates. I believe that those who think that they will get rid of them in twelve months' time are absolutely wrong. As I hope to

show, it will be impossible for the industry to work without them.
Nor must we forget that there was a fairly substantial cut in the subsidies last year. I know that the Minister said that that dealt, in the main, with the steam vessels, but he will not forget that when the Joint Under-Secretary of Scotland introduced them last year he pointed out that the reduction was 7 per cent. on average over the whole industry. Therefore, when considering the increases that the Minister has put forward tonight, we must bear in mind what he took out of the industry last year. There was then a very substantial cut. It is against that background also that we have to measure these proposals. On top of all this, the industry is faced with certain other problems. It is all very well for the Minister to come here and say—and I agree with him—that the industry has got to be renewed, that we have got to get new vessels and scrap old ones and get a fleet that is economic. But there are other ways in which the Government can help, though we have to confess that on this occasion they are very much hindering.
I wish to refer to the interest charges which the industry has got to pay to the White Fish Authority for loans. It is all very well to say, "We are increasing the subsidy by £1 a day." The Minister ought to have made it clear that on the other side of the balance sheet, as a result of Government policy, the industry has got to face substantial increases in interest charges arising from the Chancellor's policy. If this industry is going to plan ahead it has got to have some assurance from the Government that the financial policy will not change from week to week, bearing in mind that interest charges keep moving in an upward direction.
Let us consider what has happened this year. Interest charges this year alone show six changes at the very least, and the interest rate on loans from the White Fish Authority has now moved up to 6½ per cent., which I am fairly certain is the highest rate of interest ever charged by the White Fish Authority. When one remembers that two increases came in a matter of seventeen days, it makes it extremely difficult for the industry in any way to budget for the building of new ships or to meet the loan charges.
Therefore, when the Minister replies, I hope he will be able to tell us that the Government propose to do something about this. It is rather nonsensical to give to the industry something by way of increased subsidy and then take it back in increased charges through the White Fish Authority. It is the sort of agreement which does not meet with the approval of those engaged in the industry. They cannot help contrasting their position with the action taken by the Government in connection not only with the agricultural industry but other industries in Great Britain. Indeed, the very generous terms, according to them—and they argue this with a fair amount of confidence—that have been offered to certain other industries compared with the charges that they have got to meet make them very resentful.
I want to make it clear that the White Fish Authority has not imposed these charges because it wants to. The blame rests not with the Authority but with the Government. That is one more thing that we have got to take into consideration when we consider whether these subsidies are right or wrong.
I was interested to hear the Minister say that this flat rate of subsidy might have more beneficial effects on one district as compared with another. I was delighted to hear him say so because I have been trying to explain that to the Scottish Office for a considerable time. If we admit that that is the case, that these subsidies may be all right for one port but not all right for another, it should be the duty of the Government so to vary the subsidy as to take account of the difficulties in various parts of the country.
The Minister has gone some way in this direction in the subsidies that he is paying to the herring industry. He has made alterations and changes. The Minister said tonight quite clearly, "I am doing this because the herring industry in England had a disastrous year even compared with the industry in Scotland, and, as the result of the measures I have introduced, the herring industry in England will do much better than in Scotland". If that is the case, there can be no logic in the Scottish Office refusing to take the same kind of action to give greater assistance to

the ports which are in difficulties. As far back as 1957, we argued that this ought to be done. Since 1957, of course, we have always been told that nothing very much can be done about it until we receive the report of the Fleck Committee. The industry is a little tired of waiting for Sir Alexander Fleck and his Committee to present their report.
The present Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he held the office now held by the present Minister, had this to say:
It is sad that the results so far, from the first few diesel vessels operating in Scotland last year, have been disappointing, but it is too early to judge real prospects from the first season's fishing."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th July, 1957; Vol. 574, c. 741.]
I thought that there was a little strength in his argument then. Conditions have not improved since. It is true that in Aberdeen they have improved somewhat, but on the whole in Scotland they have not improved. The Minister should have sought to make changes in the scheme.
I will take the example of my own port. As regards Granton and Newhaven, the Minister gives it as his forecast that this year will be very much the same as last year. Last year, the Ministry thought that they would have a better year, but things did not turn out like that. Taking the best view of the port I represent, there was a loss at the end of the year, for the vessels operating from Granton and Newhaven, of £96,000. That is on figures proved by the Scottish Office. If one takes the diesel as distinct from the old steam trawlers, the profits shown on the new diesel trawlers amounted to £1 8s. 6d. per vessel per annum. Those are the figures which confront us and which confronted the Scottish Office.
I suggest that, with the increased interest charges which have to be paid to the White Fish authority, the port will not be rehabilitated by this scheme. In addition, as the hon. Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Sir D. Robertson) has reminded us in the past, these ports have to carry additional costs which do not affect certain other ports. There are boxing and transport charges because more than 70 per cent. of the catch is sold outside the port. Of course, the farther north one goes, the greater the transport costs become. I should have


thought that there was on this occasion a case for differentiating from one port and another.
All in all, the Minister will not expect us to go into raptures about the proposals he has put before us. I agree that the problem cannot be tackled or solved merely by discussing the Schemes. We have already waited with great patience and we shall have to await the outcome of the Fleck Committee's work, but I am bound to say with that, when the report arrives, we shall expect the Government to make decisions which will cover the whole fishing industry. It was done in 1948 and it put the industry in the condition it is today in the matter of new vessels.
We give a rather lukewarm welcome to the Minister's proposals, and I do not think he expects anything else. The industry is not, on the whole, in good shape. It is an industry which ought to have had even greater encouragement because it has shown considerable patience in the fact of great provocation. We had this co-operation shown by every section of the industry—I am sure the Minister would be the first to agree with this—at the Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva. I do not think that any other industry could have shown such patience.
Therefore, while we welcome these proposals—we give a qualified welcome to them—we are bound to point out to the Minister that we shall look for something very much stronger before this year has gone.

10.20 p.m.

Sir William Duthie: I feel much pleasure in following the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Hoy) on this occasion. It is very nice to see him leading for the Labour Party on fishing matters in the House. One knows the profound and intimate interest which he takes in the industry. I join him in expressing the high appreciation of hon. Members on this side of the House for the splendid efforts which were made by my right hon. Friend the Minister at Geneva. It was through no fault of his that a successful issue was not obtained.
Reference has been made to loan charges. Loan charges have become an almost insoluble problem in the fishing industry. Indeed, a noted leader of the industry speaking about a fortnight ago to a meeting of hon. Members of all parties interested in fishing matters stated that it was virtually impossible to plan ahead in a big way in the industry on account of these self-same loan charges. The way they are jumping about—on a vessel the loan charge may be 5 per cent. and the next it may be 6½ per cent.—it is quite impossible for a company or individual to plan ahead, in these circumstances particularly in view of the very low yield that capital is obtaining from the fishing industry as a whole.
As we usually have to do in a debate of this kind, we must again complain about the lateness of the hour at which a debate of this importance begins. It is a pity that it should be so. There were extenuating circumstances this year, but there have been "extenuating circumstances" in former years. We should like to see these debates started as a more seemly hour.
Also, these Orders should be published in good time for us to discuss their import with our fishermen constituents and with the fishing associations. The debate should take place earlier in the Session before the Recess so that we may have an opportunity to recommend adjustments with some hope of our being listened to.
The white fish subsidy terminates on 31st July and the herring subsidy on 31st August. We are in the position that we have to take the subsidies as they are now offered or perhaps lose them alto-

gether, because in the event of any one of these Orders being rejected there would not be time for a replacement Order to be produced and agreed by the House before the Recess.
In 1957 my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was then Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, induced us to accept the subsidies that year on a promise of the Fleck Report, emphasising that the subsidies were only stopgaps pending the publication and implementation of that Report. We have had the same story in 1958, 1959 and now 1960 without any interim report. The Report is to be published this year, we believe. I should like the Minister to promise the House that it will be published, considered and debated and its practical recommendations put into effect without any delay whatsoever, because we look upon this long-promised Report as being something in the nature of a new charter, a new Magna Carta, for the fishing industry.
Much has been said about Scottish affairs in this debate, and will be, I am sure. The best survey that I have seen of the fishing industry for the year, at least the Scottish side of it, was published in the Scotsman on 14th July. It was an extremely well-informed article. I should be glad to know that it has been fully digested at St. Andrew's House.
These increases in the white fish subsidy which have been announced are most necessary and most welcome. should like to interject—and I hope that I shall not be out of order in so doing—that the time is rapidly approaching, in view of the fishing limits and the like, when trawlers proceeding to our distant grounds will have to be considered for assistance.
I welcome, too, the increase in the herring subsidy for vessels over 80 ft. from £8 to £12 per day. This increase for these craft is most necessary. I must, however, join issue with my right hon. Friend over the treatment of the herring vessels from 40 ft. to 80 ft. These comprise practically the whole of the Scottish herring fleet of some 200 to 250 vessels, and in that number of vessels there are only two over 80 ft. The subsidy for the Scottish vessels of 40 ft. to 80 ft. is £6 10s. per day and there is


no change, whereas there is an increase of £4 per day for the English vessels. Yet I am sure that the Minister will agree that it is this self-same Scottish herring fleet that really keeps the industry going in all its phases and activities—the fresh market, the processors, the canners, curers, redders, marinators, kipperers, Klondykers, etc. It is these vessels which supply the bulk of the catch for all these purposes.
I cannot begin to fathom the process of reasoning, or of lack of reasoning, which has resulted in the standstill in the Scottish herring fleet, for that is what it amounts to, bearing in mind that these subsidies which we are debating tonight and have debated in previous years are only stopgaps to tide the industry over till the Fleck Report is received and acted upon. Why differentiate against the Scottish herring fleet? I will repeat to the House the reason given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he was Minister of Fisheries. When announcing these subsidies for on 25th July, he said that the object of the subsidy
was to reverse the drift from herring fishing to white fish catching. In the herring fleet, costs have gone up, and we cannot safely assume that the proceeds of sales during this year or in the near future are likely to increase. The present subsidy, which the House will remember was instituted a good few months ago, does not seem, on present evidence, to be likely to attract vessels back to herring fishing from white fishing."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th July, 1957; Vol. 574, c. 741–2.]
What is happening today is that that very laudable process, which was instituted in 1957, is now being reversed and the disparity between white fishing and herring fishing as productive of wages and employment is being restored. The alleged reason for the revival of this disparity is that the oil and meal subsidy goes largely to the Scottish vessels, If that is so, I would point out that if the Scottish vessels are catching the bulk of herring sold for oil and meal then the English catches must be sold at a much higher average figure than the Scottish catches are obtaining. I will deal with that point in greater detail a little later. I think that the House should know how the subsidies apply in so far as the crews are concerned.
Provision is made in the Scheme for applying the white fish subsidy. It deals with white fish and it states that

in a case where the vessel does not exceed 70 ft. in length overall or is a motor vessel falling within category A specified in the Schedule to this scheme, any grant paid under this scheme shall be deemed to be part of the gross proceeds of the catch.
That is to say, it is to be applied on all the costs—the cost of gear, fuel, and so on.
When the herring subsidy was introduced in the House of Commons, an appeal went from these benches that it should be given to the crew in toto, and that is exactly what has been done. In a Scottish vessel which gets £6 10s. per day, or a £39 subsidy per week the crew is usually ten men. They get £3 per week each, £3 is used for the purchase of insurance stamps and £6 goes to the gross earnings. It must be remembered that fishermen engaged in white fishing and herring fishing work about double the weekly hours worked by skilled workmen ashore.
With this disparity of subsidy in the herring industry, let us consider what will happen in East Anglia this year. The Scottish fishermen believes that the subsidy is applied to English vessels as it is applied to Scottish vessels. A vessel of 80 ft. or over, however, and with a crew of twelve, will get £72 subsidy a week, whereas a Scottish vessel gets £39. The Scottish fishermen, therefore, imagines that his English counterpart gets something like £6 a week subsidy as compared with his own £3. That cannot lead to any peace of mind among workmen who work side by side with each other, especially when it is remembered that they fish exactly the same grounds, make exactly the same voyages, shoot exactly the same number of nets and land their catches at the same quayside. This must lead to all kinds of discontent, a state of affairs which should never have been allowed to arise.
The figures suggested by the Scottish Herring Producers' Association, who agree that the English vessels, on account of their heavier costs, deserve a larger subsidy and that there should be an increased subsidy of £2 per day for 40–60 ft. vessels and £3 per day for 60–80 ft. vessels, have been rejected. I ask both my right hon. Friend the Minister and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland to think again in this matter. The amount paid for oil and meal was mentioned by my right hon.


Friend the Minister in his opening remarks. As I have said, if our vessels are catching a large quantity of oil and meal herring, they must, on average, be getting a lower price than the English vessels.
Ullapool is the main landing port in the west of Scotland. The west of Scotland fishing has been the salvation of the herring industry. Indeed, the industry could not have survived without that West Coast fishing in view of the calamitous failure of the seasons in East Anglia. Ullapool is the main landing port, but it is not an "A" port and there is virtually no subsidy paid for oil and meal herring landed there. Neither is any subsidy paid at the Clyde ports, none of which are "A" ports.
My right hon. Friend stated that oil and meal herring would be subsidised only to the extent of 25 per cent. of the total catch in any one week. What will happen if there is heavy fishing? What will happen to herring over and above the 25 per cent.? Will they be dumped back into the sea? It seems that there is no other solution and complete chaos is likely to ensue.
We are always told that costings are taken. I would say in all sincerity that no snap costings are any yardstick whatsoever to the state of the industry. What really matters is the incidence of shoals, weather conditions, the herring quality, and the cost of gear, and be it borne in mind that so far this year in the summer herring season the catches are only about half what they were last year.
Again I mention cost of gear. There is another consideration, which, I think, has not been fully borne in mind, and that is that it is quite outside the scope of many herring fishermen today to buy new nets. They have been dependent on secondhand nets coming from Holland costing about £8 to £10 each. That supply is drying up, and herring nets today are costing over £20. For a vessel to be fully equipped with nets to work the whole year round requires a fleet of 300 nets with renewal some-like 100 nets a year. That is about £2,000 for nets a year, plus the cost of ropes and buoys and nets under repair.
The crewing difficulty we have had in the herring industry is getting worse as time goes, and this will make it a great deal harder, this, plus the utter nonsense

we have to experience from time to time with people in employment offices labelling many herring fishermen as seasonal workers.
I cannot vote against this Herring Subsidy Scheme for the reasons I have given, but I ask the Minister to think again. If I accept this Scheme, I accept it under very strong protest, and I fervently hope that the Fleck Report will show that measure of practical, businesslike approach to this industry, which this Scheme so lamentably lacks.

10.37 p.m.

George Jeger: My hon. Friend the Member for Shoreditch and Finsbury (Mr. Cliffe), who is sitting alongside me, remarked a moment or two ago that it would be a great delight if some time or another we were to hear a Member on the other side of the House congratulating some Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries on his policy. So far, for many years, we have not been able to enjoy that delightful experience.

Mr. Geoffrey Wilson: If the hon. Member was present during the remarks of my right hon. Friend, did he not observe that a number of Members on this side did cheer him and say "Hear, hear" to certain of his remarks?

Mr. Jeger: I was referring, as no doubt was my hon. Friend, to the actual speeches, not to the fulsome noises from a sedentary position made by one or two Members. The Members who have spoken and who are informed about the policy of the present Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries are extremely critical of that policy.
It is perfectly true that we, like the hon. Member for Banff (Sir W. Duthie), cannot vote against these Schemes because we do not want to deprive the industry of the subsidy which has been theirs since these subsidies were introduced by the Labour Government. We know quite well that the present difficulties of the fishing industry would be very much increased, and perhaps it would be made impossible for them to carry on their work if these subsidies were not continued.
The Minister referred to the difficulties through which the industry is passing. I should like to ask him to amplify a little one of those difficulties. He referred in passing to the fishing limits dispute. I


know that that is not a matter which comes very much within the bounds of these Schemes, but since he did refer to them I think we should like to hear a little more about the progress of the negotiations in connection with the dispute. He will be aware, as we all are, of the fact that 12th August is the deadline for the British Trawlers Federation, that it has agreed with him to hold its hands for three months which expire on 12th August. We shall have no other opportunity of discussing this matter before the House rises for the Summer Recess, and 12th August will pretty soon be upon us. I would appreciate it, and I am sure that the industry would appreciate it, if the Minister would make some statement, either in the course of this debate or before the House rises for the Summer Recess, so as to reassure the industry as to what the position is likely to be when 12th August arrives.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Sir William Anstruther-Gray): I think that it would, perhaps, be proper for me to say now that the Minister could scarcely go into great detail on the question of the fishing dispute on these three Schemes, although it is, of course, in order to refer to it.

Mr. Jeger: I fully realise that, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and I thank you for drawing my attention to it. I would, however, ask the Minister if he would, perhaps, take another opportunity of making a statement about that difficulty, because it is one of the main difficulties through which the industry is passing at the moment.
This debate is, of course, about the help being given through the subsidies. These subsidies are designed to keep the industry in action and to ensure, as is said in one of the Schemes, a continuous and plentiful supply of fish. That is very necessary.
On a recent occasion when some of us were privileged to visit Lowestoft and look over the trawlers and to inspect the fish market and see the way in which the auctions are carried out, I remember how impressed we were with the efficiency and general cleanliness of Lowestoft's fish market. We were told—I had not realised it till then—that fish is actually the only pure food that comes

to the consumer. It is not adulterated in any way, it is not chemically fed or reared artificially. Therefore, if for no other reason than the maintenance of good health, we should ensure that there is a plentiful and continuing supply of good and fresh fish to the consumers. That is why subsidies are essential for this industry.
I know that there is a good deal of dispute over subsidies in any industry and that there are various avenues of attack, but I think it true to say that without the subsidy this industry would have to go out of business. I was impressed to see in one of the City columns the other day that the demand for subsidies is spreading even to tramp shipping. It was said at a meeting of one of the shipping companies that without a direct Government subsidy to tramp shipping the decline in the fortunes of that industry could not be arrested. How much more necessary then is a subsidy for an industry which is not merely carrying goods from one part of the world to another but is providing fresh food for the people of this country?
As the Minister quite rightly said, good progress has been made in modernising the fishing fleet, and we are all very pleased at that. Modern vessels can bring fresh fish much more quickly and in much better condition to our ports and to the housewives. I have noticed in my awn constituency, where many of these trawlers are built, that the orders for them are becoming fewer and fewer and that the work in the shipyards is becoming more precarious. When I have inquired about the state of the order books I have been told that each order is now watched for anxiously and is heralded as a triumph when received.
One of the reasons for this, as has already been mentioned by both previous speakers, is the high interest charges. The trawler owners are reluctant to place orders when they know that the initial charges are going to be very high and that the interest charges might quite likely be raised several times during the period that they are paying off their loans. Therefore, I appeal to the Minister to use all the influence that he has with the Chancellor regarding the high interest charges on the


loans made for the purchase of these modern vessels. We want the whole fleet modernised as quickly as possible, and this is one way in which it can be done.
It is very little use subsidising the trawler owners and the fishing industry generally if a large portion of that subsidy has to be repaid in loan charges, and it is very little use increasing or even maintaining the subsidy if at the same time the industry is faced with another increasing charge by way of port dues and dock charges which the British Transport Commission is contemplating at the moment. This seems to me an indirect way of subsidising the Transport Commission. Whilst the Commission is entitled to a reasonable amount of dues for the use of its services, the way it is attempting to impose a disproportionate charge on the industry seems to me a matter of giving the fishing industry a subsidy on the one hand and taking it away doubly on the other with interest charges and dock charges.
All who have spoken in the debate have mentioned the Fleck Report. Between now and the time we receive it, I suppose it will continue to be mentioned. This indicates how the industry is dissatisfied with its position. The fact that we who represent various sections of the industry continue to refer to the Report indicates how sick the industry is and how we hope that a comprehensive report will be submitted so that the Government may take action on it.
Will the Government act when they receive the Report? I hate to cause a blush to rise in the Minister's cheeks, but dare I mention the Heneage Report? We waited eight years for it. No action has been taken yet on that Report. We have waited a long time for the Fleck Report. We are told that we shall have it at the end of this year, but how long will we have to wait for action? I hope that the Minister will benefit from the criticism made of the present temporary policy to which we are now agreeing faute de mieux and that we shall have the Fleck Report and then action on it without undue delay.

10.47 p.m.

Mr. Patrick Wall: I start by congratulating my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries on his policy. I am warmly enthusiastic for his actions because,

first, they extend the system of subsidies for a further two years to April. 1963; secondly, because they reverse the trend of recent years and show an increase in subsidies; and, thirdly, because my right hon. Friend has shown in his speech today that he fully appreciates the difficulties which the industry is facing.
Allusion has been made to some of these difficulties, and perhaps I may be permitted to make a further mention. We all welcome the lead which my right hon. Friend gave at Geneva and the way in which he has supported the industry throughout the dispute about territorial waters, but on 12th August when the three months truce is ended he will face the decision of having to recognise the twelve-mile limit or having to protect our fishing vessels when they are fishing on their lawful occasions. Both these alternatives have dangerous implications.
We hope that my right hon. Friend will bring the fullest possible pressure to bear on the Foreign Office to make it realise that the time is getting short within which some solution must be reached with Iceland either directly or in conjunction with other countries. There is not only the question of limits. There is the European Free Trade Area and the fact that is now becoming recognised the 10 per cent. ad valorem duty on imported fish will gradually disappear. There is also the problem of the Common Market which will become increasingly restricted against British imports; and the problem of cheap Peruvian fish meal imports which are having a financial effect on the industry.
Loan charges have also been mentioned in the debate. It has been pointed out that they have been changed six times this year. Then there is the problem of the dock charges, which has also been mentioned. If the British Transport Commission imposes the maximum charges it is allowed to charge under the proposed regulations it will impose an increase of £¼ million on the fishing industry of Hull. Even if the British Transport Commission imposes a lesser charge that has been suggested, it will mean an increase of £160,000 a year for the fishing industry in Hull. Those are heavy burdens for the industry to bear, particularly as the slipways in Hull,


owned and managed by the British Transport Commission, cannot slip more than 5 to 10 per cent. of the trawlers operating from that port.
With these facts in mind, I welcome the fact that my right hon. Friend has not reduced the subsidy for coal burners. It is important to keep those vessels in operation until they can be replaced—and so keep the crews in employment. I also welcome the additional subsidy to the modern motor trawler. This will go a long way to offset the increase in loan charges.
There is one point I want to put to my right hon. Friend which I have mentioned during the past four years. With increased costs, and with the difficulties to which I have referred, particularly in the increased cost of building new vessels, the distant water vessel owners are bound to come along to my right hon. Friend and ask for a subsidy. They do not want to do so. They want to avoid it if they can, but for economic reasons they are bound eventually to make this request, at least for subsidies for the building of new vessels. If one starts giving subsidies to new building, inevitably a request follows for subsidies for the less economical and older vessels to enable them to compete with the new vessels, so really one extends the subsidies we are talking about this evening to the whole of the distant-water fleet.

Mr. Jeger: Would it not be a better policy to increase the subsidy for building new vessels and reduce the subsidy for older vessels and thus induce the owners to convert to more modern vessels?

Mr. Wall: Yes, it would, but that cannot be done overnight. One has to keep the uneconomical vessels operating until there is time to build a new fleet, otherwise one causes unemployment and loses trained crews and skippers.
This problem underlines the need for a full debate. It is only in that way that we are allowed to discuss matters which we can only mention tonight. We cannot now go into detail and debate this problem more fully. This happens year after year. We cannot now go fully into the problems affecting the distant-water section of the industry which, after all,

is the most important section of the industry and is of great concern to Hull, which is not only the largest fishing port but the only wholly distant-water port in the country.
I hope that when the Fleck Report comes out it will enable us to have a full debate in which we can cover all these vital problems of the distant-water section of this great industry.

10.53 p.m.

Mr. Anthony Crosland: I should like to reinforce very strongly what the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) said about the scope of the debate tonight. I have been concerned for only one year in Parliament with these matters, but that does not stop me from saying that it is intolerable that we are limited by the scope of the debate from reviewing the whole prospects of the industry.
I should like to say a brief word about one part of the industry which has not so far been mentioned, a part of the industry with which I am particularly concerned, namely, crab and other forms of shell fishing. This part of the industry is not at the moment eligible for any form of subsidy. It has had an extremely difficult time during the past twelve months, not only because of the bad weather of last winter, but because of the increase year by year in the imports of crab meat from other countries causing a depressed market. It seems to me that on grounds of logic and justice that part of the industry has a claim to be considered for an extension of the white fish subsidy.
Our debate this evening is mainly about the near and middle-water sections of the fleet because they are the people primarily involved in the increase in the subsidy rates. Here it is only right to congratulate possibly the Minister but certainly the White Fish Authority and those sections of the industry on having substantially achieved what has been the object of the Government and the industry in their policy for the last ten to fifteen years. The near and middle-water fleet is now substantially post-war. The middle-water section is almost entirely post-1945 and the near-water section, given the rate at which scrapping and new building is going on, will soon be a predominantly post-war fleet. That is a considerable achievement


which, in all fairness, we ought to recognise.
That does not mean that the near and middle-water fleets have no troubles to consider. Last year they had a particularly bad year. The Minister pointed out that all sections of the fleet had suffered a drop in production last year, but that suffered by the near and middle-water sections of the fleet was considerably larger than that suffered by the inshore or the distant-water sections. There was a drop of 7 per cent. in their catch last year, and it is presumably partly because of that and partly because of the various difficulties facing these sections of the fleet that we have this increase in the subsidy rates.
The question is whether an increase varying between £1 and £2 a day granted under the Schemes is sufficient in view of the problems which this section of the industry has to face. These problems have been listed many times this evening and I will not go through the list again. It includes Peruvian fish meal, the European Free Trade Association and all the rest of it.
May I say a word on the question of loan charges, which most hon. Members have mentioned? I should have a good deal of sympathy with the Government if they were giving no aid of any kind to this industry and if they then said that they must charge competitive rates of interest for Government loans. But it seems to me illogical for them to say that they must not subsidise the rates of interest which they charge on loans when in any event they are subsidising the industry. I can understand their saying, "We do not want any direct or concealed subsidy going to the industry at all", but, as the industry is being subsidised, it seems to me illogical to insist, in this almost ideological manner, on competitive or market rates of interest.
Given the increase in the rates of interest compared with last year—and they are considerably higher than they were at this time last year—and given the other difficulties which have been mentioned this evening, the question is whether an increase of £1 and £2 a day in the subsidy rates is sufficient for the near and middle-water sections of the fleet. On the basis of figures which I have been given for Grimsby, it seems

to me that this increase may not be sufficient. I have been given figures by people in Grimsby which suggest that a very high proportion of the diesel trawlers in this section of the fleet made a loss during the last year—a loss which the increased subsidy of £1 or £2 a day will not be sufficient to meet. In common with one or two other hon. Members, therefore, I think that there might have been a case for a larger increase in the subsidy than that which has been made.
I do not always accept everything which the trawler owners say by any manner of means—that would be a great mistake for any hon. Member concerned with the fishing industry. But, taking the picture in some detail, it seems to me that on these figures they have a reasonable case for stating that the increase ought to have been larger.
Most hon. Members have made a fleeting reference to the distant-water section of the fleet, and I should like to do the same, because the problems facing this section of the industry are far greater than those facing the near and middle-water sections. I need not go over the various difficulties which have been created for them by the events of the last year. It seems to me that the basic question raised by these difficulties is whether it is desirable—and whether we should press for this to happen—that the distant-water section should be brought within the scope of the financial aid given by the White Fish Authority. I do not think that so far the industry has put forward a convincing case on this, nor does it ever put forward a single-minded case; it normally speaks with about 179 different voices, and I have not yet heard what I regard as a sufficiently convincing case. But I think one could nevertheless make out a case on grounds which the Government have already accepted in the case of other industries. For example, in certain ports one could make out a case on grounds of local employment. Grimsby is currently dependent to the extent of 40 per cent. of its employment on the fishing industry. I do not mean there is serious unemployment there now, but if things got worse a case for aid could be made out on those grounds.
One could also perhaps make out a case on wider social grounds comparable


to those which influence us in the case of agriculture. Some hon. Members opposite representing agricultural constituencies may not agree, but my view is that the case for agricultural subsidies is not so much an economic as a social case; for various social reasons we do not want the countryside to run down or the rural areas to become depressed, and so large sums of money are paid into agriculture primarily for social reasons. This argument might apply in the case of a number of ports which are heavily engaged in fishing.
Then, again, there is a strong and well-established case in this country for giving Government aid to an industry which is faced with an exceptional problem of once-for-all adjustment to an entirely new situation. This is the argument for giving aid to the cotton industry. This is also the argument for giving aid to the near and middle water section of the industry. The main object originally was sharply to reduce the total size of the fleet and also to modernise it.
One can argue that the distant water section of the industry is likely in the next five years to have to adjust its entire mode of operation, to fish very much further afield in less favourable grounds, and this will involve it in a major change, both in its capital investment policy and in its techniques. There will be more factory ships; an aircraft carrier is now to be utilised; we are to have the "Lord Nelson", Marr & Sons' new ship, and so on. All these are attempts by the industry to adjust itself to an entirely new situation. A case could be made by the industry for Government help to hasten and facilitate this process of a once-for-all adjustment. At any rate, that is something which we shall have to consider in future years, although by the time we do consider it I think the industry should get matters a good deal clearer in its own mind.
My last point has already been mentioned by the hon. Member for Haltemprice, that all these considerations which we are discussing are overshadowed by what may or may not happen on 12th August. This is something about which, sitting for Grimsby, I am extremely nervous. The three months are nearly up now. The Minister was given these

three months with very good grace by the industry, and also by hon. Members interested in the industry. But the trouble is that most of us, at any rate, have no idea whether anything is happening or has happened. We know that negotiations have started with Norway and have apparently gone well, and I am delighted to hear it, but we have no idea of what has happened to all these schemes which were put forward after the failure of the Geneva Conference—schemes for a North Atlantic limits agreement, a West European agreement, and possibly a bilateral approach to Iceland. We have no idea what prospects there are of success in any of these directions.
Meanwhile, while we are in this state of uncertainty incidents are becoming more and more common. The great majority of them have affected Grimsby trawlers, for which I am very sorry. Tempers are getting frayed on both sides. I entirely support the attempt by the British Trawler Federation to get the skippers to keep outside the 12 mile limit, since these incidents do us no good at all. I hope that either now or before the House goes into Recess the Minister will be able to say something about his view of the whole situation. Otherwise, if we do go into Recess with nothing said at all before 12th August, such little that some of us who are interested in the matter might do as envoys of good sense and restraint we shall not be in a position to do.

11.5 p.m.

Mr. Douglas Marshall: Everyone who has spoken has referred to the anxieties about the 12th August, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend is very well aware of that date and what may flow from it. At the same time, it is only right that we should, as most hon. Members have done, pay a tribute to my right hon. Friend for the very wonderful stand he made at Geneva in trying to reach a settlement. Now, we must realise that, whether good or bad, a settlement was not reached, and we now approach 12th August with some concern.
There has been much reference to the work of the Fleck Committee and its forthcoming report, and my right hon. Friend has referred to the different delaying actions which, apparently, have


to take place until the report is before us. It is perfectly true that, when we are awaiting reports from committees which are in course of preparing them, it does meet convenience that there should be a certain amount of delaying action, but what worries me a little is that this is not the first Committee to be set up to study the fishing industry. Its report will not be the first one to come before the House.
At the end of 1944, we were awaiting the report of the Committee presided over by Sir Basil Neven-Spence. We received it in 1945, and a great many very good suggestions were made in it. I do not criticise the Government of that day for not being able to implement or for not in fact implementing many of those suggestions; they were extremely complicated to put into actual practical effect. I am, therefore, cautious and anxious, in spite of what my hon. Friend the Member for Banff (Sir W. Duthie) said, about the Minister being able immediately to implement the suggestions which emerge when the report of the Fleck Committee is before the House. For one thing, until we have seen the report, we shall not know whether what it suggests will accord with what the fishing industry or we may wish.
In discussing these Measures before us tonight, the last thing one would wish to do would be to appear churlish in discussing certain of the subsidies covered by them. One must recognise, that in one case the subsidy has been raised from 8d. to 10d. a stone. That is a rise of 25 per cent., and 25 per cent. at any time is a fairly considerable rise. In present conditions, taking into account various other things which have happened during the past six or eight months, it is a quite substantial rise. I am extremely happy that my right hon. Friend has seen fit to make that rise of 25 per cent.
I did not quite understand what the hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Crosland) meant when he referred to the Scheme not conferring very much on the inshore fishing industry.

Mr. Crosland: The shellfish industry.

Mr. Marshall: Of course, I should be out of order if I were to discuss the shellfish industry or the crab and lobster fishing industries. I thought the

hon. Member was referring to the inshore fishing industry, and perhaps I misunderstood him. Of course, there is considerable reference to the inshore fishing industry. For example, a great part of page 4 of the White Fish Subsidy (United Kingdom) Scheme, 1960, refers to the inshore fishing industry.
I mentioned just now the Spence and Fleck Reports. I remind the Minister that after nothing was done to carry out the Spence Report recommendations there was a great deal of discussion in the House which led to the setting up of the White Fish Authority. One of the things debated again and again in Standing Committee was that here was an Authority being set up to put forward suggestions to help the industry. It was difficult for it to do so. We knew that when we set up the Authority. Not an enormous number of suggestions has been put forward by the Authority. That is no criticism of that authority.
But lately it has made suggestions to deal with that part of the inshore fishing industry which has particular reference to the pilchard industry, which is mentioned in their Report and to which I was delighted to hear my right hon. Friend make special reference. With regard to that industry, last year the Authority suggested that there should be an alteration in the form of subsidy, that it should apply to the voyage and not, as it does in the Scheme, to the catch. My right hon. Friend in his speech said that he had considered this and had turned it down and was awaiting the Fleck Report. I mentioned this matter to my right hon. Friend in a speech last year, expressing the hope that he would not again defer the matter until he received the Fleck Committee Report.
The interesting thing is that the Authority not only recommended this to my right hon. Friend last year but recommended it again about four months ago. It has made a great study of the subject, and so have the different committees which have been set up to examine this part of the industry. If we are to set up bodies to try to deal with the fishing industry and after protracted study a suggestion is made which is practicable and then the Minister in his wisdom, after listening to what his very excellent servants have said, says "No. It will


not do. It is too difficult", the whole thing becomes very tiresome.
I ask my right hon Friend to note that last year—and, for that matter, this year—those who were particularly interested in this part of the industry were not asking for a 25 per cent. rise in the subsidy. They were asking for no more money than the subsidy would in fact pay. They were asking for an alteration of the payment of the subsidy so that there would be a more even flow of fish through to the canning factories and so on.
Therefore, I rather agree with the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Hoy) who said that he did not go into raptures over these proposals. On the other hand, I equally think that it would be churlish not to thank the Minister for what he had done. Nevertheless, I would point out to my right hon. Friend that this part of the inshore fishing industry, which represents a goodly portion of the pilchard industry fleet, met on 9th July—that is an important date because these Schemes were laid on 29th June and were, therefore, known at the time of those deliberations—and passed this resolution:
That this meeting deplores the loss of time in implementing the proposals of the White Fish Authority for the development of the Pilchard Industry, and requests all Cornish Members to use their best endeavour with departments to expedite this matter. Also as an immediate measure of assistance, Members are asked to continue to press for a daily voyage subsidy for Pilchard vessels.
It is important that my right hon. Friend should bear that in mind.
As to the research side, we are very content. The Minister has given his authority. A conference is meeting at Plymouth tomorrow on the question of converting a vessel and so on and going into the research which is so much needed in the industry. That, however, will take at least two years, and there will be nothing else in the meantime. I rather doubt if that will help this industry to survive now, but I personally thank the Minister for what he has done with regard to the subsidy.
I do not entirely accept that it is going to solve the problem, and I hope that he will not think that the report of the Fleck Committee will solve the

problem. One of the things which I hope the Minister will do is to alter the whole pattern of payments so far as the pilchards industry is concerned.

11.15 p.m.

Mr. Hector Hughes: Nobody has yet drawn attention to the fact that this is an unusual fisheries debate in that it started before ten o'clock this evening. Usually, the Government show such disrespect for this industry that they arrange the business in such a way that a debate of this nature starts around about midnight. Hon. Members have been kept in the House after midnight discussing fisheries on many occasions.

Mr. Hare: Mr. Hare indicated assent.

Mr. Hughes: I see that the Minister nods his head, so I take it that he agrees with me. It is a shocking thing that so much disrespect should be shown to one of the nation's great industries.
The hon. Member for Banff (Sir W. Duthie) appeared to be in some doubt as to which of the Statutory Instruments he would address his mind, but I take the view that all three are of very great importance, not only to the fisheries industry and its ancillary industries, but to the consumers of this country and to the thousands of workers in all branches of the industry. But I make my protest, as I have on other occasions, against the Government initiating a debate on this great industry at so late an hour when hon. Members are not in the mood to consider all the implications of it as they should be examined. Tonight is only one of a series of such occasions when the business of fisheries has been tacked on to the end of the day's business instead of its being treated as a primary matter of great concern to the nation.
Other hon. Members have addressed their minds to details, some of them mathematical and some of them historical, but I want to invite attention to another aspect of this topic which so far has not been mentioned. On former occasions, Ministers of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food—and what a nomenclature, as though fisheries did not produce food and agriculture had nothing to do with food—have dealt with similar Statutory Instruments in a hurried and casual way. Tonight, the


Minister gave some consideration to what he called outside considerations, and I wish to ask him to take a somewhat longer view of the implications of these Statutory Instruments.
There are larger considerations which merit careful discussion and analysis, and whatever may have happened on former occasions, the Statutory Instrument have not been dealt with in a perfunctory manner tonight. I congratulate the Minister upon that fact. These Statutory Instruments merit careful, long-term consideration, because the conditions in the fishing industry have changed and are changing and the future of the industry is uncertain, as I shall indicate briefly. It may well be that the statutory conditions and provisions which sufficed for the fishing industry in the present and in the past may suffice this year and next year. The question we have to ask tonight is whether the subsidies now proposed are sufficient for their purposes.
The Minister very fairly said that the whole topic will be considered when the Fleck Report is published. Presumably, by that he means that it will be considered in a long-term manner. As has been indicated by other hon. Members on this side, however, other Reports of a similar character have not been considered for a long time. It is important that we should give consideration tonight to the long-term implications of these three Statutory Instruments.
I have said that the conditions of the industry for this year, with which these Statutory Instruments are conversant, are not certain. I say that because of the new economic proposals which are before the Government and before the country and which shortly will be before the House, arising from the Common Market, the European Community and agreements with regard to the Six and the Seven. Those agreements may vitally affect the fishing industry and its need for subsidies and the amount of the subsidy.
I shall deal with only one of these Statutory Instruments, the White Fish Subsidy (United Kingdom) Scheme, 1960, which succeeds last year's similar scheme. The Explanatory Note to the Scheme states that
The conditions relating to grants in respect of voyages made and fish landed remain the same as those under the previous scheme.

That is not true. The conditions are not the same, as I shall indicate.
As recently as 7th July, I asked the Prime Minister about what were called threats by the Common Market to British trade, including the fishing industry. The Prime Minister quoted his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, who said that
the present economic division of Europe threatened the normal development of European trade, including our own, even though this was not the design or intention of the members of the Common Market. This is also the view of Her Majesty's Government.
Then, I asked the Prime Minister whether he was aware that
the policy of the Government is a confused mass of threats and fears arising from the situation in Europe? In the interests of industry and progress in Britain, will he do something to clarify the situation and remove the threats?
I was speaking of the fishing industry. I had the fishing industry in mind, and so had the Prime Minister. Here is his answer:
what we want is an arrangement for a partnership between the two groupings for a common system of European trade. That implies, first, loyalty to our friends in the E.F.T.A. and, secondly, every possible effort to reach agreement between the Six and the Seven to see how this larger system can be brought about. We are anxious for that."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th July, 1960; Vol. 626, c. 696.]
The Prime Minister was then, and apparently is still, anxious for an arrangement with a formidable entity which may engulf Britain's industries, including Britain's fishing industry. These Statutory Instruments should take account of that, the immediate future of the industry. Britain's fishing industry will need much greater subsidies than these Statutory Instruments now provide to save it from damage or, perhaps, extinction.
The European Community is enormous. It covers an area of 449,000 square miles, as many as there are in the United States. It has a population of 169 million people. Its workers—I am not going into great detail, Mr. DeputySpeaker—number 73 million, more than the United States. Its associated countries contain a further 53 million people. It is the world's largest importer and second largest exporter. It makes these Statutory Instruments inadequate for their purpose.
I pass, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, from that dangerous territorial ground concerning which you were about to call me to order, but in my submission it is strictly relevant. I say that the British fishing industry is in danger. These Statutory Instruments do not mitigate that danger as they should. The relevant problems need further consideration. I shall give one example of that danger, and, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, in my submission it is strictly relevant. It was supplied to me by the British Trawlers Federation in a statement, dated as recently as 6th July, on what the Prime Minister calls "a partnership which implies loyalty to our friends in E.F.T.A." The British Trawlers Federation said this:
The Norwegian fishing industry estimates that if Britain will accept frozen fish as an industrial product Norway can send her about £75 million worth a year. This would enable the Norwegian fishing industry to work all the year round and employ about 10,000 more workers in the freezing plants.
This will take employment from British industry and it will therefore need greater subsidies in the future. I am asking the Minister to take a long-term view of this. This agreement I have referred to will probably so damage Britain's fishing industry and its ancillary industries that higher subsidies will be needed if British crews and fish market workers are not to be thrown out of employment. This is a pistol at the head of the industry, and presented to this House now at the dead of night with no alternative but to accept it or reject it. As we have the utmost care for the fishing industry we do not reject it, but I ask the Minister to take into account the considerations I have suggested so that he may evolve a long-term policy in the interests of the fishing industry.

11.28 p.m.

Mr. G. R. Howard: The hon. and learned Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) will forgive me if I do not follow him into the rather dangerous vicissitudes of the Sixes and the Sevens.
I should like to welcome the news the Minister has given us tonight. I should also like to congratulate the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Hoy), who led for the Opposition tonight, on his speech. I should like to say how much we all miss a certain person who is un-

fortunately deceased, and his great knowledge and experience of this industry.
I personally am very sorry that the Minister cannot change his mind about day payments as opposed to stone payments. If we set up an authority such as the White Fish Authority, and if for two years running it says that a thing ought to die, then it does seem a pity that the Government cannot act on that advice. Of course, I must say once again, as I say every year, how much I agree with the hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Crosland) about shell fishing. We try to get this matter reconsidered every year. There never seems to be any good reason why it should not be reconsidered, but, unfortunately, it never is. However, we can at least mention it every year and hope for the best.
I now come to something in more general terms which has not yet been mentioned. It is the intolerable situation in which the Royal Navy is placed at the moment vis-à-vis the Icelandic situation. It is no good going on month after month making kind references to the Royal Navy and saying what a wonderful job it is doing and, at the same time, leave it with no guidance whatever to get on with the job.
As the House knows, the idea of the havens is no longer operating. Therefore, it means that the ships which are in Icelandic waters are having to cover vast areas and having to deal with more and more difficult situations with practically no guidance. I know that the Government say, "Give us a little bit longer." Goodness knows, this House has been very patient in the matter, and we will certainly go on being patient. But I wish to emphasise that it is really up to the Foreign Office to be a little more active in the matter.
The Foreign Office seems to have the word "appeasement" written for all to see in everything it does. When we say, "All right, if these other people wish to make 12-mile limits why should not we do the same?", the Foreign Office says, "For goodness sake do not do that; it will upset somebody." It seems to me that we are the people who are always being upset and who never do anything about it. It is not fair to our inshore fishermen. Everyone else seems to have these increased limits, but we


do not. We are told. "Give us a little bit longer" There really must be a limit to this. The present situation cannot be allowed to continue.
The Royal Navy cannot be asked to go on indefinitely defending the present intolerable situation in Iceland. The Trawler Federation is doing a wonderful job in trying to restrain its members. I think that the telegram recently sent by the Federation was a statesmanlike action, not only on the part of the owners but on the part of the skippers and the trade unions involved.
When it is proposed that we should tell the people who threaten to extend their limits that if they do so we will cut off their imports of frozen fish, we always seem to be told that we dare not do so because it would upset someone. It is obvious from the telegram which the Trawler Federation sent that the continuation of recent incidents will stop any possibility of getting talks started.
Our naval ships have been told that it is essential for them to obey instructions and keep outside the 12-mile limit while fishing is going on. Nothing could be more definite than that. The trawlermen are saying that they are on the side of the Icelanders and the Icelanders are saying that they are on the side of our trawlermen, and the Royal Navy is getting the sticky end both ways with very little direction. There is always the knowledge that the captain in charge of the ship, who has to discharge arduous and seemingly endless duties, has to make the decision which may involve him in all kinds of trouble.
I beg the Government to make some sort of decision fairly soon on the matter because it is not fair to these men, apart from their extremely arduous and unpleasant duty of protecting the areas, to have to go on interminably in this manner.
What can we do about it? I suggest that after 12th August, if we do not get any satisfaction in the matter, it is up to us to try something really active. One knows if one reads the Icelandic sagas that that kind of diplomacy is more or less the diplomacy of two men lined up against each other.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am becoming a little anxious lest the hon. Member

should go further than the reasonable reference to the Icelandic dispute which would be in order in this debate.

Mr. Howard: I bow to your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.
I suggest to the Government that there is a very good reference to this dispute in the 8th July issue of Fishing News, in which it is said that
To ensure that more 'incidents' do not mar the proceedings, it might be worthwhile to set up a neutral zone, say between nine and 12 miles from the Icelandic coast, policed by vessels of the British and Icelandic navies working in pairs. To some, such action may seem fantastic …
but it might be something worth considering. It should be clearly known that if we cannot come to an agreement by 12th August we shall take firm and drastic action to try to end the dispute.

11.27 p.m.

Mr. Patrick Wolrige-Gordon: I accept with gratitude most of what is in these Schemes and support wholeheartedly the general direction of the Government's policy on the fishing industry. At the same time, mistakes are sometimes made and it is because I am frightened that one may be in the process of being made, that I have been anxious to speak in the debate tonight.
I refer to the decision to provide an extra £4 daily subsidy for boats of over 80 ft. in length, bringing them up to £12 per day at sea, while the boats with which I am principally concerned, those of under 80 ft. in length, receive only £6 10s. per day at sea. This looks like unfair discrimination and it may have serious effects on the industry in the North.
There are boats from Fraserburgh and Peterhead of 73 ft. in length competing with those of over 80 ft. in the same waters, regardless of distance and weather, and they are landing in the same market fish in just as good condition. If the reason for the different rate of subsidy is that the 80 ft. boats have to go farther and need a higher subsidy in consequence, why should other boats which do likewise be denied it? Could there not be an arrangement whereby boats doing the same fishing as boats of over 80 ft. should receive a similar subsidy administered independently to them on those grounds?
If the reason for this subsidy is simply that boats of this class have been doing badly, I, of course, support giving them the help that they need; but could not comparable help be given to boats under the 80 ft. mark, which need such help pretty badly also? The reaction of the men in the under 80 ft. boats to these Schemes will be that they are being penalised in some way; that is the reason for my forebodings on this matter. It is not a matter of figures and of adjusting one set of balance sheets to conform with another set, or it ought not to be. This has to do with people in the industry.
I should like to quote from a letter I received from one of my constituents. This man is the skipper of a boat fishing out of Fraserburgh. He says:
What I fear personally if the present proposed subsidies come into force is our crew reaction.
It is impossible to overemphasise the serious nature of this fact; the crews of these vessels are the backbone of the industry. They are the majority interest of the industry. The Scottish Herring Association has more vessels in membership, or affiliated to it, than all the other Scottish and English Herring Catchers Associations combined. They do a very hard day's work, and they do it well. When they go to East Anglia and find themselves working alongside 80 ft. boats with a £12 per day subsidy they will feel the inequity very strongly.
Let me make another point. Before the daily subsidy was introduced, the herring industry was falling off at an alarming rate. It was revitalised, but there is the feeling once again up in the North that a recession is creeping on, and when the discrepancy between the under 80 ft. and over 80 ft. boats becomes obvious there will be a real possibility of trouble. These boats are dual-purpose boats. For many that has been so since before the war. They can change over in 24 hours, and they may do so.
As the hon. Member for Banff (Sir W. Duthie) mentioned in a wider survey, fish meal and oil prospects are not bright. The East Anglia fishing prospects are not bright. The West Coast fishing will suffer from the extra fishing that a fall off at East Anglia will produce. These under 80 feet herring drifters may change their lines

of production. Are the Government prepared to face that with equanimity?
Finally, towns like Fraserburgh and Peterhead depend upon the herring fishing. When the fishing is good the towns are buoyant. When the fishing is bad there is gloom, and sympathy with that gloom. If there is less and less herring fishing, we have to face the cost to the whole economy of the North-East. Canning factories, fish meal factories, and freezing establishments have been built at tremendous capital cost and they employ large numbers of people. These concerns are largely dependent on the under 80 feet boats. If they are forced to switch to alternative lines of production there will be resultant unemployment.
It is for that reason, as well as for the reasons of comparable interest between the crews of the under 80 feet boats as apposed to those in the over 80 feet class, that I ask the Government to consider very carefully indeed this decision they are making tonight.

11.43 p.m.

Mr. Geoffrey Wilson: I do not wish to prolong the debate unnecessarily at this late hour. I merely wish to put on record that I support my hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. D. Marshall) in congratulating the Minister on the improved grants as far as they apply to inshore fishermen, but I regret that it has not been possible to alter the method of payment.
It occurs to me that possibly the reluctance of my right hon. Friend to make any alteration is because it is suspected that perhaps a grant made to an inshore man on a day basis might somehow get confused with that form of activity which in my part of the world is described as "going on the ruby." That means taking out a boat with visitors, not primarily for fishing, but more as a form of entertainment for tourists.
I cannot help thinking that if that may be the case there is justifiable reluctance to pay the money, but that could be got over and some definition could be found which would confine the subsidy grant to fishing that is fishing, and not merely another form of activity.
If that be the case, I hope that the Minister will look at this again, because


a number of different organisations and numerous persons concerned with the industry have said that they think it would be an improvement, so far as the inshore men are concerned, if it were possible to make the payment to them on a different system from that which appertains at the present, and that it should be given to them on a daily basis.

11.45 p.m.

Mr. John Wells: I will deal very briefly with a most important secondary aspect of these subsidies. For 300 years the purchasing power of the Royal Navy has sustained our small-boat-building industry. The Royal Navy went on ordering small ships and small boats up to the latter days of the last war. From the end of the war we have been very fortunate in having these subsidies, which have taken over, as it were, the position of the Royal Navy in giving support to the boat-building industry.
There is a popular feeling that the small-boat industry is booming, and so it is in plywood dinghies and that sort of boat, but if we are to maintain the traditional crafts and skills in out-of-the-way places such as the Highlands and other widely scattered areas of the nation, it is essential that the 'boat-building industry should continue to have Government support through subsidies such as these. The subsidy is indirectly to the boat-building industry, as I am sure hon. Members realise, but it is of the greatest assistance.
The boat-building industry is somewhat concerned that, with the introduction of E.F.T.A., those fishermen who wish to buy new boats may look overseas for their purchases. It would give the industry some assurance if my right hon. Friend would ask the President of the Board of Trade to look into that in the future and to assure the boat-building industry that these subsidies will be paid on British-built craft only.

11.47 p.m.

Mr. Frederick Willey: I have no wish to delay the House unduly at a time of the evening at which much inconvenience can be caused if we talk longer than we need, but I say at once that it is not fair to those hon. Members who represent the fishing industry, in particular, to have these debates at this time of the

day. Nor is it fair that the debates are limited, as this is, because we have to deal with these Statutory Instruments.
This is particularly unfair tonight, because I do not believe that we have discussed the essential problem at all. I protest particularly because we have been discussing a subsidy to a private industry, and we ought to discuss it at an appropriate time; but we have not discussed the essential question. The right hon. Gentleman has had a more favourable reception in the discussion of these Schemes because he has stated that they increase the subsidy following certain Government actions which have prejudiced the industry. I am sure that all hon. Members agree that what we want to discuss is the actions of the Government to the prejudice of the industry.
Mention has been made of the failure to reach agreement at Geneva. I have every sympathy with the right hon. Gentleman, but I think that he was put in an impossible position by the failure of the Attorney-General. I do not absolve the Government from blame. This has been a failure, and politicians cannot afford failures; they are accountable for them. While I absolve the right hon. Gentleman, I say that, as a result of the mismanagement and miscalculation at the earlier conference, he was put in an impossible position. We ought to have had an opportunity to debate this.

Mr. Hare: On a point of order. I think that this is not in order, and I regret this attack on my right hon. and learned Friend.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Sir William Anstruther-Gray): I think the Minister has drawn attention to the difficulty in which the House finds itself, in that we can make only passing reference and not go into these matters in detail in discussing these Schemes.

Mr. Willey: I am much obliged, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. You know how generous I am. I was endeavouring to be fair to the right hon. Gentleman. I do not wish to pursue the matter further.
I say again about the subsidy as a whole—I think I have said this before in previous debates of this kind—that where we are providing public funds


there is a duty upon us to see that the purposes for which the funds are provided are fulfilled. I found it most disturbing that the right hon. Gentleman should be so complacent about there being 150 coal-burners still at sea. I should have thought if this was the position that we should consider a little more fully whether the purpose of the Government subsidy is being properly met.
Here again, I have every sympathy with the point that has been made about loan charges and interest rates. What is the purpose of the Government? The Government are accountable. We have got the highest interest rate now because of Government policy. This is an extraordinarily flagrant waste of public funds, to provide a subsidy on the one hand and, through deliberate Government policy on the other hand, to discourage new construction. This is exactly what is going to happen. We have had it before.
The right hon. Gentleman touched upon this. He said that the coal-burners might well have had a reduction in subsidy this year if they had not put in so many orders for new vessels this year. But we know that this is only a reflection of Government policy. Of course, the building record has been better in the past twelve months because interest rates were lower. Now interest rates are going up and the Government say, on top of everything else, "We penalise you." I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Grimsby (Mr. Crosland). If one is, for proper purposes, giving aid to an industry, one has got to be consistent about this.
So with regard to the other matters that have been discussed. It is really a flagrant waste of public funds to come to the House and meekly say, "We are awaiting the Fleck Committee." If meanwhile this very substantial subsidy is being paid, the Government had better speed up the Fleck Committee. As I have said before, why could we not have had an interim report on some of these matters? I believe it is very likely that the Fleck Committee will make very wide-sweeping general recommendations about this industry. What are the Government going to do? Shall we, because of these wide recommendations, get a long delay in their implementation?

These are matters of policy. We have got to have a Government that is capable of taking policy decisions. I hope that at any rate this will be the last debate in which we await the Fleck Committee. I warn the right hon. Gentleman, if he is not Minister of Defence by then, that we simply cannot wait year after year while the Government make up their minds about the Fleck Committee.
These matters may be extraordinarily difficult, but here we have an industry which for ten years has been State-aided. The Government, having State-aided the industry for good reasons, should know something about the industry. They should know how it has responded to that subsidy. Otherwise it is extraordinarily unfair to an industry. This is a question of putting money into an industry. The same applies to almost every aspect of this industry.
I will make no more than a passing reference to it, but I should have expected something to be said about the Icelandic dispute. We know what is to happen next month. It is these uncertainties which affect the future and livelihood of people in an industry such as this. Again, there is the matter of the E.F.T.A. Agreement and the frozen fillets from Norway. We know that there was a condition written into that, and there was the possibility of further discussions about it in the circumstances now obtaining. These are the things in which we have a very real interest since we are, for what I regard as very proper reasons, supporting the industry.
I do not wish to say much more because I want to give the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland time to reply. Because of the difficulties of a debate such as this, I do not expect him to answer all the points which have been made, but I hope that the Government will keep them in mind and that they will face these matters squarely in an effort to reach conclusions. Otherwise, we shall have an unsatisfactory situation. We look anxiously from year to year to see what adjustments in subsidy are made, but what the industry wants to know is what is the Government's fundamental approach to the support they are prepared to give. The industry has seen some very disturbing developments which, though not necessarily the result


of Government policy—I am not being unfair—are attributable to Government policy. They are not unassociated with Government policy.
The important thing is to have as quickly as we can a report from the Fleck Committee and then, whatever the difficulties in coming to firm conclusions, we should have clear and definite conclusions from the Government as soon as possible thereafter. The industry is not in an easy position in the new developments which are taking place in European trade. It will be prejudiced both ways, prejudiced by concessions made by the Government at a time when the Government are not sufficiently resolute in seeing that the industry itself is able as effectively as possible to meet the new situation. While I qualify a little further the qualifications which have been put on the work which has gone into the Measures before us, I must say—I think that in fishery debates I can always speak for both sides of the House on this—that I hope that, by the time we next discuss these matters, we shall have a clear definition of policy from the Government.

11.58 p.m.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Gilmour Leburn): This evening, we have had, as usual on this subject, an interesting and exhaustive debate, and I shall do my best to deal with some of the points which have been raised. Hon. Members will not expect me to cover the whole ground and try to answer all the questions which have been put, but I assure the House that my right hon. Friend and I will take very careful note of some extremely interesting suggestions which have been made.
The debate has shown that, while there are certain criticisms of various details of the subsidy schemes, there is broad agreement, albeit a little lukewarm, perhaps, in some quarters, on our aims and on the policies intended to achieve them. The subsidies, together with grants and loans for new vessels, and the measures we are seeking to promote internationally for the conservation of fish stocks, constitute a concerted policy with a view to tiding the industry over a difficult period while the fleet is modernised and placed, we hope, upon a sound economic footing. I have no doubt that hon. Members particularly noted some remarks made by

my right hon. Friend at the start of his speech.
As several hon. Members have pointed out, the industry is still confronted by a number of difficulties—fishery limits, fluctuations in stocks and so on. As my right hon. Friend pointed out, we shall have to consider the whole position very carefully following the report of the Fleck Committee. In the meantime, we believe that we are pursuing policies which are basically sound and that the Schemes that we ask the House to approve tonight conform to them.
I should like to touch on one or two of the points which have been raised this evening. The hon. Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey), the hon. Member for Edinburgh, Leith (Mr. Hoy) and a number of other hon. Members on both sides of the House have referred to the uncertainties facing the industry over fishing limits off other countries, particularly Iceland, Norway and the Faroes. The Faroes is the area of most direct concern to the vessels that we are considering tonight—the near and middle water fleet. There the fishing limits are fixed by the agreement that we made with Denmark last year, and this provides for consultation between us in October, 1961, if a general convention regulating the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits has not by then come into force.
In the case of Norway, hon. Members will know that talks with the Norwegians have already taken place this summer about a bilateral agreement. A substantial measure of agreement was reached, and we hope that it may he possible in further talks in the autumn to reach full agreement.
In the case of Iceland, the Government have repeatedly expressed their willingness to discuss the situation with the Icelandic Government, and they will continue to do their utmost to bring about talks for the settlement of the situation.
A number of hon. Members have raised the question of the date—

Mr. Crosland: It is very agreeable to hear that the Government have repeatedly expressed their willingness to discuss the situation with the Icelandic Government. Have they actually thought of sending someone to Iceland to discuss matters?

Mr. Leburn: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will allow me to finish. A number of hon. Members have raised the question of what arises on 12th August. I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House will realise that this is, as well as being a very difficult problem, a very delicate one. I can assure the House that my right hon. Friend is in the closest touch with the situation, and I know that he will consider, along with my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary, whether it would be helpful to make some statement before we rise for the Recess. I do not think that I can go further than that tonight.
Turning now to the question raised by the hon. Member for Sunderland, North as to whether or not—

Mr. Hoy: Has the hon. Gentleman moved from the Faroes for good, or would he not just like to say a further word, because there is considerable trouble and danger arising there because of the Danish vessel which is patrolling in that area?

Mr. Leburn: I am aware that there have been some difficulties recently in the waters to which the hon. Member refers, but I do not think he would expect me to comment on cases which are still sub judice since the owners have lodged appeals against the convictions of the two skippers concerned. I can, however, tell him that we are concerned at certain aspects of recent incidents which do not concern the judicial proceedings taking place, and appropriate representations have been made to the Danish authorities through diplomatic channels.
I was about to say a word about interest rates, because that is a subject which has been raised by a number of hon. Members. The question of interest rates on loans is not new It has been said that the fluctuating rates of interest charged by the White Fish Authority have caused difficulties and uncertainty to borrowers, but I can only repeat what has been said on previous occasions. The plain fact is that such fluctuations are inevitable. The Authority has to borrow the money it lends, and the rates which it charges must reflect the rates at which the Authority can borrow from the Exchequer for corresponding terms.
I can hold out no hope of a means being found by which the fishery industry can be insulated from the changes

which affect other industries; I believe and am advised that the rates charged by the Authority compare favourably with those obtained from other sources. Paragraph 13 of the Report of the White Fish Authority states that there is no evidence that higher rates of interest are retarding the modernisation of the inshore and near and middle water fleets.

Mr. Hoy: But since that Report was printed there have been two further increases in interest rates which now stand at the highest point ever reached.

Mr. Leburn: I do not think that that changes in any way what I have said. The two changes in question amount to only three-eighths of 1 per cent. and, while not insignificant, I do not think that changes the general principle.
The hon. Member for Leith, raised the question of the Granton trawlers and, as he is aware, I have considered very carefully his suggestion that the so-called "boxing allowance" should be reintroduced. I am afraid I must tell him that on consideration we cannot do this.
The circumstances in which this allowance operated at Granton prior to 1956 no longer apply. At that time subsidy payments were related to gross earnings and the subsidy was reduced, or ceased altogether, if gross earnings per day at sea exceeded certain amounts. This allowance was simply a recognition of the fact that, as a result of their marketing methods, and the resulting method of determining their earnings, the Granton owners would have been unfairly penalised without an allowance of this kind. In other words, its purpose was not to give the Granton trawlers more subsidy than other trawlers received, but to prevent them from getting less.
That problem no longer arises since the subsidy is now paid at the full daily rate, irrespective of earnings. The hon. Member is asking that the subsidy scheme should be so drafted as to permit the Granton trawlers to get more subsidy than similar vessels at other ports and that, of course, is a very difficult proposition to accept.
The hon. Member for Leith suggested that the Minister said that differing factors were being taken into account in making the herring subsidy; but


there is a distinct difference. The subsidy does not differentiate by ports and countries. The subsidy for vessels of more than 80 feet will apply to both English and Scottish ships. The difference is not between ports and countries, but between ships.

Mr. Hoy: If that is the test, and as these particular trawlers are about the only type in this country, then why does the Minister not put them into that class and pay the higher subsidy?

Mr. Leburn: That may at first sight appear to be an attractive suggestion, but I should need to look at it carefully. There might be vessels in other parts of the country which, it might be claimed, had to bear higher transport charges or to travel longer distances to the fishing grounds. Instead of having a small number of categories, we might have dozens of them to contend with.
I should like to say a few words to my hon. Friends the Members for Banff (Sir W. Duthie) and Aberdeenshire, East (Mr. Wolrige-Gordon), who complained about what, I think, they would term unequal treatment for Scottish and English herring fisheries. I could not agree that there is such inequality. The English suffered a big drop in earnings last year—my right hon. Friend described it as disastrous—as a result of which both motor and steam vessels made substantial losses, whereas they made profits in 1958.
The subsidy rates for vessels over 80 ft. have thus been increased by £4 a day for motor vessels and £2 a day in the case of steam vessels. These are increases which, I agree, benefit mainly, but not wholly, the English fleet. The Scottish herring vessels as a whole, however, did not suffer a corresponding drop in earnings. The ring net vessels made bigger profits than in 1958 and the drifters continued to make quite satisfactory profits, although slightly less than in 1958.
It is true that if the Government were not assisting the Herring Industry Board to maintain its present prices for surplus herring purchased for reduction to meal and oil, the Scottish vessels could expect to suffer a big drop in earnings. For that reason, this assistance is being continued. Thus the English are being helped primarily by an increase in the ordinary

subsidy and the Scots by the oil and meal arrangements. In each case, the assistance being given is equivalent to about a 50 per cent. increase in the present subsidy. I genuinely believe that this is fair all round.
Simply because those classes which need an increase in subsidy are to get it, to say that others should also automatically get it—in other words, when we widen a band in order to narrow the gap in profits—is to take a view which is neither sound, fair nor attractive.

Sir W. Duthie: Surely, my hon. Friend realises the effect of this disparity in the subsidy between fishermen operating alongside each other in the same fishing grounds, shooting the same number of nets, and landing their catches at the same quayside, when one vessel gets £72 a week and the other gets £39, each with a crew of similar size. My hon. Friend must appreciate that this will lead to unpleasant circumstances in East Anglia.

Mr. Leburn: I take the point and I sympathise with it, but that does not happen all the year round. In any event, if the differences in the profit margins between the two types of vessel are properly explained to the fishermen, I believe that we can overcome that. The hour is late and I do not want to go on too long. We have had extremely interesting contributions particularly from the hon. Member for Goole (Mr. Jeger) and the hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Crosland), as well as from my hon. Friends the Members for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) and Bodmin (Mr. Marshall).
This matter of fisheries is of extreme importance. I am appalled that throughout the whole of this debate no representative of the Liberal Party has been present. I said at the beginning that my right hon. Friend and myself and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland will take careful note of what has been said during the whole of the debate. I do not think that there is any fundamental disagreement with the Schemes which we have considered tonight, whose importance to the fishing industry is self-evident. I should like to finish by paying my tribute to all those who fish in the industry. It is a job which is dangerous and hazardous. I am sure that they all command our respect, and I would pay my tribute particularly to them.
With that, I recommend these Schemes to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved.
That the White Fish Subsidy (United Kingdom) Scheme, 1960, dated 29th June, 1960, a copy of which was laid before this House on 30th June, be approved.

Herring Subsidy (United Kingdom) Scheme, 1960, dated 29th June, 1960 [copy laid before the House, 30th June], approved.—[Mr. Hare.]

White Fish and Herring Subsidies (Extension) Order, 1960, dated 28th June, 1960 [copy laid before the House, 30th June], approved.—[Mr. Hare.]

SELBY TOLL BRIDGE

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Bryan.]

12.16 a.m.

Colonel Sir Leonard Ropner: The hour is late, but I have half an hour in which to lay before the House the sad and, as I think, the disgraceful story of Selby Toll Bridge; the maddening and disgraceful story because of the indecision and, I submit, the lack of good faith on the part of the Ministry of Transport over a period of very many years.
This toll bridge crosses the Ouse at Selby in the West Riding of Yorkshire and leads into Barlby in the East Riding. Regarded from many aspects Selby and Barlby are one town, and the fact that every individual and every vehicle must pay a toll on every occasion that the bridge is crossed is an unmitigated nuisance from which the locality has suffered for well over a hundred years. In addition to the inconvenience, the payment involved has been and still is a serious discouragement to the commercial and industrial activity of the two towns. One industrial undertaking alone pays something like £7,000 a year in toll charges.
I hold no brief for the Selby Bridge Company, but neither do I in the slightest degree blame the Company which by a special Act of Parliament was given the right to build the bridge in the first place and to collect tolls. If Selby is to have a toll-free bridge the toll rights

must be bought, and it was a very recent act of justice on the part of a Conservative Government which now ensures that a fair price is paid for property which is compulsorily acquired.
When, after twenty-five years, the late Lord Bingley ceased to represent Barks-ton Act in this House he told me that when he died "Selby Bridge" would be engraved on his heart. After thirty years the same words may well be written on my heart—with perhaps other words which I think you would rule out of order as unparliamentary, Mr. Speaker.
My remarks tonight will be chiefly composed of a miserable catalogue of events which display, I submit, inefficiency, vacillation, contradictions, and 'broken pledges on the part of Ministry of Transport. I have found it impossible to memorise the sequence of events which make up the whole sad story, and I hope, therefore, that the House will forgive me if I make frequent reference to the notes which I have prepared and in which, I hope, I have included the salient points in the long battle wtih successive Ministers. Much of what I say will be quotations from letters or extracts and quotations from Questions and Answers which have been asked and given in this House.
Tonight I will not refer to events prior to 1938. It was in that year that the county councils of the West Riding and the East Riding agreed with the Minister of Transport that, in the first place, the toll bridge should be replaced by a free bridge on the same site, and, secondly, that at the same time a bypass should be constructed round Selby necessitating another new bridge about a mile down the river.
These two projects were quite distinct, but were, of course, in part complementary. It was announced in that year that work on both projects would start in 1940. It seemed that at last the toll bridge at Selby was to go. Of course, unhappily, the war made it impossible for work to be started on either of these schemes. After the war, in the summer of 1945, that is to say, fifteen years ago, the Minister of Transport inquired from the county councils whether it was desired to reopen the question of freeing the toll bridge, of replacing it by a new bridge and of constructing the by-pass.
In the light of the events of recent years, it is interesting to note that it was the Minister himself who started the ball rolling at that time. New hope was found by the people of Selby. In April, 1946, the East and West Riding County Councils decided that, in order to assess the compensation to which the bridge owners would be entitled, a census must be taken of the traffic passing over the bridge. In May, 1946, the Minister of Transport agreed to make an increased contribution to the cost of carrying out these schemes, and that in itself was encouraging.
In September, 1946, the census was completed and in December of the same year the East and West Riding County Councils agreed to contribute to the cost as soon as the chief valuer had completed negotiations with the bridge owners. A year had passed, but it seemed that some progress had been made. Six months later, in June, 1947, the Minister of Transport told me that it would be necessary to collect certain information locally; secondly, to investigate the precise nature of the powers of compulsory acquisition, and, thirdly, to assess the basis of compensation appropriate to the acquisition.
It would not have been unreasonable, I think, to have asked at that time, but I do not think that I did so, why on earth these things had not been done during the previous eighteen months. However, another year passed, and in May, 1948, the Minister of Transport told me that he had broken off negotiations with the bridge owners, and he added that in any case the toll bridge would be unsafe if it were freed. It was surely quite extraordinary that after ten years the Minister of Transport had only just made this discovery. But, in fact, the remark was irrelevant, for it should be noted that the proposal which had been made in 1938 and followed up later was not that there should be indefinite use of the old bridge but that the new free bridge should be erected on the same site to take the place of the toll bridge.
The West Riding County Council expressed the view at that time that it was quite unable to accept the Minister's reasons as adequate and expressed the desire as strongly as possible to press the Minister to reopen negotiations with the owners of the bridge.
In view of the disappointing climax of nearly three years of procrastination on the part of the Minister, I asked for a full report and received the astonishing reply that the Minister—and here I quote—
did not want there to be delay in abolishing the tolls because the new bridge was not ready by the time the toll negotiations were concluded.
What on earth that was meant to mean I do not know to this day.
What is even more surprising was that the Minister added that he must investigate the location and design of the new bridge. Later in the same month of May, 1948, I asked him if it was really true that the exact location of a new bridge had not yet been decided upon. I might have asked how many civil servants in the Ministry were employed hatching new and apparently bogus excuses for the lack of action on the part of the Minister himself.
Months passed, and in July, 1948, the Minister of Transport wrote to me and said that
Circumstances had necessitated a reexamination of the proposals for solving the traffic problems at Selby. The by-pass could no longer be regarded as the answer.
He now suggested that
…the first steps should be made to improve the existing road by buying out the tolls, and reconstructing the toll bridge.
It should be noted that nobody had ever suggested that the by-pass of itself could be regarded as a solution to the traffic problems of Selby. In any case, here was the Minister telling me with a note of surprise in his voice that he proposed as a first step to do something which he had said he was going to do three years ago but which only a very few weeks earlier he had told me he could not or would not do.
In reply to the Minister's letter I said that every time he wrote to me about Selby toll bridge he found a new reason for postponing effective action. That view was certainly supported by the West Riding County Council which told the Minister that it was quite unable to understand his attitude. The County Council told the Minister that
on the one hand he apparently was anxious to free the bridge, while on the other hand he continued to advance reasons why steps should not he taken forthwith, to free it from tolls.


That was a pretty tart letter coming from a county council and addressed to a Minister of Transport.
Three months later, in November, 1948, the Minister of Transport told me that he would bear the whole cost of acquiring the tolls and building a new bridge. That, of course, was good news but unhappily he added that
…the difficulty is practical, rather than financial.
That remark made me a little suspicious, but he added
I hope to see the toll bridge replaced in a matter of two years.
Knowing the record, I had my doubts. That was twelve years ago and the only bridge at Selby in 1960 is our old friend, or our old enemy, the toll bridge.
I gathered at the time that the practical difficulty to which the Minister referred was that his Ministry had only just discovered that it might be necessary to build a temporary bridge while he was pulling down the old one. I wonder whether that was really so. Did the Minister really expect me to believe that this discovery had just been made, or was it another excuse for further inaction? In December, 1948, the Minister of Transport said that it was not a foregone conclusion that a temporary bridge would have to be built at all and that consultants were considering other possibilities. Surely that is a question which could have been decided years before. I suggest that it was just another excuse hatched in the Ministry of Transport.
In June, 1949, the Minister told me, with complete disregard for what he had said previously, that negotiations with the bridge owners were progressing and that the preparation of a contract for the temporary bridge was well advanced.
In 1951 the Conservative Party was returned to power at the General Election of that year. With the people of Selby I heaved a sigh of relief: now that Labour inaction had come to an end, surely Tory brains and sheer drive would in a few weeks get Selby that which Labour had failed so dismally to procure doing all those years. How wrong we were.
In December, 1951, I wrote a nice little letter to the right hon. Gentleman who is now the Secretary of State for

Scotland. He was then the Minister of Transport. I said in effect:
In Selby we are not all right Jack. Please free our toll bridge.
A further two years passed. Not two months, but two years; two years of stagnation; two years of irritation and disappointment for my constituents in Selby and the surrounding district.
In November, 1954, in reply to a letter I had written two months earlier, the Minister of Transport said:
In the absence of detailed information it has not been possible to make a close estimate of the cost of acquiring the toll rights and building a new bridge.
Nine years—not nine days, or nine weeks, or nine months but nine years—had not been long enough for the Minister of Transport to get this information. How perfectly ridiculous, and how pathetic.
A month later the Minister told me:
Estimates for the building of the bridge can be made, but it is another thing altogether to estimate the cost of buying out the tolls.
More miserable excuses. One would have thought that after six years of negotiations with the bridge owners the Minister of Transport might have found it possible to obtain the necessary information on which to found an estimate.
In February, 1954, I had taken the first step to ascertain whether all the local government authorities concerned would wish to be represented on a deputation to the Minister of Transport with a view to persuading the right hon. Gentleman that perhaps he should do something about Selby Toll Bridge. They all did, and on 7th July, 1954, the right lion. Gentleman the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Lennox-Boyd) received a deputation representing the West Riding County Council, the East Riding County Council, the Selby Rural District Council, the Selby Urban District Council, the Howden Rural District Council, and the Derwent Rural District Council. There were also present three Members of Parliament.
At that meeting, after full discussion, the Minister of Transport gave me a pledge to the effect that of all the toll bridges in the country the Selby Toll Bridge would be placed at the top of the list of bridges to be cleared.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. John Hay): Toll bridges on trunk roads.

Sir L. Ropner: The Minister gave me the pledge that of all the toll bridges in the country Selby Toll Bridge would be placed at the top of the list of all the bridges to be cleared.
On 12th July, 1954—I should like the Minister to note this—for record purposes I wrote to the Minister of Transport and said:
We feel that we achieved something, when you so readily placed Selby Bridge at the top of the list".
Shortly afterwards the right hon. Gentleman who is now the Minister of Pensions became Minister of Transport, and in July, 1954, I reminded the new Minister of the pledge given by his predecessor.
Six months later, in January, 1955, I reminded the Minister that the pledge that Selby Toll Bridge would be put at the top of the list had not been forgotten and that it had received wide publicity. In March, 1955, I again reminded the Minister of the pledge that had been given.
Two more years passed—wasted years, letters, talks, Questions and Answers; but no effective action whatsoever.
But in December, 1956, the night hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Watkinson), who was then Minister of Transport, revived the hope that something would be done. In reply to a Question the Minister said,
An approach has been made to the bridge proprietors to reopen negotiations for the acquisition of the bridge and toll rights. Subject to a satisfactory settlement of this question, I hope to authorise the scheme for the replacement of the bridge before the end of the financial year 1958–59."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th December, 1956; Vol. 562, c. 222.]
Was that good news? Perhaps it was, but some of us had not forgotten the lesson of previous years.
Again my constituents waited and waited, but in May, 1957—five months latter—real hope was engendered, for the right hon. Gentleman told me that the negotiations were proceeding and that, subject to a satisfactory settlement being reached, he still hoped to be able to authorise, before the end of the financial year 1958–59, the scheme for building a toll-free bridge.
In July, 1957—that is to say, two months later—ithe Minister of Transport told me that

Further preliminary discussions were held recently with the bridge proprietors' representatives, on compensation matters, and it is hoped to arrange another meeting very soon, when we shall be able to produce up-to-date proposals for the replacement of the existing bridge.
That was good news, but the word "preliminary" in this context was a little disconcerting, bearing in mind that the question of Selby Bridge had been a burning topic for sixty years.
Time passed, and five months later, in November, 1957, I addressed a Parliamentary Question to the Minister of Transport in order to find out whether his negotiations for the purchase of the toll rights had been completed. The reply was disappointing. From time to time, later, I continued to ask the Minister how he was getting on and, needless to say, I continued to get disappointing replies.
In February, 1958, in an attempt to excuse the appalling length of time taken over the negotiations, the Minister of Transport told me that he must avoid the appearance of being anxious to reach a quick settlement with 'the bridge owners. I was not able to resist the temptation of telling the right hon. Gentleman that I found some cause for amusement in his remarks since, off and on, negotiations had already been proceeding for rather more than fifty years.
In October, 1958, I was told by the Minister of Transport that the whole question of the loll bridge had been put back into the melting pot. Needless to say, that shocked me and my constituents. After fifty or sixty years the Ministry had discovered the obvious, namely, that it would cost a considerable sum of money to buy the toll bridge and the toll rights. In spite of previous declarations that the first step to help the people of Selby would be to get rid of the toll 'bridge, the Minister hinted at a complete reversal in priorities and reverted 'to giving first place to the by-pass scheme. Let it be noted that the by-pass scheme will help through traffic but will not deal with the century-old nuisance of the toll bridge.
Nevertheless, two months later, in December, 1958, I was informed that negotiations were still being conducted with the owners of the bridge. Two more months passed, and in February, 1959, I wrote to the Minister and reminded him again of the pledge given


by the right hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire. It was at this stage in the unhappy story that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport stated for the first time that the pledge given referred only to toll bridges on trunk roads. Since July, 1954, I had on frequent occasions reminded successive Ministers of Transport of the pledge that had been given, namely the promise to deal first with Selby Bridge, of all toll bridges in the country. Over the years my interpretation of that promise had never once been disputed; indeed, it had been confirmed.
In April, 1959, about five years after the event, the Parliamentary Secretary sent to me a copy of a Press statement alleged to have been issued in July, 1954. In this statement, which was never submitted to me and would not have been approved by me if it had, or, as far as I know, by any of the local authorities involved, a wholly mistaken qualification is given to the Minister's promise.
Another year passed—again a year of inaction—and in May of 1960 the Minister of Transport told me that the plan to give Selby a toll-free bridge had been completely abandoned. Fifteen years of wasted planning and negotiation; for the people of Selby a fifteen-year walk down the garden path which, under the guidance of the Minister of Transport, had led in the end to nowhere.
The latest chapter in this pitiful tale is perhaps the most discreditable. Not long ago I heard that two toll bridges had been freed. If that was so—and it proved to be so—then the Minister of Transport had broken a pledge which had been given to a number of local government authorities and to myself by one of his predecessors. Even if it were possible to accept the official and belated version of the pledge which the Minister had given six years previously, it would still be broken in letter and spirit if the Minister of Transport had made a grant towards freeing any toll bridge before dealing with Selby Bridge.
I find that in the case of a new bridge which has taken the place of a toll bridge at Langstone, the Minister quite recently made a grant of more than £186,000. Does he really think that that was not a violation of the pledge by which he was bound? At Conway the toll bridge

which carried a trunk road has recently been replaced by a toll-free bridge. In the case of Conway bridge, the Minister of Transport has made an effort to wriggle out of the pledge by saying that the toll rights of the old bridge were not acquired. Nevertheless, £500,000 were spent by his Ministry in building a new bridge which in effect has taken the place of the toll bridge.
If the Minister of Transport does not agree with me when I say that there has been not only muddle and indecision over a period of fifteen years, but also a woeful lack of good faith, then he and I do not accept the same standards when we gauge degrees of honesty. As traffic over the bridge increases in volume, as it has, and will, so the toll rights will increase in value. Some day Selby will have a toll-free bridge. I appeal to the Ministry of Transport to write "finis" to this miserable and disgraceful story. By exercising his usual vigour, for which he is famed, let him give to Selby a toll-free bridge.
I conclude by saying that I am conscious that I have left the Parliamentary Secretary very few minutes in which to reply. For that omission and the fact that he cannot reply he will never be blamed by me or by the people of Selby. Perhaps he can deal with my remarks, but if such is not the case I will endeavour by ballot to obtain the Adjournment when we re-assemble after the Summer Recess.

12.43 a.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. John Hay): Just about a minute remains for me in which to reply to the long series of allegations of bad faith, indecision, inefficiency, vaccilation and so on which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Barkston Ash (Sir L. Ropner) has delivered. I must say that I repudiate all those allegations and I only wish that I had as much time as he has taken, in which to reply fully to the statements that he has made.
I think it is quite impossible for me to attempt to do any more than say that now. If there is a further opportunity I will try to deploy the case in full.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at sixteen minutes to One o'clock.